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LOCAL FOUNDATIONS AND MEDICAL RESEARCH 
SUPPORT IN INDIANAPOLIS AFTER 1945 
Philanthropy plays an important and often publicly visible role in modern 
medicine.  Names like Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Gates are associated with medicine 
both personally and through the foundations they created.  This phenomenon also played 
out on a local level, where communities are dotted with hospitals, university laboratories, 
and medical schools bearing the names of families who contributed to build, literally and 
figuratively, the institutions of medical research.  Little is known about these local 
philanthropists, including why they decided to support research and how they organized 
and carried out the work of grantmaking.  Consequently, there is no deep understanding 
of the value of their contributions.  I seek to remedy that omission through this study of 
the history and work of three small foundations dedicated to medical and scientific 
research and located in a single, midsized American city.  Ultimately this work considers 
a question fundamental to medical research philanthropy:  Can smaller foundations make 
a meaningful contribution to modern medical research given the scale, complexity, and 
cost of the work as well as the dominance of federal government funding?  This work 
concludes that the primary value of the foundations under study was not their financial 
support for research per se, but their flexible and sustained contributions to the local 
research infrastructure, including philanthropic investments that helped launch research 
projects and the careers of individual scientists; provided capital for needed physical 
space; and supported recruiting efforts to bring innovative and productive faculty 
members to staff new research and patient care departments.  The foundations in this 
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study, both individually and collectively, served as valuable strategic allies to the     
research institutions in their community.  As a result, the foundations contributed directly 
and meaningfully toward the expansion and improvement of the research institutions.  
The resulting growth in the size and reputation of these programs and facilities generated 
economic gain that benefitted the broader community.  This finding supports a call for 
the development of a more nuanced and complete understanding of the potential impact 
that smaller funders can have in a large and complicated system.   
 
Nancy Marie Robertson, Ph.D., Chair 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 Why Study Local Foundations that Support  
Medical Research?  
  Philanthropy plays an important and often public role in modern medicine. Names 
like Carnegie and Rockefeller, and more recently Hughes and Gates, are associated with 
medicine both personally and through the foundations they created.  This phenomenon 
played out on a local level as well, where communities are dotted with hospitals, 
university laboratories, and medical schools bearing the name of local families who 
contributed to build, literally and figuratively, the institutions of medicine and research.  
Medical philanthropy, in fact, was never limited to the very wealthy.  Individuals 
of even modest means found ways to contribute to organizations trying to defeat disease 
and improve health.  Americans chipped in to support the construction of new hospitals 
in their communities.  They bought Christmas Seals for the American Lung Association 
and canvased their neighborhoods collecting money to support the fight against polio, 
tuberculosis, or cancer.  Organizations referred to as voluntary health organizations 
aggregated small contributions and used the money to educate and advocate for increased 
government support for research in the organization’s chosen field.  Campaigns run by 
voluntary health organizations and local hospital funding drives gave individuals the 
opportunity to participate in the search for treatments for diseases that affected them, 
their families, and communities.   
Another source of medical research funding became popular in the 1950s and 
1960s as more individuals and families created private philanthropic foundations.  Many 
of these new foundations supported medical research either occasionally or exclusively as 
part of a larger philanthropic portfolio.  The growth of smaller foundations supporting 
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medical research grew as the largest foundations slowed or ceased their support of 
medical research.   
By the end of the Second World War, a new entity came to dominate medical 
research funding—the federal government.  The National Institutes of Health (NIH), in 
fact, became the largest single funder of medical research in the world.  Some traditional 
funders, including large foundations, felt that they could no longer have a meaningful 
impact on the direction of research and moved to work in other areas.  If funders with the 
capacity of Rockefeller and Carnegie felt crowded out by the size and influence of the 
national government, what role could smaller foundations play at their level of financial 
support?  Yet, small and midsized foundations continue to make grants to support 
medical research across the country. 
According to Foundation Center data, 9,087 (some 14%) of America’s nearly 
65,000 grantmaking foundations identified medical research support as a priority in 2016.  
These funds made 21,603 grants valued at more than $1.2 billion to medical researchers 
and institutions.1  Few foundations dedicated to medical research today are wealthy 
enough to take on projects of a size and scope reminiscent of early heavyweights like 
Rockefeller.  Only 390 foundations, or 4% of all foundations included in the 2016 census, 
managed assets of more than $100 million, while 188 foundations held over $500 million 
in assets.  Foundations managing smaller holdings distribute less annually.2  Additionally, 
                                                 
1  The Foundation Center’s online Foundation Directory was used to identify the number 
and asset value of foundations supporting medical research.  The search filtered for non-
governmental grantmakers located in the United States funding “researchers” working on 
“diseases and conditions” or “medical specialties” or “biology.”  
2 Under current United States Internal Revenue Service regulations, private grantmaking 
foundations must annually pay out at least 5% of the value of their endowment in 
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smaller organizations typically work without the assistance of professional or 
administrative staff.  There is no generally accepted standard for classifying foundations 
by size, though descriptions such as “small” and “midsized” are commonly used 
descriptors.  For purposes of this dissertation, a small foundation is one that manages less 
than $100 million, while a midsized foundation manages between $100 and $500 million.  
Research studies typically focus on single foundations that are either large or 
controversial, or both.  Alternately, some works examine the collective effort of 
foundation clusters in areas like education, advocacy, or social services.3  Individual 
foundations that could be described as midsized or smaller are typically omitted from 
scholarly consideration.  The focus on large foundations is not surprising.  Whales are 
more enticing than minnows; they are easier to spot and their potential impact is more 
visible. Yet, as in the natural world, smaller organizations far outnumber the larger ones 
and organizations of all sizes have influence on the entire system.  This study seeks to 
contribute to the broader understanding of foundations by examining one type of 
foundation typically omitted from review: smaller foundations.  
                                                 
furtherance of their charitable purpose.  Thus, a foundation with a $50,000,000 corpus 
will make an estimated annual payout of $2.5 million. 
3 Exemplary works include:  Helmut Anheier and David C. Hammack, eds. American 
Foundations:  Roles and Contributions (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2010); Lucy Bernholz, “Private Philanthropy and Public Schools: San Francisco in the 
1960s and 1970s” (PhD diss.: Stanford University, 1995). Daniel J. Kevles, 
“Foundations, Universities, and Trends in Support for the Physical and Biological 
Sciences, 1900-1992,” Daedalus 121, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 195-235; Raymond Blaine 
Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952); 
William H. Schneider, ed., Rockefeller Philanthropy and Modern Biomedicine:  
International Initiatives from World War I to the Cold War (Bloomington:  Indiana 
University Press, 2002). 
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This work examines the history of small and midsized private grantmaking 
foundations that supported medical research in one city, Indianapolis, Indiana, during the 
period between 1965 and 2016, the last year before several long-term foundation leaders 
retired Common approaches used by foundation historians include operational history, 
organizational and sector history, and often social history.4  Operational histories focus 
on how a single entity worked.5  Frequently, operational histories are commissioned by 
the organization, and are therefore of limited analytical value.  Both organizational and 
social histories take a larger view and consider a foundation or foundations within a 
larger context.  In these studies, foundations are considered one actor in a larger system 
and the focus in these studies is often on the larger system and not the component parts.6   
This investigation proposes a different and, perhaps, more precise approach by 
looking at a small group of foundations.  The three foundations identified in Table 1, 
below, are the focus of this work.  Each foundation was created between 1969 and 1985 
and has operated continuously in Indianapolis, Indiana.  These foundations are ripe for 
study as a group because they were founded within 20 years of one another in the same 
city, they are relatively similar in terms of size, and each foundation in this study donates 
exclusively to medical and scientific research. Other foundations working in the same 
community are also considered, but not at length. 
                                                 
4 Lucy Bernholz “The Future of Foundation History,” in Philanthropic Foundations: New 
Scholarship New Possibilities, ed. Ellen Condliffe Lagemann (Bloomington:  Indiana 
University Press, 1999), 362-365.   
5 For example, Raymond Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York:  
Harper and Brothers, 1952). 
6 For example, Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Big Foundations (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972); Kathleen D. McCarthy, American Creed: Philanthropy and the 
Rise of Civil Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Olivier Zunz, 
Philanthropy in America: A History (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2012).  
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Table 1: Three dedicated medical research foundations in Indianapolis.7 
 
Foundation Date Formed Assets (2016) 
Regenstrief Foundation 1969 $178,189,723 
Showalter Trust  
 
1973 $39,757,294 
Walther Cancer Foundation 1985 $146,762,412 
 
This study takes up the challenge issued by authors including David Hammack, 
Helmut Anheier, and Lucy Bernholz to deepen and enrich our understanding of the 
American foundation by examining the purpose, practices, and procedures developed and 
modified over time by a variety of types of foundations working in diverse fields and 
places.8  This work engages that challenge by looking at the development and choices 
that three foundations made to support medical research and then organize and carry out 
the work of grantmaking.  In addition to motivation and structural and operational 
decisions, this study also examines what Robert Kohler described as the “evolving 
partnerships between patrons and recipients.”9  These foundations participated in a set of 
steady relationships among and between grantmakers and recipients in a single 
community.  Ultimately, this study asks: How we can best assess and understand the 
impact of smaller foundations in both the areas they fund as well as on the broader 
communities where they work? 
 
                                                 
7 Information from the Foundation Center “990 Finder” at foundationcenter.org. 
8 David C. Hammack and Helmut Anheier, A Versatile American Institution: The 
Changing Ideals and Realities of Philanthropic Foundations (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 2013); Bernholz, “The Future of Foundation History,” 372-373. 
9 Robert E. Kohler, Partners in Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991): 2.  
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1.  Animating research questions.  
Answering this core question requires addressing a number of smaller questions.  
This work explores many questions: Why do funders choose to support medical research 
despite the complexity and challenges of working in this area?  How do these foundations 
organize to make funding choices?  How do they structure their contributions?  Does 
evidence demonstrate whether these gifts advanced research?  What types of 
relationships do small and midsized funds develop with external actors, including 
potential and actual recipients? How do these relationships influence an organization’s 
behavior?  Finally, do these foundations share common traits or characteristics that might 
inform future research on and practice of smaller and locally-orientated foundations?  
These questions—and many others—remain largely unaddressed by current literature.  
Smaller foundations are rarely studied.  Therefore, answering these questions will 
help fill a gap in current knowledge about the nature, behavior, and value of smaller 
foundations in general and their roles in contemporary medical research in particular. 
This work is built on the historic and operational records maintained by the three 
foundations at the heart of this study as well as other relevant literature and archives.  The 
three organizations highlighted in this study have provided generous access to their files, 
records, and archives.  Their openness and cooperation made this work possible.  
2.  What are the challenges of choosing medical research funding?   
Medical research is not for the faint of heart.  It is complex and agonizingly slow. 
As one researcher put it, “New knowledge about disease has a fifteen to twenty-five year 
gestation from basic discovery to clinical application, an interval that may be 
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lengthening.”10  Individual projects often focus only on a narrow part of a larger problem.  
The complexity and interrelated nature of scientific research require the participation of a 
growing number of specialists and technicians.  The researcher toiling alone in a 
laboratory is no longer the vehicle of medical research, if indeed it ever was.  
Collaborations sprawl across specialized disciplines, organizations, and geography.  
Working over time and distance can consume energy and time. Fights over primacy on a 
research team or ownership of resulting intellectual property can distract from work and 
even derail projects.  In clinical research, shortages of qualified investigators and willing 
patients can stall progress and derail agendas.11  Government regulations touch many 
aspects of medical science and add further challenge to the work.  Rules and regulations 
impact the operation of laboratories, control of materials and specimens, protection of 
confidential health information, all aspects of clinical testing, and patient protection. 
Another fundamental challenge of contemporary research is its high and growing 
cost.  Research project budgets cover the cost of highly trained specialists such as 
physicians, research scientists, students, and assistants.  Other costs include the 
acquisition, maintenance, and operation of sophisticated laboratories and facilities; 
acquisition of materials; hazardous waste use and disposal; information technology; and 
data storage.  Medical research often includes expenses associated with patient recruiting 
and care as well as regulatory compliance.  This list of expenses is daunting.  Even with a 
solid research design and sufficient resources, success is elusive.  
                                                 
10 Hamilton Moses, III, M.D., et. al, “The Anatomy of Medical Research: US and 
International Comparisons” JAMA. 313(2): 174-189 (2015): 181, 
doi:10.1001/jama.2014.15939. 
11 Nancy S. Sung, et al; “Central Challenges Facing the National Clinical Research 
enterprise,” JAMA 289(10) (March 12, 2003) :1278-1287  doi:10.1001/jama.289.10.1278. 
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Strategic grantmaking requires foundations to undertake a sophisticated and 
multi-variable analysis of a grant’s potential impact.  It is necessary to understand and 
evaluate the proposed scientific work.  Foundations must weigh technical proposals, 
assessing the promise of work and weighing that potential against the value of competing 
options.  The need for sophisticated assessment does not stop at examining the proposals.  
Once work is underway, it is important to track and evaluate progress.  Is the funded 
work moving as promised?  Is continued funding necessary or appropriate?  Funders 
must feel confident that they can peek behind the researchers’ often rosy assessment and 
reach their own conclusion. Even large foundations with professional staff may lack the 
technical acumen to evaluate the scientific merit of a program or proposal internally. 
Compensating for the absence of expertise means identifying experts willing and able to 
assist the organization voluntarily or the resources to compensate them.  
In addition to assessing the scientific quality of a proposal, this work urges that 
foundations should also consider the important secondary impact of grant funding.  
Philanthropic funding does more than allow a particular line of research to move forward.  
Grant funds generate benefits beyond the project.  Consequently, and in addition to 
weighing the promise of science, funders should also understand what a grant could mean 
to the institution receiving funds and to that institution’s community.  Will the grant 
allow the institution to add new employees to expand the capacity of a research team or 
department beyond what currently exists?  Will the money support construction or 
improvement of a physical facility and thereby create benefits for local companies and 
laborers?  Does the grant facilitate an expansion of care services to patients?  Thoughtful 
consideration of the benefits a grant might bring to an institution and to a community is 
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additional work in an already complicated process, but it is an essential step for a funder 
who wishes to bring a strategic approach to their grantmaking.12 
Finally, scientific and medical discovery can be agonizingly slow.  Foundations 
eager for quick and visible return on investment could easily lose patience. Given the 
complexity of medical research, the high cost of working in the area, and the time it takes 
to accomplish anything worthwhile, the question will inevitably be asked: why do 
foundations continue to make grants to medical researchers rather than selecting a 
different focus for their work?   
3. What motivates foundations to choose medical research? 
Literature focused on donor motivations more generally is extensive.  Authors 
suggest motivations ranging from selfless to self-serving.13  Researchers examining the 
narrower question of why wealthy individuals choose to form charitable foundations span 
a similar and often more politically ideological spectrum.14  Fewer studies examine the 
                                                 
12 William McKersie provides a useful discussion of locally-focused strategic 
philanthropy in, “Local Philanthropy Matters:  Pressing Issues for Research and 
Practice,” in Philanthropic Foundations, 329-358.  FIRST MENTION—you need full 
cite 
13 Waldemar Nielsen, The Big Foundations, 1st ed. (New York:  Columbia University 
Press, 1973); Warren Weaver, U. S. Philanthropic Foundations, (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1967); Susan Ostrander and Paul A. Schervish, “Giving and Getting:  Philanthropy 
as a Social Relation,” in Critical issues in American Philanthropy. John Van Til, ed. (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990). 
14 Foundation critics argue that the wealthy use the foundation as a tool to engage in self-
serving efforts to improve their public image, assuage personal guilt, or advance their 
interests and as well as those of the elite classes.  Others challenge the organizations as 
anti-democratic consolidations of private wealth.  See, for example, the works Robert F. 
Arnove, Philanthropic and Cultural Imperialism:  The Foundations at Home and Abroad 
(Boston:  G.K. Hall, 1980); Teresa Odendahl, Charity Begins at Home:  Generosity and 
Self-Interest Among the Philanthropic Elite (New York:  Basic Books, 1990); James T. 
Bennett, Health Research Charities:  Image and Reality (Washington D.C.:  Capital 
Research Center, 1990); Mark Dowie, American Foundations: An Investigative History, 
(Cambridge:  MIT Press, 2001).  Authors including Joel Fleishman take a more generous 
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reasons for selecting one particular area of work over another or for maintaining that 
focus in cases where the foundation’s organizational documents allow subsequent 
decision makers the latitude to change.  This work focuses on a more specific question:  
What motivates foundations to dedicate their funds to medical research?  The remainder 
of this section discusses the theories and literature addressing this question. 
The most common popular theory about why a charitable funder chooses to 
support medical research, either personally or through a foundation, centers on the 
“grateful patient” concept.  This theory posits that patients or their loved ones will 
develop a relationship of gratitude with some part of the medical establishment that 
motivates philanthropic giving.  An emerging body of literature explores this concept, 
though almost exclusively from the angle of examining potential ethical challenges that 
arise in these situations or from the more positively oriented language of professional 
literature encouraging more effective exploitation of the provider’s link to the patient.15 
No identified literature considers this phenomenon as a motivation to begin a foundation 
or to direct the resources of an existing foundation toward this work, though question of 
whether the grateful patient theory applies to the creation or governance of a foundation 
is worthy of future exploration. 
                                                 
view, suggesting that the overarching reason for placing personal wealth into foundations 
is to “create a vehicle for promoting large-scale, lasting social change.”  Joel Fleishman, 
The Foundation:  A Great American Secret How Private Wealth is Changing the World, 
(New York:  PublicAffairs, 2007), 40. 
15 Rosalyn Stewart, et al. “Success in Grateful Patient Philanthropy: Insights from 
Experienced Physicians” The American Journal of Medicine, (2001) 124 no. 12; Scott M. 
Wright, Leah Wolfe, Roslyn Stewart, et al. “Ethical Concerns Related to Grateful Patient 
Philanthropy,” Journal of General Internal Medicine (2013) 28: 645. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11606-012-2246-7. 
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Historians provide some insight into why large American foundations supported 
medical research at the beginning of the twentieth century.  Steven C. Wheatley identifies 
a philosophical and strategic motive, one that grew out of the popular Progressive-era 
orientation known as scientific philanthropy.  Scientific philanthropists acted out of a 
combination of fear and confidence.  They feared that unrestricted benevolence served 
only to foster dependence.  This risk could be avoided, however, through application of 
scientific reason and efficiency toward efforts to solve social problems at their root.  
Scientific philanthropists preferred a permanent cure to the temporary relief of symptoms.  
Medical research, Wheatley argues, provided an ideal target for practitioners of this new 
philosophy of philanthropy.  An investment in medical research “would constitute the 
most basic and symbolic expression of the ideal of scientific philanthropy:  the quest for 
disease cures was much more important than mere mitigation of suffering.”16 
Consequently, foundations interested in addressing problems of health would use their 
funds to empower scientists and physicians to find cures and treatments 
 In American Foundations and the Funding of Science, Kenneth Prewitt argues 
that for industrial barons like John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie, medical and 
scientific research was logically connected to their commercial endeavors.  Rockefeller, 
for example, “built his wealth through the exploitation of scientific and technological 
advances and it took no great leap of imagination to appreciate the ways in which science 
could realize other human purposes, especially that of improved health.”17 Prewitt 
                                                 
16 Steven Wheatley, The Politics of Philanthropy: Abraham Flexner and Medical 
Education; (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988). 
17 Kenneth Prewitt, “American Foundations and the Funding of Science,” Essays on 
Philanthropy, No. 21, Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, (1996), 6. 
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suggests that these donors were attracted to opportunities that allowed them to apply 
trusted methods and technologies to new problems.   
Another potential factor motivating a donor to choose medical research is the 
influence of donor’s trusted advisor.  Rockefeller’s selection of medicine as a central 
subject of his philanthropy resulted from the urging of his personal advisor, Frederick 
Gates, a former minister with a personal interest in medicine.  Andrew Carnegie was 
encouraged to support the reform of medical research at the urging of his advisor, Henry 
S. Pritchett.  In their profile of the Commonwealth Fund, A. McGehee Harvey and Susan 
L. Abrams noted that the large medical and educational foundations of the early twentieth 
century shared one characteristic: “the presence of strong administrators” who led their 
patrons toward the support of medical research.18  
Administrators in early, large foundations exerted influence on questions beyond 
who would receive funding.  They also determined the form that gifts took.  In Partners 
in Science, Foundations in Natural Science: 1900-1945, Robert Kohler traces the 
evolution of private support for research from the block grants to institutions that were 
common in the 1920s to the current preference for grants to individual researchers.  The 
movement in the 1930s away from block grants and to individual grants, Kohler argues, 
was driven partly by the fact that even the largest foundations could no longer make the 
capital investment required to support research institutions.  Instead, these funders moved 
to smaller, less costly individual grants and “hundreds of medical foundations followed 
                                                 
18 A. McGehee Harvey and Susan Abrams, For the Welfare of Mankind: The 
Commonwealth Fund and American Medicine (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 2. 
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the leaders into research in the 1940s and 1950s, doling out their modest funds to worthy 
subjects.”19  
A contemporary director of a medical research foundation suggests that 
serendipity and personal acquaintance are often significant in a foundation’s decision to 
select medical research as an area of grantmaking focus.  Notably, this proposal does not 
come from a scholarly source.  Instead the author is a participant-observer in the system 
he critiques.  His remarks and reflections can be regarded as primary source material 
worthy of consideration and examination.  Greg Simon, head of the medical research 
foundation FasterCures, finds that many donors enter medical research inadvertently.  
Individuals with money to give typically turn to their own past, perhaps their university, a 
doctor who treated an early illness, or a friend or neighbor who works in medicine, in 
search of an idea and winds up supporting a suggested area of scientific inquiry.20 In 
other cases, Simon suggests, a wealthy donor may be intrigued by a chance encounter 
with a provocative researcher who occupied a nearby seat on a flight or at a social 
event.21 Simon’s idea extends the theory of the trusted advisor as motivator.  He observes 
that a chance encounter can be sufficient to motivate some donors to action. 
                                                 
19 Robert E. Kohler, “Philanthropy and Science,” Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 129, no. 1 (March 1, 1985): 9-13. 
20 Simon presented his critical view of the nature of donor selection during The Arthur C. 
Frantzreb Lecture at Indiana University’s Center on Philanthropy 19th Annual 
Symposium, “Health and Philanthropy:  Leveraging Change.”  His remarks were 
published as:  Greg Simon, “Entrepreneurial Philanthropy and Innovative Medical 
Research: The Arthur C. Frantzreb Lecture at Indiana University’s Center on 
Philanthropy 19th Annual Symposium: ‘Health and Philanthropy: Leveraging Change’,” 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 37, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 6S -16S. 
21 Simon, “Entrepreneurial Philanthropy,”12S. 
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What Simon concludes is that contemporary donors, like their philanthropic 
predecessors, are likely to enter medical research as a result of personal contacts or even 
chance encounters.  His comments suggest that unlike the large funders of the past who 
depended on trusted and long-term philanthropic advisors, smaller contemporary funders 
may act in response to fleeting contacts or the recommendations of individuals who are 
less likely to have the donor and their strategic goals in mind.   
When answering questions about motivation, it is important to be mindful of a 
simple reality:  smaller foundations have less to spend on any effort.  Regardless of the 
motivation, a donor or a foundation that decides to support medical research must possess 
both a desire to improve health or cure a disease and the belief that this goal can be 
accomplished through their contributions.  For a very large foundation, it is possible to 
make grants significant enough to advance an effort in a meaningful way or to bring 
sufficient public attention to a problem to move it onto the public agenda so that others, 
including wealthier public and private actors, will contribute. Few foundations occupy 
that rare space.  Consider, for example, the Gates Foundation’s efforts to address the 
challenges of HIV/AIDS, including supporting research on a vaccine.  The Gates 
Foundation has made grants of nearly $4 billion to AIDS-related research and care 
delivery.  In 1999, Gates made a $25 million grant to the International AIDS Vaccine 
Initiative, a gift that immediately doubled the initiative’s development efforts.22  
However, the Gates Foundation itself recognizes that its resources “represent only a small 
                                                 
22 “Bill and Melinda Gates Make $25 Million Grant to International AIDS Vaccine 
Initiative.” Gates Foundation last modified May, 1999, 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-Center/Press-Releases/1999/05/International-
AIDS-Vaccine-Initiative (1999). 
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portion of worldwide funding” committed to the effort.23  Consequently, smaller funders 
working in medical research soon face the reality that their ability to solve a problem is 
limited.  It is reasonable to consider how this practical fact influences a smaller donor or 
foundation’s decision to begin or persist in medical research funding.   
Researchers and authors who have examined donor motivation typically did so 
through the lens of the large funders. There are many intriguing issues around the 
question of motivation and smaller funders.  Do smaller foundations respond to different 
factors or express other motivations, or do all donors, regardless of size, respond to the 
same influences?  Did historical factors encourage or discourage donors toward medical 
research support?  For example, did smaller foundations created in the decades following 
the Second World War choose medical research support simply to mimic the major 
foundations in both purpose and method, as Kohler suggests, or were post-1950s 
foundations acting on a different set of motivations and in response to a different set of 
influences?  Were they influenced by the success of voluntary health organizations like 
the American Cancer Society and the March of Dimes?  What role, if any, did the 
changing relationship between the lay public and medicine in the post-war decades have 
in donors’ decisions to support medical research?24  Did persuasive outsiders or events 
influence contemporary benefactors toward medical research, or do smaller donors, like 
                                                 
23 “What We Do:  HIV Strategy Overview.  The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,” 
Gates Foundation, accessed May 30, 2016, www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-
Do/Global-
Health/HIV#bodyregion_0_interiorarticle_0_strategysections_2_strategysubsections003d
5bb5b7d94917b0e1f (May 30, 2016).  
24 Creager, “Mobilizing Biomedicine”; Keith Wailoo, “Sovereignty and Science: 
Revisiting the Role of Science in the Construction and Erosion of Medical Dominance,” 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 29, no. 4-5 (August, 2004): 643-660. 
 16 
their larger predecessors, act on the counsel of trusted advisors?  This work takes up these 
questions in the context of three foundations that are smaller and more locally focused 
than the foundations studied in existing literature.  
4.  How do medical research foundations organize their work and make funding 
choices?   
 
All foundations, regardless of size or purpose, engage in one essential task: they 
decide how to allocate financial resources.  These decisions are not made in sterile 
conditions.  In addition to internal factors, like operational policies and grantmaking 
philosophy, foundation choices are subtly and not so subtly swayed by a variety of 
factors including the foundation’s giving philosophy, its organizational culture, and 
external factors that cross the transom and enter the decision process.25  Additionally, 
powerful external influences exert power on decision making, particularly the “complex 
interactions between and among people,” including both the personal relationships of 
individuals engaged in the decision-making process and the institutional relationships 
between the foundation and other entities. 26  In medical research funding, the most 
critical relationships exist between the foundation and the relatively limited number of 
actual and potential recipients working in the area of research preferred by the funder.   
Relationships between foundations and other organizations are not one way, 
running only from the funder to the recipient.27  Rather, foundations are engaged in a 
                                                 
25 Bernholz, “The Future of Foundation History,” 359-375. 
26 William Bloomfield, “Grantmaking Foundations in America:  Analyzing the Process 
and Practice of Philanthropic Decision-Making,” (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 
2002), 130. See also McKersie, “Local Philanthropy Matters,” 340-342, on local 
foundations and organizational interdependency. 
27 Lester M. Salamon, Alan J. Abramson, and Nonprofit Sector Project, The Federal 
Budget and the Nonprofit Sector (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1982); Peter 
Dobkin Hall, “Abandoning the Rhetoric of Independence:  Reflections on the Nonprofit 
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relationship of exchange, what Susan Ostrander and Paul Schervish labeled the “social 
relation of giving and getting.”28  The benefits to the recipient are obvious.  When 
foundations make grants, recipients receive needed direct financial support as well as 
increased prestige resulting from the external validation of their work.  Validation from 
external sources is particularly valued in medical science.  Other individuals and 
organizations in the general community obtain indirect benefits from these gifts, such as 
the potential for improved health care and, particularly in the context of medical research 
grants, the opportunity for economic development.29  This exchange creates “multifaceted 
and complex” interdependent relationships between the foundation and others beyond the 
recipient.30   
Foundation literature contains a growing list of works that have explored 
questions of mutual influence and sector and organizational dependence and 
                                                 
Sector in the Post-Liberal Era,” in Shifting the Debate: Public/Private Sector Relations in 
the Modern Welfare State, ed. Susan A. Ostrander, Stuart Langton, and Jon Van Til (New 
York:  Transaction Publishers, 1987), 11-28; Jon Van Til, Critical Issues in American 
Philanthropy: Strengthening Theory and Practice (New York:  Jossey-Bass Inc., 1990); 
Bernholz, “Private Philanthropy and Public Schools.” 
28 Susan Ostrander and Paul A. Schervish, “Giving and Getting:  Philanthropy as a social 
relation,” in Critical issues in American Philanthropy, ed. John Van Til (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1990): 67-98. 
29 A recent report prepared for BioCrossroads, a biomedical industry group in Indiana 
reported that from 2005 to 2010, the Indiana Economic Development Corporation 
(IEDC) identified an estimated 14,500 new life sciences jobs and nearly $1.8 billion in 
projected capital investment from life sciences companies.  Walter Plosila, Indiana Life 
Sciences Industry 2002-2010:  Tracking Progress and Charting a Course for Continued 
Success (Indianapolis:  BioCrossroads, 2010) available at:  
https://www.ibrc.indiana.edu/studies/Indiana-Life-Sciences-Industry-Report-2002-
2010.pdf. 
30 William McKersie, “Strategic Philanthropy and Local Public Policy: Lessons from 
Chicago School Reform, 1987-1993” (Ph.D. diss. University of Chicago, 1998), 35. 
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interdependence in foundation decision making in particular contexts.31  Lucy Bernholz 
and William McKersie, who both examined foundations that supported education reform 
efforts in single cities, provide insights into questions of influence and interdependence in 
a similar context to the one in this study.  Both authors examined the nature of the 
relationships between foundations and nonprofit agencies working on reform projects in 
public schools.  These researchers found high levels of organizational interdependence.  
Beyond the expected flow of money from donor to recipient, McKersie, for example, 
found extensive interaction between professionals and a consistent flow of ideas between 
foundation and agency.32 These were two-way, interactive exchanges rather than top-
down flows from funder to recipient.  McKersie’s conception of sectorial relations built 
on work by Peter Dobkin Hall who explored three types of links between sectors: fiscal 
ties, overlapping career patterns, and substantive connections.33  
This study applies those findings in the context of a highly technical field.  
Foundations commonly rely on expert information to understand funding options and to 
evaluate work. Large foundations are able to bring this expertise inside the organization, 
perhaps by hiring experts or bringing them into board roles.  Smaller foundations may 
have neither the revenue nor the clout to do this.  How do such foundations cope with this 
                                                 
31 Bernholz, “Private Philanthropy and Public Schools” (education reform); William 
McKersie, “Local Philanthropy Matters” (education reform); William A. Diaz, “The 
Behavior of Foundations in an Organizational Frame: A Case Study,” Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 25, no. 4 (December 1, 1996): 453 -469 (social services).  
John R. Thelin and Richard W. Trollinger, Philanthropy and American Higher Education 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) (higher education).  
32 William S. McKersie, “Strategic Philanthropy and Local Public Policy”; Bernholz, 
“Private Philanthropy and Public Schools.” 
33 Peter Dobkin Hall, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector and Other Essays on Philanthropy, 
Voluntarism, and Nonprofit Organizations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1992), 100-104. 
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deficit?  One option is to attempt to find independent advisors to help sort and process 
technical information.  Another option is to lean on actual and prospective donors for 
information. Potential recipients may even be expected to prescreen and select the best 
candidates for funding.  Of course, an organization may use all three of these strategies or 
develop others. Small foundations that lack the expertise needed to work effectively in an 
area may develop a heightened form of dependence on other organizations and this fact 
may shape and alter their work in significant ways. For example, organizations that 
become dependent on their recipients are more likely to become tightly tethered to the 
institutions’ strategic agenda rather than forming and advancing their own.   
Another way to assess how organizations manage external influences is to 
examine the formal decision-making structures that organizations develop, follow, and 
revise.  In the context of a grantmaking, decision processes include both the mechanism 
that the organization puts in place to solicit grants and the process it uses to select 
recipients and evaluate their work.  The nature of the decision-making processes that an 
organization follows reveals important information about the organization.  Several 
thoughtful works have introduced theories of organizational sociology and political 
science as lenses for examining these processes.34 This work uses an historical approach 
to examine these same questions because historical examination includes consideration 
not just of the structure of decision processes or the outcome of particular choices, but 
also of the broad context leading to and surrounding the development of ways of 
                                                 
34 For example, see Bernholz, “Private Philanthropy and Public Schools”; William 
McKersie, “Strategic Philanthropy and Local Public Policy”; William A. Diaz, “The 
Behavior of Foundations in an Organizational Frame:  A Case Study,” Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 25, no. 4 (December 1, 1996): 453-69. 
https://doi.org/10/117/0899764096254004. 
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working. History is an ideal lens for evaluating the ways that social relationships shape 
and challenge internal organizational processes. 
Decision processes can act as gatekeepers by controlling who may influence a 
decision and directing the points in the process when they can be heard.  A process can 
also reveal how receptive, even encouraging, foundations are to outside influence, 
including from actual or prospective recipients, external consultants, community 
members, and other grant makers.  For example, applications can be reviewed using a 
blind or double-blind process similar to those often used by academic journals. 
Alternately, organizations take a completely opposite approach and invite potential 
recipients to make their case for support personally.  This work will explore the processes 
created and used by two midsized and one small foundation as a means for examining the 
manner in which these organizations respond to influence. 
5.  What value can foundations, particularly smaller ones, bring to the medical 
research endeavor? 
 
Little academic literature explores the contributions of small foundations working 
in a particular area.  This dissertation examines the actions of one small community of 
foundations and serves as a study of ways that smaller organizations contribute to 
medical research.  Cataloguing the type and form of support that foundations have 
provided sheds light on the question of how these foundations provide unique support or 
duplicate the contributions of others.  
The most frequently identified role for philanthropic funders is their willingness 
to support innovation, test new ideas, develop new methods of working, or support 
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untested concepts.35 In the context of medical research, funding new and untested 
researchers or projects is necessary.36  Indeed, many scholars and practitioners consider 
the willingness to provide venture support the most valuable role that foundations play.37 
The other two primary sources of medical research funding, government and private 
industry, are not likely to fund the early or start-up phase of science.  Constituent 
pressures, whether from voters or shareholders, push government and private industry 
funders toward funding with an eye on return on investment.   
Early stage work is naturally speculative.  Government and industry are inclined 
to fund proven concepts, which are typically closer to a practical and commercial payoff.  
Thus, innovative but unproven concepts—as well as innovative but unproven 
researchers—struggle to find funding.  This work provides an opportunity to evaluate the 
extent to which the subject foundations stepped into roles like the innovator, risk-taker, 
and gap-filler.  It also explores the possibility that these foundations may mimic the work 
of their forefathers, the large foundations of the early twentieth century, in that their 
essential value is the contributions they make to building and sustaining the infrastructure 
needed to perform research.  
  
                                                 
35 Barry Karl, “Funding Science: An Adventure in Public History,” Reviews in American 
History 23, no. 3 (September 1, 1995): 496-501; also, Anheier and Hammack, American 
Foundations; Peter Frumkin, On Being Nonprofit: A Conceptual and Policy Primer 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
36 Robert I. Field et al., “Toward A Policy Agenda on Medical Research Funding: Results 
of A Symposium,” Health Affairs, 22, no. 3 (May 1, 2003): 224 -230; K.R. Matherlee, 
“The Outlook for Clinical Research: Impacts of Federal Funding Restraint and Private 
Sector Reconfiguration,” Academic Medicine: Journal of the Association of American 
Medical Colleges 70, no. 12 (December 1995): 1065-72; B L 
37 Moses, “The Anatomy of Medical Research”, 1339. 
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6. Research design.  
This work explores a small community of medical research foundations and 
focuses on three foundations.  Original documents from the three organizations provide a 
meaningful look into the creation and the operation of these foundations.  This study 
allows us to learn more about questions relevant not just to the foundations discussed in 
the study, but also to many other grantmaking funds across the country.  For example, 
this work considers the factors that motivated the individuals who started these 
foundations to fund medical research over other options.  That information can enhance 
our understanding of other foundation founders and other grantmaking foundations and 
guide efforts to frame new questions for future research.  This work also tells us how 
these individual organizations created and recreated ways of working with and relating to 
other organizations in their community.  This study necessarily involves a look at the 
work and choices of other actors in the community, particularly the institutions and 
individuals engaged in medical research, in one place, Central Indiana over a fifty-year 
period.  
Because this work focuses on foundations located in a single city working in the 
same period of time, often with the same recipient institutions, the subjects experienced 
many of the same environmental pressures.  Consequently, it is possible to compare 
organizational strategies followed by these foundations without the need to consider 
significant differences in the ambient environment. Analyzing a community of 
foundations creates a more complex picture than a snapshot of a single foundation.  It is 
possible to diagram lines of influence between funders, as well as those between donors 
and recipients, and to ask questions such as whether these foundations chose to compete 
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or cooperate.  Foundations act within communities and their efforts naturally have 
consequences for others in the community, including those who are supported by the 
foundation.  This study creates the opportunity to examine not just what the granting 
organizations funded, but also how these funds, and even the potential for funds, caused 
the recipient organizations to behave. 
7.  Dissertation structure and content. 
This study is organized into five chapters.  Chapter One has provided an overview 
of the project, including a discussion of the questions that animated this work, the reasons 
such examination is needed, the methods employed, and the contributions this study can 
make to our understanding of both smaller foundations and medical research support 
organizations.   
Chapter Two provides a broad, general overview of the history of foundation 
support for medical research in America since 1865.  At the core of this section is the 
story of the emergence and growth of America as a medical research powerhouse.  
Among other things, the chapter sets out the roles that nonprofit foundations have played 
over time as instigators, reformers, advocates, and funders.  This section also includes a 
brief discussion of the ways that medical research is financed today to inform 
consideration of how foundations can engage in the system now.   
Chapters Three and Four are the heart of this work.  They examine the creation 
and evolution of three Indianapolis foundations that focused exclusively on medical 
research support:  the Regenstrief Foundation, the Ralph W. and Grace M. Showalter 
Research Trust (hereafter, the Showalter Trust), and the Walther Cancer Foundation, Inc. 
(hereafter the Walther Foundation).  These three foundations were created in Indianapolis 
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within ears of one another and each dedicated its giving exclusively to medical and 
scientific research. They operated in Central Indiana and worked in the same city at the 
same time and provided a lens to compare the choices and activities of multiple 
organizations doing similar work.  The organizing themes of this study—motivation, 
method of work, organizational relationships, and purpose—weave through these 
chapters.  They are organized to cover two brief, but significant, periods in the lives of 
these organizations.  Two of these organizations are classified as midsized, Regenstrief 
and Walther, while Showalter is a small foundation.  Chapter Three looks at the creation 
and early growth of each foundation.  This period provides insight into motivations for 
selecting medical research and the influence of external relationships on foundation 
choice and direction.   
Chapter Four examines the work of the foundations as mature entities.  During 
these years the maturing and mature organizations were forced to react to significant 
internal and external challenges.  Founding donors and original donors left the 
organization.  Relationships with external partners, including grant recipients, evolved 
and changed.  The stock market drove great growth and ultimately significant decline in 
the value of foundation assets.  Political and healthcare leaders in Central Indiana, as in 
many communities in the country, looked to emerging research disciplines like genetics, 
biomedical engineering, and informatics as engines of local economic growth adding new 
external pressure to the complexities of medical innovation.  Chapter Four will examine 
how the organizations in my study responded to these challenges.   
  Chapter Five will set out conclusions from the study, reflect on their meaning, 
and suggest areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A Brief History of Philanthropic Support of 
Medical Research in the United States since 1865 
Philanthropic support is only a relatively small part of current funding for medical 
research in the United States. American universities and colleges spent over $71 billion 
on scientific research and development in 2016.  Indiana universities received nearly $1.4 
billion that year, up from approximately $1 billion 10 years earlier.38  University research 
budgets rely on three extramural sources:  federal and state government, private industry, 
and philanthropy.  The federal government dominates the research funding landscape.  
The National Institutes of Health alone provided over $53.3 billion in research support in 
2016, or 75% of the $71 billion spent on medical research that year, making it the largest 
single research funder in the world.39  For comparison, the United States government 
allocated almost $60 billion toward other non-defense research and development in 
2016.40  
Though the public budget is large, it supports only a part of America’s ongoing 
research effort at universities, colleges, hospitals, and research institutes. Private industry 
and investors interested in the potential financial rewards from successful commercial 
ventures fund significant medical research that occurs both in industry laboratories and in 
                                                 
38 These totals identify the cost of all organized research projects covered by the 
institutions with separately accountable funds. Katherine Hale, Ronda Britt and Michael 
Gibbons, “Higher Education R&D Spending:  Spending and Funding Sources Differ by 
State, NSF 19-202” accessed March 7, 2019, 
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2019/nsf19303/.  
39 Roderik F. Viegever and Thom C.C. Hendriks, “The 10 largest public and 
philanthropic funders of health research in the world: what they fund and how they 
distribute their funds,” Health Research Policy and Systems 14, no. 12 (2016). 
40 “Trends in Federal R&D, FY 1976-2018,” accessed April 30, 2019, 
https://www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/historical-trends-federal-rd. 
 26 
universities and hospitals.  Higher education institutions also allocate resources to this 
work. 
The contribution from philanthropy contributes the smallest amount to the 
research endeavor, but as this study will show it plays a role in research support that 
exceeds the proportion of funds it provides.  In 2016, nonprofit organizations contributed 
$4.6 billion toward research and development at higher education institutions or 6.1% of 
the total research and development expenditures that fiscal year.41  This total combines all 
nonprofit organizations, including public charities, particularly voluntary health 
organizations (like the American Heart Association), medical research organizations (like 
the Howard Hughes Medical Institute), and private foundations of all types.  “Private 
foundations and public charities, though small, play an essential role in filling [a] gap, 
especially for the most speculative undertakings or where commercial incentives are 
insufficient.”42   
According to Foundation Center data, over 9,000 grantmaking foundations 
identified medical research support as a priority in their grantmaking in 2016.  Only 4% 
(390) of these foundations managed assets in exceeding $100 million.  Although 
nonprofits’ share of the overall funding total is small, these dollars are increasingly 
valuable to researchers and scholars because they fill important gaps left by other 
funders.  Specifically, philanthropic funders are willing to fund early and highly 
                                                 
41 Katherine Hale, Ronda Britt, and Michael Gibbons, “Higher Education R&D 
Spending:  Spending and Funding Sources Differ by State,” National Science Foundation 
InfoBriefs, NSF 19-303, March 7, 2019. 
42 Moses, “The anatomy of medical research,” 1339.  
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speculative work, including supporting the needs of young scientists and unproven 
work.43  
To understand how private philanthropy has come to this role in funding in the 
United States, it is necessary to review some of the major historical changes in medicine 
and how research is done in such institutions as hospitals, medical schools, and research 
universities.  This chapter outlines the history of medical research in the United States 
since the 1800s as well as the structure of and challenges facing contemporary medical 
research, including funding and the role that the nonprofit sector plays in that ecosystem.  
1.  Strengthening the “withered arm of science”:  The roots of the American      
medical revolution, 1865 to 1900.  
 
Prior to the American Civil War, the United States lagged well behind Europe in 
scientific research productivity.  America generally lacked capacity to staff and support 
the institutions needed for meaningful scientific research.  Like much else in the post-war 
years, this situation would begin to change.  The practice of medicine as it is known 
today emerged during the second half of the 1800s, and this and other developments laid 
the foundations for an evolution in both higher and medical education and a resulting 
explosion of research in America.   
During the 1800s, the practice of medicine began to transition from a trade to a 
profession. Organized medical schools gradually replaced apprenticeships as the way to 
educate doctors.  The earliest medical schools in America were formed by medical 
                                                 
43 Moses, “The Anatomy of Medical Research,” 1339; also, “U.S. Funding of Health 
Research Stalls as Other Nations Rev Up, National Public Radio,” January 13, 2015, 1:00 
p.m., accessed August 12, 2015 at http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2015/01/13/376801357/u-s-funding-of-health-research-stalls-as-other-nations-rev-
up. 
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societies and run in association with existing universities.44  Most universities, however, 
were primarily concerned with training clergy and took only limited interest in the study 
of science; existing medical schools were occupied with training doctors in the work, but 
not necessarily the science, of medicine.  During thirty-five years between the end of the 
war and the beginning of the twentieth century, a number of changes essential to the 
transformation of medical care as well as education and training took place. 
The first change involved growth in the number of hospitals.  Before 1865 
hospitals were few and far between and the quality of care was low.45 Treatments for 
serious illnesses and injuries were lacking or crude, and sound sanitary practices were 
often unknown and absent resulting in high mortality rates in most hospitals.  In most 
communities, individual providers took care of patients at home.  In the decades 
following the end of the Civil War, hospitals were built to meet growing needs, 
particularly in urban areas.  The number of hospitals increased from one hundred in 1870 
to over 6,000 in 1920.46 
A second development necessary for advancement of medicine was the 
unification around a standard approach to care.  For much of the 1800s, the profession 
was bedeviled by conflicts between mainline providers, often called “regulars,” and 
practitioners in medical sects, or “irregulars,” organized around a defined set of 
therapeutic concepts.  Irregular sects included hydrotherapy (internal or external 
application of water), Thomsonianism (botanical medicine), homeopathy (treatment of 
                                                 
44 James H. Cassedy, Medicine in America: A Short History, (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991): 26. 
45 Ibid., 67.  
46 Ibid, 73. 
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disease with drugs eliciting similar symptoms), and eclecticism (crafted from the most 
preferred aspects of other therapeutic sects).  Squabbling between these sects occupied 
many physicians’ time.  By the post-war years, most of this open conflict subsided, the 
regulars prevailed as the dominant philosophy, and doctors were able to turn their 
attention to the more urgent matters of improving medical education and fostering 
scientific research.  Footnote? 
As late as 1865, physician-owners of proprietary medical schools taught most 
aspiring doctors.  The more rapacious of these owners operated degree mills that handed 
medical credentials to any tuition-paying white male.  Most medical education remained 
dismal and lacked meaningful grounding in science.  Outright quackery was common.  
Relatively few universities took an interest in teaching of medicine, with even the faculty 
who practiced and taught science regarding medical research with disdain, calling it “the 
withered arm of science.”47  Ambitious and financially able students who completed 
degrees at the better American medical schools often traveled to Europe, particularly 
France and Germany, for more advanced training.  After their education, they returned to 
the United States with new ideas about science and medical education, ideas they shared 
in academic and medical circles.  
As the turn of the century neared, increasing numbers of colleges and universities 
established or associated with medical schools, thus elevating the quality of their 
programs by building laboratories, increasing admission and graduation standards, and 
requiring faculty to teach full-time rather than maintain outside medical practices.  
                                                 
47 Richard H. Shryock, American Medical Research Past and Present (New York:  The 
Commonwealth Fund, 1947): 7.   
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Simultaneously, organized medical schools gradually replaced apprenticeship and 
proprietary schools as the primary means of medical education. The American medical 
school of the late 1800s began to look more like the schools of Europe, where faculty and 
deans often had trained.48  This shift toward a scientifically grounded medical education 
had implications for higher education and hospitals, and, eventually, research. 
Universities, for example, needed to hire faculty, develop curriculum and build 
laboratory space to accommodate work in the sciences.  To accomplish these goals 
universities turned to private philanthropy.49  The link between higher education and 
philanthropy was already strong.  American private universities depended on 
philanthropic support, particularly from large donors. 50  Private support helped turn these 
schools into premier research institutions.  For example, John D. Rockefeller’s substantial 
pledge of $600,000 allowed the rejuvenation of the University of Chicago in 1890, an 
institution that had been near closure.  His subsequent financial support gave the school 
the ability to make the sustained financial commitments required to become a leading 
research institution.51   
While Americans were opening the door to scientific and medical education, 
researchers in European laboratories were making critical discoveries.  Europe remained 
                                                 
48 More extensive coverage of medical education in the United States can be found in 
comprehensive works including Kenneth M. Ludmerer, Learning to Heal: The 
Development of American Medical Education (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1985) and Cassedy, Medicine in America. 
49 Daniel J. Kevles, “Foundations, Universities, and Trends in Support for the Physical 
and Biological Sciences, 1900-1992,” Daedalus, 121 No. no. 4 (Fall 1992): 195-235 
50 Duke (1838); Cornell (1865); Vanderbilt (1873); Johns Hopkins (1876); Stanford 
(1885); and Carnegie Mellon (1900) universities, for example, were all founded after 
large gifts from donors. See also, Hammack and Anheier, A Versatile Institution, 50. 
51 John Boyer, “The University of Chicago’s 125-year History,” accessed February 27, 
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a vital research hub until the first of two world wars ravaged the continent resulting in 
both the loss and the immigration of many of Europe’s most productive scientists and the 
destruction of its research institutions.  In the late 1800s, however, Europe remained the 
center of the scientific world and American students training there were introduced to 
exciting discoveries and technologies.  
Some of the most significant of these discoveries involved the invention of 
diagnostic tools.  The stethoscope (1819), ophthalmoscope (1851), and the X-ray (1895), 
for example, were revolutionary.  In the 1870s, Joseph Lister pioneered the use of 
antiseptic surgical procedures to combat bacterial infections following surgery, enabling 
the growth of surgery as a therapeutic tool, but requiring hospitals for its practice, just 
like the new diagnostic equipment and procedures.  Louis Pasteur, Robert Koch, and 
others ushered in the age of bacteriology when they demonstrated the link between 
bacteria, known as “little animals,” and disease. Recognition of the connection led to a 
new focus on hygiene to prevent disease, a period known as the “great sanitary 
awakening,” when governments and reformers in Europe and the U.S. began to organize 
efforts to protect the public health through a variety of sanitary measures.52  
Pharmacologic research led to profitable commodities developed by an emerging 
pharmaceutical industry.  Firms like E.R. Squibb (1885), Eli Lilly Company (1876), 
Merck & Company (1891), and Burroughs Welcome and Company (1894) combined 
new manufacturing technologies with laboratory discoveries to mass produce and market 
tablets and capsules. As one scholar has noted: “Drugs and research became inseparably 
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linked.”53 By the end of the century, scientists were able to identify many diseases and, in 
some cases, provide a prophylactic or a cure.  Health care advanced on the back of 
science, with a push from industrial manufacturing, and the general public watched 
eagerly for each new development.   
Since the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, most science was 
either self-financed or supported by wealthy or, in some cases, royal patrons.54  This was 
true even in Europe where government support of research was already common.  The 
scientific society provided another avenue for funding.  Many societies collected 
contributions from members and used this money to provide financial support to 
researchers.55 The Royal Society (England) and the Academy of Science (France), for 
example, grew out of regular meetings of those interested in scientific topics.56  
Gatherings also served as a formal and public avenue for the peer review of science.  
Scholarly societies formed in the United States, as well.  Benjamin Franklin founded one 
of the most prominent, the American Philosophical Society, in 1743, though it did not 
begin a grant program until the 1930s.57  
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Individual donors also contributed to the first medical research institute in the 
world, the Institut Pasteur in Paris in 1887.  In 1880, Pasteur had developed a vaccine to 
treat rabies.  He skillfully parlayed his successes into an international reputation and 
fundraising campaign.  Donations that “flooded in” after the successful administration of 
the rabies vaccine became public helped fund construction.58 The French government 
provided the remainder of the funds.  Pasteur also developed the model for future 
research institutes when he brought together scientists from different specialties to 
conduct research to advance basic science and medicine. Americans following 
developments in Europe learned about more than medical discovery; they learned how to 
organize and fund their own research efforts. 
2.  Educators, reformers, and philanthropist in the United States, 1900 to 1945. 
Modern America emerged during the first half of the twentieth century.  This 
period was marked at home and abroad by innovation, industrialization, and expansion; 
there was the accumulation of great wealth as well as financial instability, developing 
social and economic disparity, and engagement in two world wars.  In medical research, 
biology, and particularly bacteriology, continued their reign as a dominant area of 
inquiry. There were many discoveries resulting in successes that dramatically altered the 
ability to successfully fight infection and disease.  Industrialists eager to turn discoveries 
into marketable products began to fund work by others in addition to conducting their 
own developmental research.   
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Progressive reformers, meanwhile, challenged established order and pushed for 
change on many fronts.  In the areas of health and medicine, reformers tackled many 
issues related to public health and sanitation.  Often, these initiatives resulted in extended 
government oversight and regulation aimed at protecting human health and safety.  The 
federal government, in particular, expanded its capacities to conduct scientific research in 
areas of public health and increased its financial commitment to support research done in 
America’s universities on problems in medicine and other sciences.   
One target of reform, driven principally by insiders, was medical education.  This 
initiative, like many in medical and health research in the first half of the century, was 
funded by private philanthropy.  Large foundations created by successful industrialists, 
particularly Rockefeller, shaped the American scientific research agenda and accelerated 
its work.  Average citizens, too, contributed to the war on disease through their financial 
support to build local hospitals and campaigns against diseases like polio, tuberculosis, 
and cancer.  
Hospital construction continued throughout most of the first half of the twentieth 
century.  Some hospitals built during the period were public hospitals funded by the 
government.  Most, however, were a product of philanthropy.  Denominations and other 
philanthropic organizations funded, and in numerous cases ran, new hospitals.59  These 
three sources—government, religious organizations, and other philanthropy—had 
supported hospital construction and development since ancient times and would continue 
to do so into the twentieth century. 
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Hospitals built in the United States after the turn of the century also followed 
another established practice: these hospitals served as the location for training physicians 
and conducting medical research.  Hospitals as the primary site for medical care, and not 
a catch-all charitable refuge for anyone needing assistance, had taken root in Paris in the 
early 1800s.  In this environment, physicians pioneered significant developments 
including the practice of routine clinical examination.  Surgery became more common 
and patients were segregated according to their condition or need.  Information and new 
technologies, like Lannec’s stethoscope, could be tested and disseminated.60   
In addition to the general construction of hospitals, including new buildings in 
smaller towns across the country, specialized hospitals developed in many larger cities.  
In Boston, for example, the Peter Brent Brigham Hospital opened in 1914 to treat patients 
with arthritis and severe joint diseases.  In Indianapolis, the James Whitcomb Riley 
Hospital for Children opened in 1924.  These specialty hospitals resulted from and 
supported a trend toward physician specialization.  They also permitted a concentration 
of patients of a particular type.  The development of providers concentrating on the care 
of women or children, for example, focused research questions in those fields.  
Medical education also evolved in the early twentieth century.  The displacement 
of proprietary medical schools by those affiliated with colleges and universities was 
largely complete by the 1920s.  At the same time, higher education institutions elevated 
the quality of their medical programs by building laboratories, increasing admissions and 
graduation requirements, and requiring faculty to work for the university full-time.  The 
                                                 
60 Lindsay Granshaw and Roy Porter, The Hospital in History (New York: Routledge, 
1989); Dora B. Weiner and Michael J. Sauter, “The City of Paris and the Rise of Clinical 
Medicine.” Osiris 18 (2003): 23-42.  
 36 
American medical school of the late 1800s became more rigorous and more scientifically 
oriented.61  
Teaching hospitals were also part of these reforms, but aspiring physicians were 
not the only students in medical training hospitals in the early 1900s.  The first nursing 
programs were located in hospitals where trainees’ curriculum centered on the hospitals 
service needs.  In 1909, the University of Minnesota opened the first university-based 
nursing programs; Indiana University’s nurse training began in 1914 at its new university 
hospital; and Yale University created the first autonomous nursing school on its campus 
in 1923.  The presence of well-trained nursing staff further improved the outcomes for 
hospitalized patients.  
Public health departments took an increasingly visible role in efforts to manage 
the health of communities.  Public health agencies grew out of the sanitation movements 
of the 1800s and focused on efforts to identify and address problems and hazards 
affecting the health of the general citizenry rather than of individual patients.  In crowded 
cities, public health officials often focused on controlling communicable disease and 
abating hazards such as those associated with substandard housing and contamination of 
food. Officials working in city and state public health departments worked alongside 
other progressive reformers to extend the reach and authority of public officials and 
agencies authority over “sanitation, immunization, regulation, health education, and 
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personal health care.”62  Though the individuals charged with enforcing public health 
regulations were often doctors, their function as public health officers was distinct from 
the work of providing medical care.  The authority of state and local public health 
organizations to enact interventions and impose regulations designed to protect the public 
expanded throughout the early twentieth century.63  At the federal level, in 1912, the 
Marine Hospital Service was renamed the U.S. Public Health Service.  The National 
Institutes of Health were created in 1930 and, over the next three decades, became a 
major research center.   
While medical and nursing schools grew and reformed, programs for public 
health officers were slower to be established.  Wickliffe Rose, who designed and led the 
Rockefeller Sanitary Commission, enlisted Abraham Flexner to create an education 
program for public health officials, first at Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene 
and Public Health, which opened during the influenza epidemic of 1918, and then at 
Harvard’s public health school which soon followed thanks to Rockefeller support.  
Consistent with reforms in physician education, the curriculum in these early programs 
focused on scientific and laboratory innovations.  Public health officials at all levels 
engaged in research and designed demonstration projects throughout the country. 
Important to this work is the fact that all of these reforms were largely underwritten by 
private philanthropy.  Another important aspect of the turn toward public health was its 
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role in creating a sense among individuals that they could participate in the work of 
protecting health and fighting disease.  This awareness of the value of individual 
participation in efforts to maintain health and prevent disease certainly bolstered the logic 
of making financial contributions toward the same end. 
Between 1870 and 1900, rapid urbanization and industrialization contributed to 
the accumulation of extraordinary wealth in the hands of a small number of financiers 
and industrialists set up grants.  As the century ended, some of America’s most wealthy 
and influential business leaders aligned with a belief that Andrew Carnegie outlined in 
his 1889 North American Review article titled, “Wealth,” and often referred to as his 
“Gospel of Wealth,” that the wealthy were obligated to support social improvement 
through philanthropic investments made during their lifetimes.64  Toward this end, 
Carnegie and others created private foundations and used these to manage their 
philanthropic efforts and maintain control over their wealth.  During the first half of the 
twentieth century, foundations would help reform medical education and research.   
Education, particularly higher education, attracted the attention of many 
influential philanthropists.65  This is unsurprising given a common preference that 
philanthropy be used “to provide part of the means by which those who desire to improve 
may do so.”66  In this way, Carnegie and those who subscribed to his view saw their 
philanthropy as an investment, one that should be made in a manner to maximize return.  
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Carnegie specifically preferred the dedication of “great sums” to support “public 
purposes” creating “lasting advantage” over making “scattered” gifts in “trifling 
amounts.”67  Among his most important efforts were his support for public library 
construction, a teacher pension fund, the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburgh, and the 
Carnegie Institution for Scientific Research in Washington, D.C. 
Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller found both purpose and advantage in 
supporting research universities and medicine.  Rockefeller’s interest in medicine was 
sparked by Reverend Frederick Gates, a pastor and principal philanthropic advisor, who 
harnessed the assets of expanded universities graduating trained scientists and improved 
medical schools graduating scientifically trained doctors.  Gates believed that “disease” 
was the “main source of almost all other human ills: poverty, crime, ignorance, vice, 
inefficiency, hereditary taint, and many other evils.”68  He reasoned that by tacking 
disease directly other social problems could be eliminated.  Gates persuaded Rockefeller 
to support work in the sciences, in particular the medical sciences. Rockefeller’s 
investments were transformational.  
Gates understood that, as a result of “the peculiar commercial organization of 
medical colleges,” including the need for faculty to see patients and teach students, 
medical research had received little attention and less philanthropic support.69  He 
persuaded Rockefeller to fund the creation of a dedicated medical research institute 
similar to the Institut Pasteur, where medical researchers could work spared of 
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distractions.  Rockefeller agreed to provide $20,000 in exploratory funds to determine 
whether sufficient interest and talent could be found to sustain a research institute.  The 
trial succeeded and in 1902, Rockefeller committed $1,000,000 (over $29 million in 2018 
dollars), and the nation’s first dedicated medical research institute, the Rockefeller 
Institute for Medical Research (now Rockefeller University), opened in 1907 in New 
York City.  The Institute’s success spawned similar organizations in Cleveland, 
Philadelphia, and San Francisco. 
Carnegie also concentrated his focus on medical education.  He, too, was 
influenced toward this work by an advisor. Henry Pritchett was the head of another of 
Carnegie’s institutions, the Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, and he took an 
interest in the training of physicians.70  He recruited Abraham Flexner, author of a 
critique of higher education, to conduct a Carnegie-sponsored study of the state of 
medical education.71  Flexner visited medical schools across the country and catalogued 
substantial deficiencies.  He also used his 1910 report to extol the virtues of the teaching 
methods used at Johns Hopkins Medical School, with its emphasis on the scientific 
training of medical students.  The report received attention from funders, educators, and 
policy makers.  
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The Rockefeller Foundation followed Carnegie’s lead and took up the cause of 
advancing medical education generally and not just through the work of the Rockefeller 
Institute.  Rockefeller’s General Education Board extended financial assistance to 
universities and hospitals to create or improve medical schools that emphasized scientific 
training.72  Over the next 30 years, the support and influence of philanthropic patrons, 
particularly Carnegie and Rockefeller, led to the wholesale reform of medical education.  
Sectarian and commercial schools, which lacked the facilities and staff to teach science 
and conduct research in addition to providing clinical training, largely disappeared 
leaving university-based medical education as the dominant model.  
Ten years after the Institute opened, Rockefeller made his most significant and 
dynamic gift, a permanent, charitable foundation designed to provide direct research 
support across a variety of fields, particularly medicine and public health.  In 1913, the 
largest Rockefeller charitable fund, the Rockefeller Foundation, was incorporated with 
holdings of $100 million.  This Foundation was structured to operate in a fundamentally 
different manner from both Rockefeller’s prior approach to donations and the funding 
methods common in other foundations.   
In the years before the stock market crash of 1929, the Rockefeller Foundation 
made large grants directly to a small group of educational institutions.73 Much has been 
written about the Foundation’s extensive and substantial contributions to the development 
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of these institutions.74  Fixed-amount awards allowed university officials to allocate the 
funds among schools to support projects that best advanced the respective school’s own 
needs and priorities.  The Foundation referred to these as “fluid” grants; they were easy 
for the Foundation to administer. Recipients appreciated the flexibility the block grants 
gave to both universities and the researchers who were not required to convince anyone 
outside their own institution of the value of their work.  Rockefeller preferred supporting 
proven researchers and programs, so grants went to schools and departments with 
demonstrated expertise and prior success.  Grants were intended to enhance existing 
strengths, not to develop new fields or experts.   
Shortly after the market crash of 1929, the Foundation’s Board directed 
foundation officers to abandon the use of block grants in favor of providing “aid to 
individuals, groups and departments in relation to research” consistent with the 
Foundation’s mission, the “advancement of knowledge.”75  The structure that arose from 
this directive was the fixed-term research project grant.  This choice was practical given 
the realities of the Great Depression.  Smaller grants provide a foundation with the ability 
to control costs and remain flexible, untethered from the risks of long-term and expensive 
obligations, particularly to projects that proved unsuccessful.76  Grant officers had more 
flexibility to explore and support emerging areas and to foster promising initiatives 
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without the challenge of negotiating these terms with the grantee institutions.  The model 
of term-limited grant awards to support predefined work remains the prevailing funding 
approach used by private and public funders, including the National Institutes of Health.77 
At the time of this transition, some inside the Foundation worried about problems 
that research funders, including small funders, wrestle with today.  Some worried that the 
short-term grant program discouraged bold science and fostered a type of dependence.78  
Term grants seemed to perversely encourage extended projects as recipients often 
returned requesting additional or extended awards to complete or continue work.79  The 
new system created concerns about the influence that a funder or program officer could 
have over the selection of scientific winners and losers.  A grant officer’s decision 
effectively determined the direction of the scientific endeavor, particularly given the 
limited funding alternatives.  
At the same time that a few large foundations were building and funding a 
research infrastructure, another style of health philanthropist emerged—the smaller 
individual donor.  These donors were activated through the efforts of a new type of 
voluntary organization.  In the early 1900s, nationally-coordinated, community-based 
groups like the National Association for Infantile Paralysis and the American Cancer 
Society were founded to combat afflictions such as polio and cancer respectively.  These 
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groups organized around a single disease with initial goals of educating the public and 
subsidizing care and treatment.80   
Over time, voluntary health organizations helped form “new and remarkable 
alliances” between organized medicine, laboratory researchers, and the public.81  These 
organizations raised money and eventually made grants to support research.  They also 
became powerful advocates for increased public funding of medical research.  In her 
work, Angela Creager found that these groups “played a key role in channeling political 
sentiments towards large-scale federal patronage of laboratory research in the name of 
conquering disease.”82   
Voluntary health organizations used annual fund drives as their primary means of 
fundraising.  Two examples include the National Tuberculosis Association (now the 
American Lung Association), which conducted the well-known Christmas Seals 
campaigns beginning in 1907, and the National Society for Crippled Children that ran its 
first Easter Seals campaign in 1934.  Other disease-related fundraising drives included 
efforts associated with to tuberculosis and venereal disease (1880s) and cancer (1910). 
Drives like these depended on local volunteers.  An organizational structure built on 
active, local chapters gave the campaigns an immediate, community feel.  Drives were 
often enormously successful.  The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (now 
known as the March of Dimes) raised $12 million during its annual fund drive in 1944.  
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Rather than decreasing in the face of wartime austerity, the campaign raised $19 million 
the next year.83  Other organizations mimicked this successful technique.   
National voluntary disease associations reached large segments of the population 
and gave average citizens the sense that through small contributions they, too, were 
engaged in battling diseases like polio, tuberculosis, and cancer.  These organizations 
also created a sense of personal connection to scientists’ fight against disease.  Illnesses 
were no longer something that needed to be accepted.  Through the work of science, 
supported by even small individual contributions, disease could be defeated.  Medical 
fundraisers continue to ply this message today. 
As philanthropists developed new methods to fund medical research, capitalists 
developed ways to profit from discovery.  Pharmaceutical companies in Europe and the 
United States learned to capture and scale advances made in the laboratory.  Aspirin and 
salvarsan were developed in Germany, and the Institute Pasteur developed vaccines for 
production. Commercial vitamins were developed in 1920 at the University of Wisconsin 
and, in 1923, scientists at Eli Lilly and Company, located in Indianapolis, introduced 
Iletin, the world’s first manufactured insulin product.  Corporate investments in research 
and development would continue to grow and contribute to the financing of scientific 
discovery.84  
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3.  The golden age of medicine, post-1945 
As remarkable as were the changes in medicine in the first half of the twentieth 
century, the development of drugs after 1945 to treat or prevent a variety of serious 
conditions—including streptomycin for tuberculosis, the Salk vaccine for polio, and 
penicillin for a variety of illnesses—created the optimistic belief that cures for every ill, 
every discomfort, were just around the corner.  Historians often label this “sharp rise in 
confidence in both physicians and the public in the efficacy of medical science,” as “the 
golden age of medicine.”85   
During the Second World War, science itself was recognized as a valuable soldier 
in the fight to protect America’s security and well-being.  Before the war ended, policy 
makers began to examine how best to enlist wartime research capacity to maintain 
national and economic security during peacetime.  This transition required significant 
public investment in research, including medical science. The important expansion of 
federal grant funds pushed many large foundation funders away from medical research 
support and toward other work.  Gradually however, new philanthropists, many smaller 
funds, took on medical research as a focus for their support.   
The post-war period provided a challenge for American physicians and 
researchers to incorporate discoveries made during the war into peacetime practices and 
extend many of the discoveries that occurred during the war years, including dramatic 
developments in surgical techniques, the use of antibiotics and other chemotherapeutics, 
and the application of new materials and technologies for medical purposes.  These 
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successes, however, required dramatic increases in resources.  Prestige and confidence in 
the power of science to produce more miraculous gains enticed students to science and 
medical training, including women and minorities who had been generally excluded 
before.  The G.I. bill increased opportunities for returning service members to pursue 
education in health care and health sciences.  Medical schools were encouraged to accept 
larger classes of students.  Research funding from external sources increased, creating 
additional capacity to conduct research at universities and medical schools.  This growth 
required building and equipping increasingly advanced facilities and recruiting and 
retaining more specialists.  Beginning in the years leading up to and increasing during the 
Second World War, American medicine and science had benefitted tremendously from 
the influx of scientists who escaped Europe, often with the help of philanthropic refugee 
organizations. 
As the American medical system grew, so did the challenges of access to care. In 
1946, two members of the United States Senate drafted legislation to respond to President 
Truman’s post-war pledge to build hospitals and clinics to serve the growing and 
demilitarizing population.  In 1946, Congress passed the Hospital Survey and 
Construction Act, commonly known as Hill-Burton after its Senate sponsors Lister Hill 
(D-Alabama) and Harold Burton (R-Ohio).86  The law gave hospitals, nursing homes, and 
other health facilities grants and loans for construction and modernization.  In return, the 
facilities agreed to provide certain services to persons unable to pay.  Facilities were also 
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required to make their services available to “all persons” residing in the facility’s service 
area, a significant step toward the desegregation of care.87  Between 1947 and 1971, the 
federal government invested over $3.7 billion to modernize care facilities across the 
country.88  Many of these investments benefitted hospitals engaged in research and 
medical training. 
Access to care was one policy debate related to healthcare; the other concerned 
payment for care. Since Roosevelt’s depression-era reforms, policy makers and health 
providers had battled long and hard over whether and how to pay for care.  After John F. 
Kennedy’s election campaign and shocking assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson secured 
passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, which helped provide medical care for the 
elderly, poor, and some chronically ill. But the new programs enabled dramatic growth of 
the overall health care system, adding the number of available care beds and specialty 
facilities in the country.89 These facilities needed to be staffed, leading to increased 
demand for physicians and ancillary care providers.   
In addition to the well-known breakthrough in production of penicillin and other 
medicines, wartime discoveries advanced medical knowledge in the fields of surgery as 
well as techniques to improve recovery and rehabilitation.  Improvements to peacetime 
care also resulted from the adaptation of wartime developments in medical practice from 
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the use of anesthesia and blood transfusion to new techniques of kidney dialysis and heart 
surgery.  Technology, including machines that isolated and magnified smaller biological 
and chemical units, played a critical role in transitioning the locus of cutting-edge science 
from biology to microbiology and genetics. Watson and Crick’s discovery of the 
chemical structure of DNA in 1953 and the subsequent sequencing of the human genome 
in 2003 opened the door to new and potentially challenging opportunities.   
The federal research agenda before 1941 had focused generally on public health 
concerns such as communicable diseases like cholera and tuberculosis.90  Scientific 
research during the Second World War, however, created an opportunity for advocates to 
make the case for continuing and increasing public support for science generally and 
biomedical research in particular.  Vannevar Bush, who led the U.S. Office of Scientific 
Research and Development, effectively made the case that a vigorous, publicly funded 
and coordinated post-war research program was a key to American security and 
prosperity.  
                                                 
90 Throughout the first four decades of the twentieth century the federal government 
supported medical research through the Public Health Service.  The PHS’s rather limited 
research agenda focused on diseases that posed a direct threat to public health such as 
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Public Health Service made grants to twenty-five research institutions for the study of 
venereal disease, one of the first organized efforts by the federal government to enlist the 
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Bush understood the need to capture the imagination of political leaders as well as 
the general public, as demonstrated in a 1945 report to the President titled “Science – The 
Endless Frontier.” A version of his report designed for the general public was published 
in The Atlantic Monthly.91  Bush sought to harness the drive and ambition of wartime 
scientific effort and sustain that energy to tackle challenges in peacetime.  He argued for 
a program of sustained federal support for basic scientific research to benefit national 
security and the general welfare, a program that demanded coordination and financial 
resources that could only be provided by the federal government.  Private philanthropy 
was no longer sufficient.   
Even before the establishment of the National Science Foundation in 1950, 
Congress created the Research Grants Office within the NIH in 1946 that was charged 
with creating and administering a program of extramural medical research grants and 
fellowships to scientists working in universities and hospitals across the country.  The 
expansion of extramural funding had both practical and political consequences.  The flow 
of resources to research institutions at universities around the country, along with the 
educational benefits of the GI Bill, led a cadre of new scientists to find work in 
laboratories and medical research centers across the country.  The program also spread 
research dollars to universities across the country and, thereby, created new champions of 
federal research support in more congressional districts.  There was little or no public 
objection to this expansion of the federal budget to support medical research.  The grants 
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program budget of approximately $4 million in 1947 grew to over $100 million by 
1957.92  
The NIH, like private philanthropic foundations before, needed to establish 
grantmaking procedures to guide the difficult work of deciding which projects to fund.  
One option was to use research contracts that identified specific objectives and outcomes 
for the funded work, including grant end dates.  The contract also “shifted the main 
responsibility of management and conduct of research to the university or private 
business.”93  Government determined what it wanted to receive and the research 
organization decided how to deliver the project.  The research contract left the 
government squarely in the position of directing the development of the national research 
agenda.   
Warren Weaver, director of the Natural Sciences Division of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, urged the government to instead identify “some way to assure that scientific 
inquiry remain[ed] free from bureaucratic control, free in fact from any control.”94  
Notably, the Rockefeller Foundation, which had been one of the most influential and 
effective supporters of medical research, exercised a similar type of control over the 
direction of science through its own funding practices, a fact that seemed not to have 
bothered Weaver.  Eventually, the NIH developed a process that used external expert 
panels or “study committees” to review grants and make funding recommendations back 
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to the Institute.95  The Rockefeller Foundation occasionally used external subject experts, 
but mostly relied on a “cadre of long serving programme officers” to identify, select, and 
evaluate grants.96  These officers learned their program areas and developed significant 
expertise.  
Congress annually increased allocations for research conducted in government 
laboratories by federal researchers and for work done in university labs around the 
country.97  The pharmaceutical industry also poured more money into research and 
development aimed at the next big drug.98  Meanwhile, large foundations, including 
Rockefeller, moved quietly toward work in other areas.  In some cases, foundations did 
not wander far from medical science. Hammack and Anheier observed that “[t]he most 
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notable foundation research initiatives of the postwar decades” involved support for 
“applied topics to which government research agencies gave low priority,” and which 
sometimes generated debates, including Rockefeller Foundation’s support for plant 
biology and green revolution initiatives, as well as studies on population, reproduction, 
child development, and behavioral science.99 Other foundations moved from funding 
research itself to supporting the construction of additional research institutions and 
capacity in California, Texas, and the Pacific Northwest.100   
The ability of even the wealthiest foundations to direct the course of medical 
research was limited by the size and cost of the work.  As early as the 1930s, some inside 
the Rockefeller Foundation understood that the medical enterprise as a whole was already 
so large that foundations could have only marginal affect, and in 1945, Raymond 
Fosdick, then head of the Rockefeller Foundation, predicted that large-scale government 
funding of medical research soon would lead the Foundation to allocate its own funds to 
other areas. 101  Allen Gregg, Vice-President of the Rockefeller Foundation and former 
head of the Medical Sciences Division, urged Rockefeller trustees to identify unoccupied 
space and provide funding for work in “new fields.”102  Gregg suggested that 
transitioning to different work would allow Rockefeller to avoid comparison to a “far 
                                                 
99 Hammack and Anheier, A Versatile Institution, 89. 
100 Hammack and Anheier, A Versatile Institution, 84-87; Alfred L. Castle, A Century of 
Philanthropy: A History of the Samuel N. and Mary Castle Foundation (Honolulu: 
Hawaiian Historical Society, 1992). 
101 Hammack and Anheier, A Versatile Institution, 53 
102 Schneider, “Origin of the Medical Research Grant,” citing, Gregg, “A Program in the 
Medical Sciences.” At https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/FS/B/B/M/R/_/fsbbmr.pdf, last 
accessed July 6.  
 54 
more powerful competitor.”103 By 1950, federal support for medical research out-paced 
all private funding sources combined. 104 
Some foundations followed Gregg’s advice and remained active in medical 
research, concentrating on opportunities to complement government support, for 
example, by demonstrating the value of new ideas or fields of inquiry.105  These funders 
acted as “angel-investors” supporting the earliest period of project development, typically 
for a period of time long enough to allow a researcher or team to obtain preliminary 
evidence needed to support the viability and promise of the idea.  This proof-of-concept 
data allows researcher to develop a more competitive application for additional 
extramural funding, particularly federal grants.  Other foundations, like the Albert and 
Mary Lasker Foundation, chose to devote resources to lobbying the federal government 
for even greater state support for research efforts.106  A few funders elected a completely 
independent path.  The most notable of these was Howard Hughes who built the Howard 
Hughes Institute, America’s largest self-funded research institute107  
The result in the post-1945 period is that most of the large funds that had shaped 
American research before the Second World War were working in other areas.  But the 
influence of their work is evident in at least two ways. First, philanthropic foundations 
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helped make early and important discovery possible and they shaped the methods of 
work that contemporary funders, both public and private, follow today.  Second and 
paradoxically, as large foundations moved on to other types of work, new grantmaking 
entities moved in to replace them.  The number of independent, private foundations 
jumped from 10,000 in 1969 to 25,000 in 1990, with individuals and families endowing 
most of these new funds.108  Some of these new foundations supported medical research 
occasionally but not exclusively.   To understand the role these new philanthropies have 
come to play, it is useful to summarize the state of contemporary medical research 
funding in the United States. 
In 2016, nonprofit organizations contributed $4.6 billion to higher education 
research and development or 6.1% of the total national research and development 
expenditures during the fiscal year.  This total is for all nonprofit organizations, including 
public charities, voluntary health organizations (such as the American Heart Association), 
medical research organizations (like the Howard Hughes Medical Institute), and private 
foundations of all types. Donations from individual gifts are omitted from this total.  
Nonprofit organizations’ contributions to research funding increased from $2.6 billion in 
1994 to $4.6 billion in 2016.109 Although nonprofit organizations’ share of the overall 
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research expenditure is small, these dollars are increasingly valuable to researchers and 
scholars as the availability of funding from other sources decreases.110 
Foundations, which provide the lion’s share of philanthropic research support, are 
the focus of this project. According to the Foundation Center, over 86,192 private 
grantmaking foundations were registered in the United States in 2012.  These foundations 
made $52 billion in grants that year.  A subset of that total, 6,922 U.S. foundations, made 
7,794 grants worth approximately $3 billion to researchers and medical research 
institutions in 2012.111 
4.  Summary. 
Philanthropy from individuals and foundations contributed significantly to the 
development and growth of the American medical research enterprise.  The sources and 
form of research support varied over time.  Before 1900, philanthropic contributions 
typically came in the form of individual gifts made directly to existing or emerging 
universities or hospitals.  These gifts helped build the institutions’ capacity to educate and 
support physicians and scientists.  Unlike European governments, prior to the turn of the 
century, the federal government in the U.S. devoted little money to support research with 
the significant exception of support for land-grant colleges and nascent investments in 
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public health research.  State and local governments contributed to colleges and 
universities, public health efforts, and the construction of hospitals.  
By the early 1900s, interest in and support for medical research grew as 
individuals, institutions, governments, and industry sought to build on the promise of 
late-nineteenth century discoveries including germ theory, the viability of vaccines to 
prevent and treat some illnesses, and the development of diagnostic devices and 
laboratories.  The period immediately following the turn of the twentieth century can be 
considered the age of the foundation in medical research.  During the first forty years of 
the twentieth century a small number of large funds, particularly the Rockefeller 
Foundation, played a critical role advancing the research capacity of institutions and 
supporting the research projects directly.  Foundations directed gifts and grants to 
universities for capital projects and they provided funding in the form of block and term 
grants to support research projects at associated hospitals and research institutes.  In 
addition to pioneering the use of the term project grant, Rockefeller developed the model 
of support for research institutes used today by many funders including the National 
Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation.  Medical schools underwent 
significant reform, transitioning from proprietary to university-based, scientifically-
grounded programs. Hospitals, which served as sites for care, teaching, and research, 
grew in number and sophistication, staffed by graduates from these schools.  Foundations 
spurred and funded many of these changes.   
Large foundations were most visible, but a new form of philanthropy came to 
prominence:  the small donor who contributed to fund drives organized by large, 
voluntary health organizations.  These voluntary societies often focused on particular 
 58 
health and medical concerns that created an empowering opportunity for the average 
donor to feel engaged in the fight against disease.  Even small donors could be warriors 
in the war against cancer, tuberculosis, or polio.  Individual donors also continued to 
provide support to the construction and expansion of local care facilities like hospitals. 
By the end of the Second World War, philanthropy, at least the major 
foundations, had turned its attention to other matters.  The federal government assumed 
priority status as the largest funder of all types of research and development work 
occurring at American universities and medical research institutes.  Healthcare was 
recognized as a matter of national concern as well as individual well-being.  The number 
of drug and device companies grew and so did their budgets for research and 
development.  Philanthropy continued to contribute to research through both individual 
gifts and the contributions of voluntary health organization.  By the end of the 1960s, 
new, often smaller, foundations existed and some of these foundations chose to follow 
the path that a few important funders had taken 100 years earlier by funding medical 
research.  
From the late 1800s through the Second World War, private foundations provided 
funding and leadership to build the institutions of a national research infrastructure, 
including hospitals and university-based research programs.  These same foundations 
also pushed the wholesale reform of medical education, thereby helping to complete the 
transition of medical practice from an apprenticed trade to a scientific profession.  Along 
the way, foundations changed their grantmaking processes and, in some cases, their 
philosophies to better align with the realities of the rapidly evolving medical 
environment, an evolution they helped finance.  By the end of this period, as a result of 
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the federal government’s growing dominance over research funding and its resulting 
ability to control the research agenda, many institutional donors retreated and identified 
new areas of focus.  Some foundations, however, persisted in the work of research 
support. 
The following two chapters of this work trace the creation, development, and 
efforts of three foundations in Indianapolis, Indiana, that participated in this new wave of 
smaller foundations that support research.  Their work is primarily local and their 
contributions, like their predecessors, were often focused on building institutions and 
improving communities, rather than curing a particular disease.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Beginnings of Medical Research Philanthropy in Indiana 
Although the story of philanthropy’s contribution to medical research is typically 
viewed through an American national lens, a variation of this tale played out in Indiana.  
This chapter begins with an overview of the development of health philanthropy in the 
state, beginning with an introduction to the early donors who modeled ways to give.  The 
remainder is devoted to exploring the creation and early organization of three foundations 
dedicated to funding research: the Regenstrief Foundation, the Showalter Trust, and the 
Walther Cancer Foundation.  This chapter explores the choices made by the foundations’ 
donors and early advisors, particularly regarding the decision to create a foundation and 
then to dedicate these funds exclusively to support medical research.   
1.  The emergence and growth of health philanthropy in Indiana before 1945. 
Health philanthropy emerged in Indiana, as it had elsewhere in the country, in the 
decades following the Civil War.  There is little clear evidence that these first Hoosier 
philanthropists set out to mimic Carnegie’s or Rockefeller’s efforts to foster academic 
research.  Instead, most early gifts in Indiana were dedicated to a more immediate and 
practical purpose:  the construction of buildings to provide patient care and educate 
medical students.  Health philanthropy was a local matter.  Examples of several early 
health philanthropists are identified in Table 2, below.  The donors’ goals concerned civic 
and not just intellectual gain.  The fact that these facilities also created necessary spaces 
for medical research was an indirect and happy consequence.   
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  Table 2: Examples of early Indianapolis health philanthropists. 
One-time donors Year begun Support for: 
Reid 1905 Hospital in Richmond 
Long  1911 Teaching hospital for IUSM  
Coleman 1927 Maternity hospital for IUSM 
Ongoing donors   
Riley Memorial 
Foundation 
1921 Establishment and continuing support 
for children’s hospital 
Ball Foundation 1926 Hospital in Muncie, nursing 
residence at IUSM, and other 
occasional health related projects 
 
Indiana, like most of the rest of the country, experienced a hospital construction 
boom between 1880 and 1920 as the stigma surrounding hospitals abated thanks to 
advances including the introduction of anesthesia, asepsis, and miracle technologies like 
the X-ray.  Some hospitals were proprietary and privately-funded by the doctors who 
provided services there.  State and local governments funded construction of other 
facilities.  Some hospitals were built substantially, and in some cases entirely, through the 
charity of donors.   
Religion motivated many donors.  Methodist Hospital, for example, opened in 
1908 financed by charitable contributions raised primarily from members of the 
Methodist denomination.  Other religious orders established hospitals as well, including 
Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul (St. Vincent’s Hospital, Indianapolis, 1881) and the 
Protestant Deaconess Association (Deaconess Hospital, Evansville, 1899).112  Though 
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originally constructed to fulfill parochial obligations to care for the needy, faith-based 
hospitals came to serve those who could pay as well as the poor. 
Other hospitals around the state were built with large, one-time gifts from wealthy 
individuals.  Daniel Reid, an industrialist who owned the American Tin Plate Company 
and the American Can Company, gave $130,000 in land and cash to support the 
construction of Reid Memorial Hospital in his hometown of Richmond, Indiana, in 
memory of his deceased wife and son.  Reid made the largest gift to the effort, but several 
of his former business associates from the city contributed as well.113 
Long Hospital in Indianapolis was another notable example of this type of 
philanthropy.  In 1908, existing proprietary medical schools in Indianapolis became part 
of the Indiana University medical school.  In 1911, Robert W. Long, a physician and real 
estate investor, made a gift of land to benefit the new school.  Long’s gift, valued then at 
$200,000, allowed the school to secure additional funds from the state legislature and 
construct the hospital on the west side of the city where the medical school and its 
associated hospital complex remain to this day.114 Long’s gift opened the door for others 
to make similar philanthropic commitments. 
Donations to support the construction of other hospitals near the medical school 
followed, including contributions to build the Riley Hospital for Children. In 1916, 
                                                 
Hospitals," in One Hundred Years of Medicine: Indianapolis, 1820-1920 (1949).  “St. 
Vincent Hospital and Health Services” (PDG what is this?).  Indiana History, Indiana 
Historical Society. 2016-06-23; “Deaconess:  About Us/Our History,” accessed January 
3, 2019. http:// www.deaconess.com/About-Us/Our-History.  
113 “About Reid Health:  Our History,” accessed May 5, 2019. 
https://www.reidhealth.org/about/our-history. 
114 William H. Schneider. The Indiana University School of Medicine: A History. With 
Elizabeth van Allen, Angela Potter, and Kevin Grau (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, in press). 
 63 
shortly after the death of Indiana poet James Whitcomb Riley, a group of his friends 
formed a charitable association and solicited contributions to build a pediatric hospital to 
be named in his honor.115  Formally chartered in 1921, the James Whitcomb Riley 
Memorial Association collected funds from individuals and organizations around the 
community, including the Kiwanis Club of Indianapolis, a service club that has supported 
the hospital and Memorial Association ever since.116  Riley Hospital for Children opened 
in 1924.  The creation of hospitals dedicated to a narrow population, in this case, 
children, was part of an emerging national trend toward medical specialization.  This 
trend continued through the twentieth century, shaping both the nature and quality of 
medical care as well as the researchers and institutions that advanced medical 
knowledge.117  A community’s ability to support a specialty hospital to complement 
general care facilities also highlighted a city’s size and wealth.   
Another specialty hospital, the William H. Coleman Hospital for Women, opened 
in 1927 next to Riley Hospital.  Coleman and his wife donated approximately $350,000 
to honor their only daughter, Suemma, who died from pregnancy-related complications.  
The hospital was the first women’s hospital in the state and only the twelfth in the 
country.  Designed as a teaching hospital, it included private rooms for wealthy women 
and general wards to serve low-income women.  Coleman Hospital gained renown for 
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research, including early work on the safe and effective use of anesthesia during 
childbirth.118 
Coleman and Long each made a single large gift to build an institution.  For 
others, donations to support medical facilities were one part of a pattern of giving.  Some 
donors made multiple contributions that benefitted medical care within a community in 
different ways.  Ball Memorial Hospital opened in Muncie, Indiana, in 1929.119  The Ball 
Brothers Foundation provided significant funding for construction of the original hospital 
building and for subsequent additions and improvements to the facility.120  The five 
brothers who owned the Ball Corporation, a manufacturer of popular home canning jars, 
formed the Ball Brothers Foundation in 1926.  
The Balls’ commitment to medicine and to the medical school aligned with the 
Balls’ interests.  Lucius, the oldest Ball brother, practiced medicine in Muncie.121  George 
Ball, who served as both president of the corporation and chairman of its board, was 
named a trustee of Indiana University in 1919 and served in that role until 1938.  He 
joined the IU Trustees shortly before the Ball Brothers Foundation contributed to support 
the construction of Ball Hall, the dormitory for nursing students at the medical school 
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that opened in 1928.122  Beyond aligning with the personal interests of at least two of the 
brothers, a modern hospital also benefitted the brothers’ economic interests and 
community reputation.  
A healthy community meant healthy workers.  Employers directly benefit when 
workers and their families could obtain the types of restorative and preventative care that 
a hospital can provide.  Equally, a modern hospital symbolized a community’s wealth 
and sophistication.  The existence of a modern hospital telegraphed to others, including 
distant investors and members of the growing professional class, the fact that Muncie, 
Indiana, was a successful, desirable place that deserved a look.  The willingness to use 
foundation assets to develop and enhance an entire community was further demonstrated 
by the other charitable priorities of the Foundation and of the individual brothers, 
including substantial support provided for the creation and development of Ball State 
University and numerous other civic assets.123  
The philanthropic investments made to construct Long, Coleman, Riley, and Ball 
hospitals exemplify the emergence of a new form of medical philanthropy in Indiana 
between 1880 and 1945.  Hoosiers had always engaged in the practice of health-related 
charity, or providing for the care and comfort of neighbors suffering from illness or 
injury.  An important transition occurred as individuals, and particularly those 
accumulating excess wealth, turned to the support of institutions that provided that care.  
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Hospitals became an intermediary, a substitute for direct personal charity to the ill and 
infirm.   
Growing private financial support for hospitals also coincided with increased 
public confidence in medicine generally and in hospitals specifically.  Hospitals had 
previously been little respected.  In the decades after 1900, hospitals came to be 
recognized as acceptable and safe as well as a desirable community asset and an 
economic engine for a community.  Hospitals were not the only beneficiaries of health 
philanthropy.  As discussed on the following pages, organizations created in response to 
particular diseases and conditions began work in Indiana.  Additionally, donations to 
support the education of doctors and nurses also grew as training for health providers 
professionalized and moved from ad hoc apprenticeships to scientifically-based 
education.   
The type of donor to health and medical philanthropy also diversified. 
Historically, religious orders built hospitals or physicians developed them as business 
ventures.124  Local and state government units also funded construction of hospitals.  
During the first half of the twentieth century, individuals in Indiana engaged in health 
philanthropy through gifts to institutions—hospitals, medical schools, and disease 
organizations.  As happened nationally, the most noted gifts were single, large amounts 
from very wealthy individuals, as was the case with Coleman, Long, and Reid.  Donors 
of more modest means, however, also began to engage in health philanthropy in larger 
numbers.   
                                                 
124 The former Welborn Hospital in Evansville began as a joint venture between several 
physicians.  “Historic Evansville:  Welborn Clinic” accessed May 13, 2018, 
http://historicevansville.com/site.php?id=welborn; about Welborn Clinic.  
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Voluntary health associations, like those created to combat polio and tuberculosis, 
grew in number and popularity during this period.  Hoosiers engaged in the work of these 
associations as volunteers, boosters, and donors.  Christmas seals purchased at the local 
post office raised awareness of and money for the anti-tuberculosis efforts of National 
Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis.125  Others went door-to-door 
collecting change for the “war on cancer,” waged by the American Society for the 
Control of Cancer.126  Smaller donors also donated to construct and support hospitals as 
part of larger community campaigns.  This approach, which was taken to raise funds to 
build Riley Hospital for Children, would become more common in the second half of the 
century.  For example, in the 1950s, residents of Indianapolis’ East Side conducted a fund 
drive to raise money for the construction of a new community hospital.127 
Another development that would grow more common after 1945 was the use of 
the private foundation as a source for medical philanthropy.  The Ball Family and Riley 
Memorial foundations each foreshadowed the ways that Indiana foundations would be 
used to support health philanthropy.  The Riley Memorial Foundation was chartered in 
1921 to raise funds to construct a hospital.  After the building was finished, the 
Foundation refocused its work and took on the role of raising money from the community 
to benefit the hospital and the work that occurs there.  In addition to supporting facility 
                                                 
125 Kelly Gascoine “Saving Children from the White Plague:  The Marion County 
Tuberculosis Association’s Crusade Against Tuberculosis, 1911-1936” (M.A. Thesis, 
Indiana University, Indianapolis, 2010); http://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/2188.   
126 "American Cancer Society: History". Working to Give: Philanthropies & 
Philanthropic Work. Archived from the original on 2013-10-17.  I don’t understand cite 
127 Beth DeHoff “Community Hospitals” in The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, eds. David 
J. Bodenhamer and Robert G. Barrows (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); 
467.  A philanthropic gift also funded construction of the Coleman Women’s Hospital in 
1927.  
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improvements and access to patient care, the Riley Memorial Foundation also provided 
significant support to medical research. 
The Ball Brothers Foundation, on the other hand, was designed as a general-
purpose fund.  It gave the family a way to protect assets from the brothers’ estates from 
taxes and to use the funds to support causes of their choosing.  The brothers’ foundation 
gave to health-related causes as only one among a variety of types of recipients.  The Ball 
brothers were also unlike Long and Coleman who both made a single large gift to support 
construction of a facility.  The Ball Brothers Foundation made multiple gifts over time to 
support both health and medical education.  Yet, the Foundation did not provide a 
consistent stream of support to any recipients.  Additionally, the Foundation made other 
large gifts to create a university in their hometown, support local schools, enrich arts 
organizations, and enhance municipal spaces like parks.  The Ball Brothers Foundation is 
an example of another type of medical philanthropist, the donor who supports medicine 
occasionally as part of broader interests and commitments.  Its donations to medicine 
were episodic and only part of a larger and more diverse portfolio of gifts.  
When viewed collectively, the grants made by the Ball Brothers appear 
motivated, at least in part, by something beyond curing the body or improving medical 
knowledge.  Building and supporting hospitals, universities, and other public assets can 
be understood as a deliberate strategy to benefit and bolster the local community.  It can 
be reasonably inferred that Ball brothers supported the construction of institutions 
essential to the practice and advancement of modern medicine not simply to benefit 
patients, but to enhance the growth and economic welfare of the town and state where 
their personal and business interests were located.  If doing so was not the intention, it 
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certainly was the effect.  The strategic use of donations to medicine, as a tool to advance 
additional if not entirely different goals, would continue in the years after the war. 
2.  Hoosier foundations supporting medical research after 1945. 
In the years following the Second World War, the federal government 
dramatically increased public funding for medical research.128  Prior to 1945, the main 
beneficiaries of medical philanthropy in Indiana were institutions, specifically hospitals 
and medical education providers.  Although philanthropic support for both types of these 
institutions continued, gifts for the direct support of research accelerated.  
At the same time, more individuals and families across the country were creating 
private foundations as they sought to shield their post-war wealth from income taxes and 
to establish permanent control over wealth.129  Those in Indiana were no different.  The 
remainder of this chapter first will introduce several Indiana private foundations, 
including those in Table 3, below, that chose to donate to research occasionally as part of 
a larger portfolio of giving that included priorities and opportunities outside medicine and 
health and then focus on three foundations highlighted in the following section elected to 
dedicate resources exclusively to funding medical research.  Examining organizations in 
each category—the occasional and the dedicated donors—provides the opportunity to 
consider whether dedication to a single cause makes a difference in an organization’s 
behavior or in its impact.  
                                                 
128 For more information on this transition, see Chapter Two. 
129 The growth in the number and value of private foundations was a central issue leading 
to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 that placed new limitations and regulations on private 
foundations. See Robert H. Bremner, American Philanthropy, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1988): 180-183, also, Peter Frumkin, Strategic Giving 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2006), 100-105 and 110 – 111.   
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 Table 3:  Major Indianapolis foundations supporting medical research after the 1950s.  
General purpose Year created Supported 
Lilly Endowment  1937 Genomics, physician and scientist 
recruitment  
Krannert Trust 1953 Cardiac research  
Fairbanks Foundation 1986 Health care, aging research, and 
public health 
Medical research only   
Regenstrief Foundation 1969 Research on health care delivery 
Showalter Research Trust 1973 IUSM and Purdue 
Walther Cancer Foundation 1985 Cancer research 
 
The foundations examined in this chapter must be considered in the context of the 
growth of the medical and medical education community they supported.  The post-war 
years in Indiana, like the rest of the United States, were a period of exciting 
developments and ambitious expansion in health care ignited by demographic changes 
and the acceleration of medical and surgical knowledge.  Both the government and civic 
leaders jumped in to capitalize on the opportunity these advances created.  
In 1946, the U.S. Congress passed legislation that came to be known as the Hill-
Burton Act (mentioned in Chapter Two).  The Act extended grants and loans to health 
care facilities for construction and modernization in exchange for a commitment by the 
facilities to expand their service area and to accept more charity care patients.130  In 
Indianapolis, the demand for hospital beds led a group of local business leaders to form 
the Indianapolis Hospital Development Association in 1951 with the goal of raising $12 
                                                 
130 Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Public Law 79-725 (1946). 
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million to support the addition of 825 hospital beds in the city by 1975.131  Many 
hospitals added beds as a result, and several entirely new facilities were created:  
Community Hospital East (1956), Community South (1963), Westview Hospital (1961), 
and Winona Memorial Hospital (1965).  The passage of the federal Medicare Act in 1965 
only added to the demand for hospital-based care.  The Hill-Burton Act and the creation 
of Medicare drew attention to the ways that health care and health facilities had come to 
be seen as public goods that the state and the civic sector had a role in providing.132  
Indiana University, which remained the only medical school in the state, 
responded to pressure to prepare more doctors to meet the state’s growing need by 
admitting larger classes.133  Many of these physicians decided to pursue one of the 
growing numbers of medical specialties and subspecialties rather than enter general 
practice.134 Expansion and specialization proceeded along with growth in the number and 
power of departments within the medical school.  During the 1950s, the medical school 
added departments of anesthesiology, obstetrics and gynecology, and radiology.  In the 
1960s, dermatology, orthopedic surgery, and medical genetics were created.  Large 
departments, specifically medicine and surgery, began designating discrete divisions 
within their units, such as nephrology (1967) and rheumatology (1975) in the Department 
of Medicine and transplant surgery (1974) within the Department of Surgery.  The 
                                                 
131 Katherine Mandusic McDonell, “Hospitals” in The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, 
David J. Bodenhamer and Robert G. Barrows (eds.) Indiana University Press, p. 713. 
132 Rosemary Stevens. In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth 
Century. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1999, also Paul Starr, The Social 
Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 1982). 
133 See Schneider, Indiana University School of Medicine, Chap. 8.  
134 See generally, Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise 
of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books, 
1984). 
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dominance of specialization over general practice was demonstrated by the creation of a 
new Department of Family Medicine in 1974, a formal recognition that even general 
practice medicine was now a distinct specialty.  The growth of specialties had 
implications for the design and operation of hospitals.  Facilities needed more space to 
carve out designated units and special treatment areas.  The need added to pressure to 
raise money for capital investment, for staff, and for research.  The administrators at 
Indiana University’s School of Medicine felt all of these needs keenly.  
The medical school operated in the middle of a health campus that the university 
trustees had designated a “medical center” in the 1930s.135  Long Hospital, its teaching 
hospital, was favorably located next door to Indianapolis’ public hospital, then called 
City Hospital, as well as hospitals for children (Riley), women (Coleman), and mental 
health (LaRue Carter).  The state’s primary hospital for veterans, the Richard A. 
Roudebush VA Medical Center, opened on property adjoining the medical campus in 
1952.136  Medical students trained in all of these facilities and the diversity of patients 
seen in the wards provided ample opportunities for learning and research.  As medical 
specialization increased, so did the need for research that advanced narrowly-defined 
fields of knowledge.  
For the School of Medicine, the need to accelerate research efforts was 
particularly acute.  After the war, medical schools around the country took advantage of 
increased funding from the National Institutes of Health and other agencies and advanced 
their research capacity.  The School, however, was focused on increasing enrollment and 
                                                 
135 Schneider, Indiana University School of Medicine.  Chapter? 
136 Richard A. Roudebush VA Medical Center, 
https://www.va.gov/directory/guide/facility.asp?id=62 (accessed February 10, 2019). 
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clinical care issues.  As other schools received grants and propelled their research 
programs ahead, the School of Medicine fell further behind.  State and philanthropic 
support provided the funds needed to jump-start this work.  The construction of a new 
medical research building in 1958 served as concrete evidence of this commitment to 
research.  That same year, a private foundation donated the funds to open the first 
designated research institute at the medical center.  
In 1963, Marion County General Hospital received a gift expressly designed to 
support the creation of a cardiac research institute from Herman and Ellnora Krannert.137  
The Krannert Institute quickly grew into a world-class cardiac research facility under the 
direction of Dr. Charles Fisch, a pioneer in the study of electrophysiology.  One of the 
first physicians recruited to work at the center was Dr. Harvey Feigenbaum, who 
developed the use of electrocardiography for the diagnosis and treatment of heart disease.  
The Krannert Institute became an important venue for focused scientific inquiry.138   
Herman Krannert was the founder and chief executive of Inland Container 
Corporation, the world’s largest manufacturer of corrugated shipping containers.  His 
wife, Ellnora, was an active volunteer and support of arts and educational initiatives.  The 
Krannerts gave to a variety of community institutions through personal funds, a family 
foundation created in 1953, and a subsequent charitable trust created in 1964.139  The 
                                                 
137 The public hospital serving Indianapolis operated under several names including City 
Hospital, General Hospital, Wishard Memorial Hospital, and, most recently, Eskenazi 
Hospital in honor of its benefactors, Syd and Lois Eskenazi.  For a more complete 
review, see Kathi Badertscher, “A New Wishard is on the Way” Indiana Magazine of 
History, 108 no. 4 (December, 2012):  345-382. 
138 See Schneider, Indiana University School of Medicine. Chap. 7. 
139 Krannert IUPUI University Library, Ruth Lilly Special Collections and Archives, 
Foundation Center Historical Info File  
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couple had no children and directed their assets to a trust and then stipulated that the trust 
fund must be spent down within 15 years after their deaths.  The Krannert Institute 
received capital and operating support from the Krannerts during their lifetimes and their 
foundation until its termination in 1987.140  
The couple valued research and donated regularly to the Purdue University 
Research Foundation as well as to the University of Illinois, Herman Krannert’s alma 
mater.  They also made significant gifts to support the arts and higher education.  The 
legal documents creating the Krannerts’ foundation suggest that the couple adopted a 
model used by Rockefeller many years earlier of giving consistently and in large amounts 
to centers of excellence in education, medicine, youth services, and the arts.141  The 
Krannert Foundation favored large donations until its termination.  
The majority of the donations made by the Krannerts personally and through their 
foundation supported capital projects.  For example, in 1969, the Trust made $2.2 million 
in grants with more than $1.7 million dedicated to construction projects at five different 
performing arts and museum buildings.  In 1979, the Trust made $11 million in grants 
with $10 million going to capital projects at multiple educational, arts and community 
                                                 
140 The Trust terminated in 1987 and most records of the Foundation and Trust were 
likely transferred or destroyed when the Inland Corporation moved its headquarters out of 
the city.  The limited Krannert records maintained by the Payton Philanthropic Library 
THIS IS Different from RLSC, no? show that the Institute continued to receive operating 
funds of approximately $200,000 per year until the Trust dissolved.  Ruth Lilly Special 
Collections and Archives, Foundation Center Historical Information Files, Krannert 
Charitable Trust – Indiana Folder. 
141 See Foundation Center Annual Questionnaires, 1964 – 1985.  Foundation Center 
Historical Information Files, Krannert Charitable Trust –Indiana, boxes 44 and 112.  
IUPUI University Library, Ruth Lilly Special Collections & Archives. Indianapolis, 
Indiana.  
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centers.142  Gifts were generally restricted to Indiana organizations and specifically to the 
Indianapolis area.143  The Krannerts’ primary philanthropic intent focused on building the 
knowledge and cultural assets of the community by building physical spaces.  This 
preference for capital construction, for building the places where work occurred rather 
than funding the work itself, connects the Krannerts to another occasional donor to 
medical research, Richard M. Fairbanks.   
The Fairbanks Foundation is another notable example of a private foundation in 
Central Indiana that made significant occasional, but important contributions to support 
medical research.  Richard M. Fairbanks, Jr. built a successful media network between 
1950 and 1980; he developed a reputation as a shrewd businessman.  Born into a 
privileged family, Fairbanks was the son of a prominent lawyer and grandson of 
Theodore Roosevelt’s vice president, Charles Warren Fairbanks.  His family owned and 
published the Indianapolis News, the city’s evening newspaper.  After Fairbanks 
graduated from Yale and finished a stint in the Naval Reserve, he took a seat on the board 
of directors of his family’s newspaper in 1946.   
In an effort to bolster the paper against the type of losses it experienced during the 
Depression, Fairbanks invested in a small radio station in 1947, the first in a series of 
media investments. 144  At the height of his career, Fairbanks owned over twenty radio 
and television stations across the country, as well as the Indianapolis Motor Speedway 
                                                 
142 Krannert Charitable Trust, Form 990-PF (1983) (KT). 
143. Foundation Library Center Questionnaire, Herman Charles and Ellnora Decker 
Kranert Foundation, dated April 10, 1958, (KF). 
143 Wendy Ford, Richard M. Fairbanks, A Life in Broadcasting (Indianapolis: Richard M. 
Fairbanks Foundation, 2008): 20. 
144 Wendy Ford, Richard M. Fairbanks, A Life in Broadcasting (Indianapolis: Richard M. 
Fairbanks Foundation, 2008): 20.  
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radio network.  He invested successfully in real estate and cable television, and owned 
part of the Indiana Pacers, the city’s professional basketball team, as well as a share in 
Carnegie Hall. 145   
As his fortune grew, Fairbanks began to think about the disposition of his wealth.  
He was particularly eager to avoid taxes and had little appetite for passing all of his estate 
to his children and grandchildren.  In the mid-1980s, Warren Buffet, an influential 
financier, published an article in Fortune magazine warning against the dangers of 
inherited wealth.  In the article, Buffet said that he planned to give his money to a 
charitable foundation rather than to his children.146  Fairbanks liked that option, and he 
asked his corporate lawyer, Leonard Betley, to create a foundation.  
Betley formed a private foundation in 1986, and Fairbanks funded the new 
organization with a place-holding deposit of $5,000.  Fairbanks, his wife, Virginia, and 
Betley served as the Foundation’s first directors.  Fairbanks chose to focus on the city 
where he gained success, and he provided a clear statement of this intent.  The 
foundation’s Articles of Incorporation required that future directors of the foundation 
have a close connection to Indianapolis.147  Projects to benefit the city were strongly 
preferred, but the type of project or the ideal beneficiaries were undefined save a 
preference that Fairbanks shared with the Krannerts for capital projects.  Fairbanks died 
in 2000.  At the close of his estate, $132 million were deposited into the Foundation.  
Betley was named CEO of the new foundation, a position he held for 15 more years.  
                                                 
145 Ford, Richard M. Fairbanks, 149 & 236. 
146 Ibid., 235. 
147 Richard M. Fairbanks Foundation, Articles of Incorporation, dated October 27, 1986 
(FFOF). 
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Fairbanks’ decisions about where to give were driven less by a dedication to a 
particular cause or organization than by his goals to honor his family and enhance 
Indianapolis.  Unlike the Krannerts, who rarely made grants of less than $50,000, many 
of the Fairbanks Foundation’s gifts were small amounts, $5,000 or less, given to 
organizations his family supported.148  In 1997, for example, the Foundation made 
twenty-seven small gifts, including ten to health care providers and disease 
organizations.149   
During the Foundation’s first two decades, it followed a pattern of providing 
small grants to a laundry list of mostly local organizations along with a few large, often 
multi-year grants to support capital projects or new program initiatives undertaken by 
organizations the fund already supported.  Major gifts supported construction at schools, 
including Butler University, and at cultural institutions, including the Indianapolis 
Museum of Art and the Indianapolis Zoo. During Fairbanks’ lifetime, these large gifts 
were less numerous than smaller gifts to support organizations. 
Fairbanks did, however, specifically identify an interest in health and medicine.  
The Foundation’s Articles of Incorporation directed special consideration for projects that 
were “health care related” and designated several of the city’s largest hospitals as 
intended beneficiaries.150  The resulting gifts were generally directed toward institutional 
growth in the form of new buildings and equipment or patient access to care, rather than 
                                                 
148 Fairbanks also provided consistent financial support to the Fairbanks Hospital, a 
facility dedicated to the treatment of substance addiction.  Fairbanks’ grandmother was 
an early funder of the facility and it is named in her honor.  Fairbanks’ support for this 
organization typically took the form of operating grants.   
149 Richard M. Fairbanks, Minutes of the Board of Directors, July 18, 1999 (FFOF). 
150 Richard M. Fairbanks, Minutes of the Board of Directors, September 29, 1999 
(FFOF). 
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research facilities or efforts.  Typical of Fairbanks’ work was a 1999 commitment of $2.5 
million over 3 years to support the creation of a burn center at Wishard Hospital that 
would bear the Fairbanks name.  As with many facility gifts, however, a treatment 
facility, particularly at a hospital staffed by medical school faculty and students, also 
provided a venue for research.  That same year, Fairbanks awarded grants to twenty-six 
other arts and social service organizations as well as to three other local hospitals.  
Medical philanthropy was, in sum, a part of a larger whole.  
Fairbanks’ biographer, Wendy Woodruff Ford, suggests that his interest in 
medical research arose only late in his life as a reaction to the health challenges that he 
and other family members faced.  She offers no specific evidence of this transition.  What 
can be seen from the Fairbanks Foundation’s records and grantmaking is that 
deliberations of each gift were more overtly strategic and specific about a goal other than 
health or medicine per se.  Minutes from a 1998 board meeting, for example, capture the 
factors relevant to considering a gift to the medical school.  The Board minutes 
specifically identify the school’s importance as an “economic driver for Indianapolis.”151   
Beyond adding to the body of medical knowledge or even improving health care, 
Fairbanks and his board also saw that donations could offer indirect benefits such as 
building the prominence of the medical school and its reputation as a leader in a distinct 
field of research.  In 1997, for example, the Foundation granted a proposal to provide 
$1.5 million to support a “leadership position (Fellow, Professor or Chair)” at the Indiana 
University Center on Aging Research, a new interdisciplinary research center created to 
                                                 
151 Ford, Richard M. Fairbanks, 241.  
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investigate issues related to aging and care of the aging patient.152  An endowed research 
position was a helpful tool in the effort to attract an accomplished researcher with a 
developed reputation in the discipline.  A high-profile researcher would enhance the 
reputation of the new center, a fact that could be leveraged in the quest to secure federal 
grants in the emerging field of geriatrics.153 Again, we see recognition of Rockefeller’s 
philosophy of rewarding and enhancing institutions with proven success in a field of 
research.  By enhancing an institution’s reputation, Fairbanks’ gift could generate 
multiple benefits.   
The Fairbanks Foundation continued its pattern of occasional engagement in 
health, most recently with a focus on public health.  In 2010, the Foundation committed 
$20 million “to support the creation of the Fairbanks School of Public Health on the 
IUPUI campus.”  This gift is another example of leveraging philanthropic gifts to support 
economic development as well as health, a fact recognized by IU President, Michael 
McRobbie who said that the new school would “enable Indiana University to compete for 
federal and foundation funding that is available only to schools of public health” and 
“contribute to economic development.”154 
Medical school deans and administrators came to appreciate that philanthropy, 
whether from dedicated supporters or those who give to medical research occasionally, 
could be used strategically to act as seed or startup funding to nudge an initiative or 
                                                 
152 Richard M. Fairbanks Foundation, Minutes of the Board of Directors, September 10, 
1998, 2, (FFOF). 
153 National Institute on Aging, NIA Timeline, https://www.nia.nih.gov/about/nia-
timeline. 
154 School of Public Health at IUPUI named for Fairbanks in honor of Foundation’s $20 
million gift,” at http://newscenter.iupui.edu/archived-releases/index.php-id=5794.html 
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research agenda into motion.  Fairbanks’ $20 million gift, for example, opened the door 
to new federal funding opportunities not previously available.  Such a grant provided an 
appealing, high reward opportunity to the donor. 
The Lilly Endowment is another example of an important Indianapolis donor that 
supported a diverse number of initiatives and organizations in the community, including 
making grants to support medicine and health.  This foundation was comprised of the 
gifts from both the Eli Lilly and Company pharmaceutical firm and members of the Lilly 
family.  The Endowment, one of the largest private foundations in the country, is located 
in Indianapolis.  Since 2000, the Endowment has given over $240 million in three 
different grants to the Indiana University School of Medicine to support research in 
human genetics as well as to support the recruiting and retention of high caliber research 
scientists to the medical school.155 Although the Endowment is orders of magnitude 
larger than the foundations in this study and will eventually warrant a more detailed 
examination, these gifts demonstrate that even the largest foundations are willing to 
provide research support that is designed to increase capacity of research organizations 
broadly and that can catalyze future, but undefined work. 
3.  Hoosier foundations and medical research:  A dedicated focus. 
While Krannert and Fairbanks made occasional gifts to medical research 
institutions, three foundations in Indianapolis adopted scientific and medical research as 
their sole philanthropic focus.  Grants from these dedicated funders contributed directly 
and significantly to medical advances, including the invention of surgical mesh, the 
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development of infant cord-blood banking, and the creation of the electronic medical 
records system.  Foundation support helped to build the physical spaces needed to 
conduct research as well as professional capacity and expertise to do the work.  These 
contributions generated benefits beyond individual researchers and their projects.  
Philanthropic grantmaking advanced entire institutions, the universities and hospitals 
where these researchers worked, and the general community.  
Every foundation has an origin story, a reason or set of factors that motivated the 
creation of a private charitable fund as well as the choice to devote the proceeds from that 
organization to the work of medical research.  Organizations then make choices regarding 
how they will organize and conduct the work of grantmaking as well as about what they 
will fund and what they will decline.  Comparing the choices that one founder made 
against the decisions of another provides a basis to begin identifying points of similarity 
and divergence in the work of smaller and more local foundations that are rarely studied.  
Naturally, there are obvious points of consideration regarding the individuals who started 
these foundations, including their backgrounds, professional careers, and family 
situations.  Characteristics of the organizations they created also provide meaningful 
opportunities for comparative analysis.  These factors include: how the foundations first 
structured their work and selected recipients, the level of complexity built into the 
structures and operational process, and the roles that outside advisors played in early 
operations.  The choices the foundations made concerning their work and structure 
reveals a great deal about the foundations in the study and provides a basis for asking 
more refined questions about the operation of these foundations and others working in 
other communities or supporting other efforts. 
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Another important characteristic in this study concerns the ways that these 
dedicated foundations working at the same time and in the same community shared 
knowledge across organizational boundaries with each other and with their potential and 
actual recipients.  This study affords a view of the communication and information 
sharing practices adopted by these three foundations.  In particular, this study focuses on 
the way these foundations used information to craft complementary grants that advanced 
a strategic initiative undertaken by the medical school with the goal of magnifying the 
impact of each gift.  For example, the Fairbanks Foundation provided the funds to hire a 
senior researcher at the Center for Aging Research.  This Center was housed in the 
Regenstrief Institute, an organization created and funded by another nonprofit, the 
Regenstrief Foundation.156  Leonard Betley, Fairbanks’ lawyer, worked with both 
foundations.  This practice of organizational cross-pollination was made possible by the 
relationships and communication between a small group of academic and civic leaders 
who worked regularly together—something possibly distinctive of social networks in a 
midsized city.  The linked nature of the foundations in the community will be explored in 
the remainder of this work.   
Since 1969 the Regenstrief Foundation, the Showalter Trust, and the Walther 
Cancer Foundation have collectively given over $500 million to support medical 
research.  This total represents thousands of grants to universities, hospitals, and 
laboratories located primarily in Indianapolis.  The remainder of this chapter introduces 
                                                 
156 Richard M. Fairbanks Foundation, Minutes of the Board of Directors, February 27, 
2002 (FF0F). 
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these three organizations with a focus on the factors that motivated their creation and on 
the early operation of these dedicated funds. 
A.  The Regenstrief Foundation 
In 1967, Sam Regenstrief was wrestling with two related problems.  He owned 
82% of Design & Manufacturing Corporation (D&M), then the largest manufacturer of 
residential dishwashers in the world.  Sam and his wife, Myrtie, had no direct heirs.  They 
did not want to leave their entire fortune to distant relatives.  Instead, Sam wanted to 
provide for his employees and the community where they lived by ensuring that D&M 
would continue operating in the hands of his employees after his death.  A lawyer 
suggested that creating a philanthropic foundation would allow him to meet both goals.  
In this case, an extensive set of available records provides the opportunity to 
examine the operation of the Regenstrief Foundation as those operations were recorded in 
minutes and other records.  Regenstrief the donor, however, was a private and modest 
man who left no personal papers or interviews that give insight into his decisions.  
Consequently, conclusions about the motivations for action are based on inference from 
the written records of the organization.   
Sam Regenstrief migrated from Vienna to Indianapolis as a child in 1914.  In 
1929, he became a “time study man” evaluating worker productivity at the Real Silk 
Hosiery factory.  Regenstrief’s early introduction to the science of efficiency shaped his 
career and his eventual philanthropic endeavors.  In 1958, he purchased a shuttered Jeep 
manufacturing plant in Connersville, Indiana, and opened D&M.  Within months, the 
plant was producing the first affordable, front-loading dishwashers for a post-war 
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consumer market eager for luxury.  By the 1970s, the company produced over a million 
units a year, or three of every four dishwashers sold in the world.157 
Sam and his wife, Myrtie, were dedicated to Connersville, where they lived most 
of their lives in a modest home.  The couple had no children but Sam, by all accounts, 
was deeply devoted to his employees.  It was not surprising that he was eager to find a 
way to keep the company operating in town and in the hands of those he knew and 
trusted after his death.  In 1966, Leonard Betley, a young tax lawyer working with D&M, 
suggested that a foundation could help him accomplish his goals.  Betley would later 
suggest this same strategy to two other Indiana businessmen, Richard Fairbanks and 
Joseph Walther. 
Under Betley’s proposal, controlling ownership in D&M would pass from the 
Regenstriefs’ estate to the new foundation.158  The foundation board could operate the 
company as an asset of the foundation in perpetuity.  Choosing the foundation as a legal 
vehicle, however, meant that the foundation would need to make regular philanthropic 
gifts.  
Regenstrief wanted a fund that would have a single focus rather than a general-
purpose.  Selecting one focus reduced the administrative burden on the foundation’s 
board of directors, a fact that Regenstrief would have found important as his foundation 
board overlapped with his corporate board.  Throughout his life, the welfare of the 
company remained his primary focus. Regenstrief wanted the foundation to operate as a 
support organization that would benefit a single organization, even though his Foundation 
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was not legally organized to operate as a support organization.  Indeed, he wanted to 
make a single annual gift to a single recipient.  Initially, Sam leaned toward supporting 
the engineering school at Purdue, but Dr. Harvey Feigenbaum had a different idea.   
Feigenbaum, a young cardiologist at the Krannert Institute, was married to 
Regenstrief’s niece.  During family gatherings, Regenstrief and Feigenbaum often 
discussed health care and lamented inefficiencies that burdened the system.159  
Feigenbaum suspected that Regenstrief, who sat on the board of the local hospital, might 
consider funding work at the medical school.  Feigenbaum enlisted the help of John 
Hickam, the Chairman of the Department of Medicine at Indiana University School of 
Medicine.160  Hickam was known nationally for his work in pulmonary medicine, as well 
as his efforts to enhance health care access and improve both care delivery and medical 
education.  He had served as a member of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon 
General of the United States that issued its report on Smoking and Health in 1964.161  
Hickam helped persuade Regenstrief to settle on a focus.  Sam would devote the 
charitable efforts of his foundation to support efforts to identify and nurture 
improvements and efficiencies in the way that care was delivered. 
Sam and several of his advisors met with representatives of the Indiana University 
School of Medicine over the winter of 1966 to 1967 to help Regenstrief and his team 
assess “the worth of programs in the field of health care which the Foundation might 
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consider undertaking.”162  To respond to Regenstrief’s request, the school proposed 
creating an "advisory council" to guide the new Foundation on how to “best to use 
University resources” to carry out the Foundation’s goals.163  The proposed group 
included the dean and associate dean of the medical school, faculty members, including 
Hickam and Feigenbaum, and five external medical professionals, including Eugene 
Stead, Dean of the Duke University School of Medicine and John Hickam's mentor.  
Finally, the medical school offered the services of Dr. Raymond Murray, a member of the 
medical faculty, to serve as a part-time director to oversee operational work that the 
Foundation would finance.   
Following formal incorporation on April 7, 1967, the Regenstrief Foundation 
Board of Trustees appointed Hickam to the board.  Sam, his wife, and several of Sam’s 
closest business advisors rounded out the Foundation board’s membership.164  Hickam 
was directed to constitute an advisory board that would identify and recommend potential 
projects for foundation support.165  A few months later, Hickam’s advisory group made 
its first recommendation.  The suggested recipient was a community-based diagnostic 
program run by the Department of Medicine, the department that Hickam led.  In 
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essence, Regenstrief created a foundation and handed effective control over to the chair 
of the School of Medicine’s largest department. 
Later that summer, Regenstrief’s Foundation Board began to add shape to its 
philanthropic goal.  Regenstrief asked Hickam and his Advisory Council members to 
investigate and propose how the Foundation could "best devote resources . . . to the 
solution, over a 20-year period, of problems existing in [the] present health care delivery 
system."166  Clearly, the goal was ambitious.  Yet, in the same meeting, Regenstrief went 
on to specify that the effort to make change should be focused in one area.  It is 
reasonable to assume that Regenstrief’s preference for philanthropic engagement 
mirrored his approach to manufacturing: do one thing efficiently.  At the same time, there 
may have been a very practical motive to Regenstrief’s desire to keep a focus on the 
corporate side of his work.  With the Regenstrief’s priorities and personal style in mind, 
Hickam’s Advisory Committee suggested an ambitious proposal, an idea that provided 
important benefits to the school as well.   
Hickam proposed creating a research institute with a working clinic and a 
laboratory to test improvements to the care system.167  The proposed institute would be “a 
separate entity with its own board of directors composed of representatives from 
Regenstrief Foundation, the School of Medicine and General Hospital,” one of the 
medical school’s training hospitals.168  Its work would focus on improving the system of 
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health care rather than on the type of basic and applied scientific work most common in 
medical research.  
The research institute concept met the needs of the donor, researchers, and the 
medical school needs, at least initially.  An institute could pursue multiple research 
initiatives simultaneously; yet, Regenstrief would make only a single allocation every 
year eliminating the need for the consideration of multiple projects.  Additionally, a 
research institute could follow a flexible staffing model by offering short-term contracts 
to researchers working on a single project rather than hiring and managing a stable of 
full-time researchers.  With few full-time employees, an institute could be more flexible 
and carry less overhead cost. 
Institute researchers could also work as medical school faculty, teaching students 
while staffing the hospital wards and clinics, thereby benefiting the medical school and 
its partner hospitals.  An independent institute also offered academic cachet that could 
entice ambitious medical researchers not otherwise inclined to take a job with a poor 
county hospital.  Hickam persuaded Regenstrief of the value of the institute approach and 
the Regenstrief Institute for Health Care was born, at least in concept.   
The Board motion creating the new institute was silent on several important 
particulars, including the extent and form of the Regenstrief’s financial support.169  
Negotiating the particulars was left to Regenstrief’s representative, Leonard Betley.  The 
Foundation and the medical school agreed to share the cost of employees working for 
both the Institute and the Medical School, including any full-time faculty and 
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administrative staff.170  Regenstrief would make annual block grants to Indiana 
University, which then paid all of the Institute’s operating costs.  A new governing board 
including appointees from the Foundation, the medical school, and Marion County 
General Hospital would direct the Institute.171  
Progress at the Institute threatened to stall in 1970 after John Hickam passed away 
unexpectedly at the age of 55.  Eugene Stead, Hickam's mentor from North Carolina and 
a member of the Regenstrief Advisory Council, temporarily stepped into the gap and lent 
his significant reputation to the effort, particularly the effort to recruit top-notch 
researchers to the Institute.  Stead also sought to maximize the opportunity that 
Regenstrief’s support created to benefit a team of young and creative faculty and to 
advance a cause Stead was personally dedicated to: increasing access to care in 
underserved urban and rural communities.   
Under Stead’s leadership, the Institute opened and ran new multi-specialty clinics 
around the state, including in small communities like Paoli, New Harmony, and 
Connersville, Regenstrief’s hometown.  The clinics combined services of general and 
specialty physicians with those of nurse practitioners, then a novel type of care 
provider.172  The School of Medicine created a new academic unit, the Department of 
Community Health Sciences (hereafter, the DCHS), to partner with the Regenstrief 
Institute.  Ray Murray, the Institute’s director, envisioned a relationship in which it would 
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collect and analyze data and the DCHS would share the lessons learned from these 
efforts.173   
The Regenstrief Institute was not like other research institutes within the medical 
school.  The Krannert Institute, which Regenstrief was initially modeled after, was a 
more typical model of an academic, medical research institute.  Krannert was an institute 
of the medical school established along with a $2.8 million donation for a new pavilion at 
University Hospital.  It focused on a particular type of work related to a type of disease or 
set of conditions.  The Krannert Institute included scientists and physicians working on 
issues related to understanding and improving cardiac care.  Physicians working in the 
Krannert Institute treated patients and therefore worked regularly in the hospital as well 
as in the clinic.  Regenstrief was located near the medical school and hospital, and some 
medical school faculty associated with Regenstrief’s regularly treated patients in the 
hospital and clinic, but much of the research undertaken by Regenstrief researchers did 
depend on this proximity.  Additionally, research institutes are typically a part of a 
medical school or hospital’s organizational structure and are housed within a department 
or division of the larger organization. The Regenstrief Institute, however, was operated as 
a unit of Marion County Health and Hospital Corporation, the quasi-governmental unit 
that also ran Marion County General Hospital, rather than by the medical school or 
hospital. 
At the same time that the Regenstrief Institute was building clinics around the 
state, the Foundation was also funding construction of a six-story building that would 
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house General Hospital’s outpatient clinics.  The Institute and its research activities 
would occupy the third floor of the building. In addition to Foundation support for the 
building, Health and Hospital Corporation floated a $6 million bond, and the medical 
school contributed $1 million.  Sam Regenstrief also gave $2 million from his personal 
accounts beyond the Foundation’s contributions to fund the construction project. 
Sam Regenstrief’s plate was full, and he and his board grew concerned over the 
increasing range and cost of these projects.  By the spring of 1974, tensions peaked 
between Stead and his supporters, who were eager to build a far-reaching care system 
with nodes across the state, and those who preferred the Institute to focus on local 
projects and the urban population that the new Regenstrief Health Center would serve.  
Sam Regenstrief dedicated the Foundation’s annual meeting to discussing the 
Foundation’s future direction.174  
Stead took a clear stand.  In his mind, there were mutually exclusive paths for the 
Institute.  The first involved an external focus, essentially staying the course and 
maintaining multiple projects at a variety of sites around the state.  The second path 
concentrated all of the Institute’s resources and work inside the new Regenstrief Health 
Center.  Sam Regenstrief preferred a local focus, which he believed allowed him to better 
concentrate and manage his resources.  The Foundation Board agreed.  
By 1975, the Institute was detached from the Medical School’s community clinic 
project entirely.  Stead returned to North Carolina and Murray resigned his position as 
Institute Director.  Meanwhile, Dr. Clem McDonald, a doctor with a master’s degree in 
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biomedical engineering and a facility with computers, was hard at work on the third floor 
of the new Regenstrief Health Center on a project to eliminate paper medical records.  
His project would prove transformational for both the Institute and the practice of 
medicine.  
B.  The Showalter Trust   
 In 1958, Grace Showalter, a devoted art collector, gave Indiana University a 
fountain portraying the birth of Venus.  Installed on university’s main campus in 
Bloomington outside the school's fine arts center, its largest auditorium, and the Lilly 
Library, the fountain became a hub of student activities including student protests.  
Groups advocating for civil rights and those supporting and opposing the Vietnam War 
frequently gathered at the fountain.  In the fall of 1967, demonstrations coinciding with 
the visits of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and corporate recruiters from Dow Chemical 
Company, a manufacturer of napalm, became violent as several hundred opponents of the 
war clashed with approximately 1,500 heckling supporters of the military and the 
Johnson Administration.175  
 By 1968, turmoil on the Indiana University campus had become so intense that it 
led to two significant changes—one highly public and another very private.  Elvis Stahr, 
Indiana University President and a former Secretary of the Army announced his 
resignation to a surprised Board of Trustees.  The school also lost the support of at least 
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one conservative donor.  Showalter was shocked at both the students’ conduct and the 
school’s response.  She decided to look for a new beneficiary.176   
Grace Showalter’s husband, Ralph Showalter, had died in 1959 and left his estate 
to her.  Ralph Showalter had worked at Eli Lilly and Company after earning his degree in 
chemistry from Purdue University.  He retired from the company in 1948 as a vice 
president.  Like the Regenstriefs, the Showalters had no children and chose not to leave 
their estate to more distant relatives.  Grace supported and engaged in a variety of civic 
activities, particularly those associated with the arts.  She gave generously to build the 
Showalter Pavilion at the Indianapolis Museum of Art, for example.  She was known to 
be formidable and opinionated.  She was the first woman to serve on the Indiana 
University Foundation Board of Trustees, where she had a twenty-three-year tenure.  
Indiana University awarded an honorary doctor of humanities to her in 1967, just one 
year before she decided to amend her will.177 
Working through her personal attorney, Robert Claycombe, Showalter contacted 
Fred Hovde, then President of Purdue University, and Glenn Irwin, Dean of the Indiana 
University School of Medicine, in 1968.  She asked Claycombe to investigate how she 
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could best support research at their institutions.178  Showalter specified that she did not 
want to support construction of buildings or student scholarships—she was interested in 
funding research itself.  In this way, her ideas about what to do with the proceeds of her 
Foundation had more shape than did Regenstrief’s at the time that he started exploring a 
foundation as an option.  Regenstrief was motivated by a business goal and was led to 
research by an advisor.  Showalter chose research particularly, though her reason for this 
choice is unknown. 
Showalter did not go so far, however, as to indicate either a particular area or type 
of research or to indicate the amount or form of her proposed support.  She gave 
Claycombe no other restrictions.  Irwin and Hovde were in the enviable position of 
pitching their best ideas, largely without limit.  Irvin first offered the somewhat 
unimaginative suggestion of establishing an endowed chair at the School of Medicine.  In 
a letter written to Showalter immediately after his meeting with Claycombe, Irwin noted 
that a gift that produced income of $100,000 per year would permit the school to recruit 
and support a “top-rate researcher.”  He also tried to build in flexibility by asking 
Showalter to allow the school to divert funds to support “unexpected” and “urgent” needs 
arising from ongoing research projects. Showalter accepted Irwin’s request for funding, 
but indicated that she preferred something beyond the limited role of funding faculty 
chairs.   
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Even before hearing from Hovde about a Purdue proposal, Showalter sent a letter 
to five men she wanted to serve as the grant “selection committee” for a charitable trust 
that she determined to establish upon her death.179  It is unknown why Showalter chose 
the title “selection committee,” rather than “board of trustees,” which was the real role 
these advisors assumed.  Grace Showalter was sufficiently familiar with sophisticated 
nonprofit governance through her prior civic roles, including a long tenure with the IU 
Foundation Board of Trustees.  Perhaps she simply preferred the term.  Possibly she had 
not wanted to confine the group in some manner.  Regardless, she turned to individuals 
who already managed her financial affairs, including two bank officers, her personal 
lawyer, Robert Claycombe, and a dermatologist in private practice who was married to a 
close friend.  Showalter asked Hovde to join the committee as well.  The Selection 
Committee functioned as the sole governing body for the organization.  Showalter herself 
was not a member. 
In her letter of appointment, which Claycombe drafted, Showalter also gave 
“suggestions and instructions” concerning her intentions as regards each university.  The 
allocation to Purdue would support a “Showalter Professorship of Bioengineering,” as a 
tribute to her husband.  The Selection Committee could distribute funds beyond the 
amount needed for the named chair to support other initiatives at Purdue.  Specifically, a 
"substantial portion of income [could] be spent in the area of air and water pollution 
control.”  She went on, however, to state that “preferential consideration,” should be 
given to projects in the area of biochemistry and bioengineering, including “control and 
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prevention of disease, development of new technologies in food production,” and “use of 
the modern computer in the measurement of biological processes.”180   
In the same letter, she set out terms for the School of Medicine grants.  Money 
would first be used to support a professor in either biochemistry or pharmacology, as 
Irwin suggested.  The dean of the school, it appears, retained discretion to identify the 
faculty member and area.  The remainder of the school’s allocation would support 
research projects “most likely to permanently benefit mankind."  Showalter added one 
additional instruction relevant to the funding of any other projects.  Support for these 
projects “should be undertaken only after careful consideration and with the expectation 
that support from my trust fund will continue to support such programs to completion.”181  
She expressed no other preferences or priorities in this letter.  
Showalter signed a new will in 1970, which modified some of the terms of the 
letters but not the basic intent.  This was the first of several changes that Showalter would 
make.  The will provided for the creation of the Ralph W. and Grace M. Showalter Trust 
Fund, a trust “to benefit mankind and encourage medical and scientific research.”  The 
terms of the will describing the Trust conformed to the directions that Showalter set out 
in her December 1968 letter to the five-member selection committee, although the 
document contained even fewer specifics. For example, the will designated that one-half 
of the income generated from the Trust corpus to go to IU School of Medicine and one 
half to Purdue.  She had described that same division in her December 1968 letter, but the 
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will contains virtually no directions concerning how the schools were to use the money.  
Nor was there any mention of the creation of endowed chairs at either school.  The will 
did, however, include one new instruction that did not appear in the 1968 letter:  no 
Showalter grant money could be used to support research in “psychiatry, sociology or 
social studies.”182 
In 1971, two years before her death, Showalter made one final change by 
expanding the trust to include financial support for the Indianapolis Center for Advanced 
Research (ICFAR).  Established in 1970 as a partnership between Indiana University, 
Purdue University, the City of Indianapolis, and the Indiana Chamber of Commerce, the 
center was to be an economic development incubator for the city and for Indiana 
University or Purdue researchers working on the newly created IUPUI campus.  
Showalter directed the Committee to allocate (up to) one-third of the annual income from 
the Trust to the Center and recommended establishment of the “Grace M. and Ralph W. 
Showalter Chair” for the Director of the Center.  She specified that up to $50,000 per 
year go to support that position.   
Later that same year, Showalter created a second, separate testamentary trust that 
the Selection Committee would also manage.  The Methodist Cardiac Trust was restricted 
to cardiac care and research at Methodist Hospital. Grace Showalter had a personal 
connection to the cardiac unit as a result of her own heart illness, although there is no 
document confirming that her gift was intended as a form of gratitude or recognition for 
her own care.  The value of the Methodist trust at the time of its creation was $2,000,000.   
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Grace Showalter died on July 23, 1972, with no direct heirs.  At the close of 
probate, the Trust corpus was valued at approximately $15 million.  The Showalter 
Selection Committee met for the first time as a grantmaking body on July 10, 1973, just a 
year after her death.  The group began its work by immediately ignoring Showalter’s 
directions regarding the method of disbursing trust proceeds.  
Fred Hovde, the only member of the committee to work at a research institution, 
led the discussions about a grant selection process.183  The discussion centered on the 
timing and nature of submissions.  The Committee ignored Showalter’s instructions to 
simply divide the money evenly between the two schools as block grants.  Instead, the 
Committee took it upon itself to be more active in the selection process by requiring 
schools to submit funding requests.  
The rationale for this decision was not set out in the minutes from the meeting.  It 
is possible that the process of submitting proposals for review simply seemed familiar, 
almost required, to Hovde.  Notably, the committee did not impose any of the other 
requirements common to research grant proposals, such as required information or 
submission schedules.  Perhaps, instead, the members of Showalter’s committee felt a 
sense of obligation to continue assessing and advising on her behalf.  After all, three 
members of the committee had served as her financial and personal advisors for years. 
Two final explanations are less flattering.  Hovde might have seized the opportunity to 
set up a more competitive process in hopes that his institution could prevail for more 
funds.  It was reasonable to predict that the other members of the committee needed to 
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rely on the academic representative to identify the most appropriate processes and select 
the worthiest applicants.  Alternately, the Selection Committee may simply have 
discounted Showalter’s wishes because she was a woman who had no corporate business 
experience.  
At this first meeting, the Selection Committee awarded several grants.  An 
allocation of $34,100 was made to the IU School of Medicine to support the first 
Showalter Professor of Biochemistry.  ICFAR received a grant of $50,000 to establish the 
Showalter Chair for the Director of ICFAR, a position that Showalter had specifically 
called for.  The Committee rejected ICFAR’s request for $30,000 to support a 
symposium on energy, because “this was not an area in which Mrs. Showalter expressed 
an interest.”184  In reaching this conclusion, the Committee again appears to either have 
ignored Showalter’s stated desire to support projects to address pollution or it concluded 
that a symposium about energy was not relevant to pollution.185 
Purdue had requested $150,000 to support the recruitment of the Showalter 
Professor of Bioengineering, including hiring a secretary, research assistants, and 
laboratory equipment.  Due to the timing of this hire, Purdue’s grant was paid early.  
Bioengineering was an emerging field, and few schools had developed freestanding 
departments.  For Purdue, the grant was an opportunity to move to the forefront of this 
field.  The Committee's response to Purdue's request was restrained; it allocated only 
$50,000 toward a recruitment package designated for a professor's salary and deferred 
action on the remainder of the request.  
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Purdue felt strongly enough about the investment that it found an additional 
$100,000—half of the bioengineering school’s entire research budget in 1974—to bring 
Leslie (Les) Geddes from Baylor University.  As part of the deal, Purdue also hired 
Geddes' top two research assistants and secured jobs for each of the men’s spouses.  This 
proved a shrewd investment.  Within 5 years of his hire, Geddes brought in over $5 
million in project grants.  The bioengineering department that Geddes created continues 
to generate millions of dollars a year in licensing fees from Geddes’ work improving 
electrodes used in medical devices, such as cardiac monitors, and for developing a 
material to accelerate tissue regeneration.186  Despite providing only a portion of the 
funds needed to complete the project, Showalter’s contribution allowed the effort to 
move forward, one that might have stalled otherwise.   
C.  The Walther Cancer Foundation 
Mary Margaret Walther died of colon cancer in the summer of 1983.  This event 
pushed her grieving husband, Joe, to action.  A surgeon, decorated veteran, and business 
entrepreneur, Walther mustered his financial resources, personal network, and strong 
self-confidence to create an organization dedicated to the "eradication of cancer."187 
Since its inception in 1985, the Walther Cancer Foundation has provided over $110 
million to research scientists, physicians, and nurses working on initiatives aimed at the 
prevention and treatment of cancer.  
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Although focused on a single disease, Walther adopted a wide and ambitious 
mission for his foundation. In short order, Walther formed a medical research 
organization, a specialized form of nonprofit organization and four related legal entities.  
Beyond scientific research, the Foundation initiated efforts to improve nursing care and 
the quality of the in-hospital experience for patients and family members.  Walther also 
created a public charity to raise money from the general public to support these efforts, 
though this proved to be unsuccessful.  The sprawling organizational chart filled with 
interlocked organizations and directors, as well the potpourri of actual and proposed 
projects, confounded many, including Walther’s closest supporters.  Despite the 
challenges that this cluttered structure created, Walther showed good judgment in his 
early funding choices.  In many ways, the first decade of the Walther Foundation 
mirrored the personality of its founding donor.   
Joseph E. Walther (Joe) was born on November 24, 1912, in Rushville, Indiana.  
His father was a physician, and Joe often accompanied him on house calls.  Ambitious, 
confident, and eager for adventure, Walther earned his M.D. in 1936 and then took a job 
as a physician to provide care for the personnel of the Transpacific Cable Company and 
Pan Am Airways.  The job took him to Midway Island, and enamored by the Pacific, he 
next headed to Kauai, Hawaii, where he was physician to thousands of employees on 
sugar and pineapple plantations. After the outbreak of the Second World War, Walther 
served with distinction as a flight surgeon.  Walther returned to Indianapolis, married his 
hometown sweetheart, Mary Margaret and set up a medical practice.  By the mid-1950s, 
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his practice was thriving and he turned to new interests—developing new business 
ventures.188   
Like many Indianapolis doctors, Walther struggled to find hospital beds for his 
patients.  He spotted an opportunity.  He and several partners opened a new hospital, 
Memorial Clinic Hospital, in February 1956 on the city’s Near-North Side.  Although 
proprietary hospitals had been common in the first half of the century, private hospitals 
had grown rare by the 1950s due in large part to the expense of constructing more 
modern hospitals and the availability of federal funds to incentivize the construction and 
modernization of hospitals, particularly those willing to provide indigent care.189 Walther 
served as President and CEO of the hospital. Within 10 years, the hospital expanded to a 
200-bed general hospital renamed Winona Memorial Hospital after his mother.  Walther 
also built and managed a professional office building on the site and he created a 
foundation associated with the hospital, the Winona Memorial Foundation.  
In 1983, Mary Margaret was diagnosed with colon cancer.  She died within 
months.  Devastated by her death, and suffering from his own serious vision problems, 
Walther decided to retire from the practice of medicine and dedicate himself to what he 
described in his autobiography as the “eliminat[ion of] cancer as a cause of death and 
suffering.”190  On September 13, 1983, only two months after his wife’s death, Walther 
                                                 
188 In 1956, Walther created his first philanthropic institution, the Winona Memorial 
Foundation, to provide scholarships for medical and engineering students interested in 
medical matters.  
189 The Hospital Survey and Construction Act (1946), commonly known as the Hill-
Burton Act is one example.  The Act provided grants and guaranteed loans to entities that 
agreed to provide services to those who could not pay.  
190 Walther, A Life Like None Other, 316. 
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and eight of his closest associates held a formal meeting to discuss the creation of a 
cancer institute at Winona Hospital.   
Walther, like Showalter, was not influenced by an advisor to support medical 
research but instead reached that decision on his own.  He envisioned the development of 
a comprehensive care facility to “provide for the total treatment, rehabilitation, and 
education of cancer patients.”191 A common presumption that people who make 
significant philanthropic investments in medical research are either grateful patients or 
they are acting out a desire to prevent a form of physical suffering that touched them or 
someone close to them. Walther is the only of the three foundations studied here to be 
motivated to engage in medical research support because of a personal encounter with 
disease.   
Walther’s ambitions, and his confidence, were extensive.  At his first meeting, he 
laid out a plan to become the referral hospital to manage all cancer care in the city.  
Walther believed that while “an adequate number of oncologists” practiced in 
Indianapolis, area hospitals showed only “a limited commitment” to cancer care.192  He 
proposed turning Winona Hospital into a centralized cancer care hospital.  Under his 
scheme, oncologists across the city would maintain their existing affiliations with other 
hospitals, but they would admit their cancer patients to his cancer center.  The meeting 
minutes do not demonstrate that the board members considered the perplexing question 
of why local hospitals would welcome the opportunity to surrender an increasingly 
lucrative set of patients to a competitor.  There was also no conversation about the steps 
                                                 
191 Walther Institute, Board Meeting Minutes of September 13, 1983, 1 (WF). 
192 Ibid. 
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that the group would need to take to begin such an ambitious venture.  Instead, the group 
spent the remainder of the meeting sketching a development and marketing plan for the 
proposed institute.193 
Walther created a small cabinet of advisors called the Oncology Development 
Committee (ODC).  This working committee was ostensibly part of the larger sixteen-
member Winona Memorial Foundation’s board of directors, the group that then operated 
the existing charitable arm of Winona Hospital.  Membership on the ODC fluctuated only 
slightly over the years, and it consisted of only a handful of trusted advisors.194  The 
group’s first project included visiting well-known cancer institutes across the country 
seeking models to replicate.   
Walther assembled a corps of local allies and expert advisors.  Dr. John Durant, 
then the Medical Director at Fox Chase Cancer Center in Philadelphia, accepted a 
position as external consultant and played a key role in influencing the structure of the 
early organization.  Locally, Walther reached out to Walter Daly, Dean of the Indiana 
University School of Medicine, and asked for help completing a feasibility study that 
would "provide evidence to the community that extensive thought had gone into 
development of the center and to provide the basis for research grants and/or other 
necessary approvals in the future."195  Additionally, Walther hired a firm of medical 
management consultants to engage in strategic planning and to develop a fundraising plan 
as well as a management structure.196  Although Walther was eager to line-up prestigious 
                                                 
193 Walther Foundation, Board Minutes, September 13, 1983, p.2 (WF) 
194 Winona Memorial Foundation, Inc., Executive Committee/Board of Directors 
Minutes, August 19, 1985, p.2. (WF) 
195 Walther Oncology Development Committee Minutes, August 16, 1984, p.2, (WF). 
196 Walther Oncology Development Committee, December 13, 1984, (WF). 
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advisors, it is not certain that he was inclined to heed their advice.  Indeed, it was not 
entirely clear what Walther was trying to create. 
One person whose advice Walther did heed was Leonard Betley, the lawyer 
already working with both the Regenstrief and the Fairbanks foundations.  Walther 
consulted Betley when he decided to sell Winona Hospital and transfer the hospital assets 
to the Winona Memorial Foundation, his existing philanthropic foundation, and then 
create a new cancer institute.  According to Internal Revenue Service rules, however, this 
transfer would leave the Winona Foundation in violation of the tax laws because a 
foundation could not operate a going for-profit business.   
Betley proposed the same solution that he had devised for Regenstrief, 
establishing a medical research organization.  Accepting this option meant that Walther’s 
foundation needed to actively engage in medical research.  Walther, however, would no 
longer own a hospital where that work could take place, and the financial support of 
research taking placed at the school of medicine alone would not be sufficient.  Betley 
also indicated that the proposed medical research organization structure accommodated 
Walther’s desire to work on multiple initiatives simultaneously through the type of 
parent-subsidiary organizational model that Walther preferred.   
Walther agreed to sell Winona for $37 million to a for-profit organization in 1983.  
To his surprise and consternation, he ran into organized opposition to the sale.  Larger 
local hospitals, which feared a new competitor entering the market, objected and 
appealed to the state Board of Health to prevent the transaction.  Opponents also 
expressed disbelief that the proceeds from the sale would move to the foundation without 
washing through Walther's hands.  A two-year legal battle followed.  
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When the sale of Winona Hospital finally closed in 1986, just under $40 million 
was transferred into the Winona Foundation, which was then renamed the Walther 
Medical Research Institute.  The Institute served as the parent organization for several 
separate subsidiary organizations: the Walther Oncology Center, the Mary Margaret 
Walther Hospice Research Center, and the Winona Memorial Foundation.  The 
Foundation was designed to generate public support and raise money to support its work, 
but this effort never gained real traction.  
Although his foundation was formed as a medical research organization dedicated 
to “eradicating cancer,” Walther and his core supporters demonstrated little appetite for 
directly managing research.  In this way, Walther’s medical research organization 
operated like its model, the Regenstrief Institute.  Walther built partnerships with an 
association of Indiana oncologists as well as with the medical school.  He provided 
funding and they conducted research.  Walther differed from Regenstrief, however, in his 
penchant for self-created complexity.  Where Regenstrief was driven to simplify and 
narrow, Walther chose to expand.  Over the next few years, Walther and his advisors 
worked at maintaining the complicated web of connected organizations and developing 
programs in the areas of education, facility design, and patient and family social and 
emotional well-being.  
4.  Conclusion: From creation to maturation. 
It is possible to consider the creation and growth of a foundation as a long series 
of choices.  Organizations result from many individual choices beginning with the 
decision to create a foundation and then one or sometimes many choices about what to 
fund.  There are choices regarding structure and the selection of leaders.  Each choice 
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frames or limits the next set of options.  These stories, in their retelling, often focus on 
the wishes and choices of the founder and imply that an organization’s creation and 
course were clean, direct and intentional.  As the stories of the medical research 
foundations examined in this chapter reveal, the creation and trajectory of foundations 
often result from chance as much as choice.   
For most of the foundations profiled in this chapter, the choice to create a 
charitable foundation was motivated primarily by individual considerations in addition to 
any urge toward generosity.  Fairbanks sought to benefit his community, but his primary 
aim was to avoid spoiling his children with a large legacy.  Regenstrief wanted to benefit 
his community as well, but he sought to do it by leaving control of his company in the 
trusted hands of his advisors.  Grace Showalter wanted to honor her deceased husband 
and, perhaps, to spite an organization that had disappointed her.   
All three of these founders sought to constrain the use of their wealth.  Even Joe 
Walther, who created a foundation to combat cancer, a purpose that is certainly 
charitable, used his foundation to create a series of organizations that he held closely and 
managed directly for as long as he was able.  Only the Krannerts, who like the 
Regenstriefs and the Showalters were childless, used the foundation as a vehicle to 
dispose of assets rather than retain them in perpetuity by directing a spend-down of their 
assets within a set time after their deaths.  
There is also an intriguing similarity between the Indiana medical research 
foundations when it came to the reasons that they donated to medical research.  None of 
the donors who created foundations dedicated solely to medical research support had 
records of extensive interest in or generosity toward medical research prior to starting a 
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foundation.  Showalter’s husband had earned most of the family fortune through his work 
with a pharmaceutical company, but he served primarily on the corporate side of the 
business.  Although Showalter had a personal history of supporting Indiana University, 
she had no connection to medical research and had been primarily interested in the arts.  
Joe Walther was a physician, but his work involved running a practice and health care 
businesses, not scientific research. Regenstrief made dishwashers, and Krannert 
manufactured cardboard boxes. 
The choice to form a foundation and support medical research, particularly in a 
dedicated way, resulted from the action of influences, specifically the recommendations 
of close and trusted advisors, including relatives and the lawyers, bankers, and civic 
leaders which the donors relied on to help them create and manage the assets that created 
their personal wealth.  In this way, Showalter, Regenstrief, Fairbanks and even Walther 
were little different that Carnegie and Rockefeller, who were led to support medical 
research by trusted counselors.  
The next chapter of this dissertation will explore the growing influence of 
outsiders on these foundations and their operation as they move into maturation, and 
particularly as they define a focus and a process for their work.  The impact of these 
foundations on the organizations they supported is also considered.  The conclusion 
includes additional and more detailed consideration of what can be learned from creation 
and early narratives of smaller and area-focused foundations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Three Indianapolis Foundations:  Growth and Change 
 Organizations, like people, move through developmental stages from birth to 
maturity.197  Anheier summarizes the “birth state” as the creative start-up period of an 
organization’s founding.  This is followed by “youth,” when an organization develops a 
structure and mission and then “midlife,” when the organization develops formal, 
bureaucratic processes to ensure efficiency and enable accountability.  Chapter Three 
tracked three foundations from birth to youth.  This chapter follows those organizations 
through the sometimes tumultuous and experimental stage of youth to organizational 
maturation.   
Founded within a twenty-year window, Regenstrief (1967), Showalter (1973), and 
Walther (1985) were shaped by similar influences and challenges.  During this period, in 
the City of Indianapolis, where all three funds were located, the practice and institutions 
of medicine and the process of medical education all continued on trajectories of growth 
and change.  Each foundation grew and changed along with the institutions and 
communities they served.   
As they matured, each foundation altered its grantmaking processes.  They refined 
relationships and developed new ones.  Eventually, each foundation developed strong 
connections to a very limited number of grantee institutions all located in the state of 
                                                 
197 Scholars use ideas of life cycle or developmental stages of to discuss and evaluate 
nonprofit organizations. W. Richard Scott, Organizations and Organizing:  Rational, 
Natural, and Open Systems, (New York, Routledge, 2006). These theories have been 
applied to nonprofit as well as for-profit organizations.  See e.g., Helmut K. Anheier, 
Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy (New York, Routledge, 2014); 
284-85. 
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Indiana and created a niche role in an effort to ensure that the grants they made were 
meaningful and did not merely duplicate or supplement other funding sources. They also 
created mechanisms to prevent risk of becoming malleable slush funds for the recipient 
institutions.   
One important external factor that shaped the course of each foundation was the 
generally positive and sustained growth in the funds’ investment portfolios.  As fund 
values increased, foundations need to distribute more money each year to comply with 
tax law requirements.  The Internal Revenue Service rules governing nonprofit 
foundations require foundations to distribute 5% of their assets every year.  The money 
must be distributed to fulfill a charitable purpose.  Foundations earn revenue through 
contributions or investment income.  The more the foundation earns, the larger its assets 
and, as a result, the more money it must distribute the following year. Wisely given, 
larger gifts could have bigger impact and foundations could do more than supplement 
other money going to existing efforts.   
The City of Indianapolis also grew, and the civic ambitions that accompanied this 
growth affected the community’s health care system.  From 1950 to 1980, the population 
of Indianapolis nearly doubled.  Beginning in the 1970s, a series of strong mayors and a 
network of engaged business and civic leaders developed and implemented strategies to 
spur growth and enhance the city’s national reputation.  Richard Lugar, mayor from 1968 
to 1976, led the merger of city government with smaller municipal units scattered across 
the county to create a governmental structure known as “Unigov.”198  The resulting 
                                                 
198 William Blomquist “Unigov, Creation of (1967-1971),” The Encyclopedia of 
Indianapolis, David J. Bodenhamer and Robert G. Barrows (eds.) (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994): 1350. 
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stronger, more centralized city government was better able to accomplish initiatives that 
required broad public and private support, including the partnerships that built facilities 
and venues needed to turn Indianapolis into a major sports and convention destination. 
A second important local effort resulted in the 1969 consolidation of several 
college and postgraduate programs offered by Indiana and Purdue universities into a new, 
single institution:  Indiana University, Purdue University - Indianapolis.  Billed as the 
“city’s university,” the campus was already emerging on land neighboring the medical 
and nursing schools as well as Indiana University, Wishard, and Riley Children’s 
hospitals, LaRue Carter Memorial Hospital, and the Veterans’ Administration 
Hospital.199  The growth of a university around the medical school campus enhanced the 
medical campus and its profile as part of a larger university campus.  Additionally, the 
municipal government’s role in creating the campus demonstrated the city’s appreciation 
for the value of higher education institutions to the community. 
Progress and growth continued inside as well as outside the walls of the medical 
school and its associated hospitals.  In the decades following the Second World War, 
advances in pharmacology, surgical techniques, genetics, diagnostic and therapeutic 
equipment, and information science drove dramatic improvements in prevention, 
treatment, and care.  Each advance opened the door to new lines of inquiry.  For deans 
and department chairs at the medical school, supporting increasingly sophisticated 
experiments and studies meant a persistent search for money, space, and human capital.  
Research productivity produced rewards in more ways than advancing knowledge.  
                                                 
199 General Hospital, the county public hospital, had recently been renamed “Wishard 
Hospital.  See footnote 138.   
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Success opened the door to new and more funding opportunities.  New funds were used 
to expand labs and hire additional scientist and staff.  For many, it was clear that 
investments in research created benefits beyond improved personal health.  Successful 
research programs enhanced the health of local economies and enhanced the vitality of 
the communities where research institutions were located.  Civic boosters took notice.   
Indianapolis’ civic and business leaders sought to exploit the potential economic 
and social energy that could result from a productive and expanding research complex on 
the city’s west side.  This chapter examines how each foundation faced and responded to 
these challenges and changes as they matured and identified their role.   
1. The Regenstrief Foundation:  Shifting roles and relationships, 1975 to 2010. 
In 1975, Sam Regenstrief named his lawyer, Leonard Betley, Acting Secretary of 
the Regenstrief Foundation Board.  Several years earlier, Betley had proposed creating a 
foundation as a way to satisfy Regenstrief’s desire to distribute his personal estate and 
keep D&M operating without interruption after his death.  Under Betley’s original plan, 
Regenstrief could contribute his own money to the foundation and obtain a personal tax 
benefit.  More importantly, he would move his ownership interest in the corporation to 
the foundation upon his death or retirement.  Under this plan, a board of trusted advisors 
that Regenstrief chose to operate his company would also run the foundation.  
Regenstrief envisioned the corporate concern as the board’s central priority.  In the 
meantime, Regenstrief, who owned most of D&M stock, was making allocations to the 
foundation.  The foundation, in turn, supported the institute, which operated as a unit of 
the Marion County Health and Hospital Corporation, the organization that also operated 
Wishard Hospital (formerly General Hospital). 
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Betley’s first major effort as Acting Secretary of the Foundation board was to 
undertake a legal and administrative reorganization of the entity.  Rules enacted as part of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 had affected foundations broadly and Sam Regenstrief’s 
efforts particularly.200  Among other restrictions imposed on foundations, the new rules 
restricted the amount of corporate stock that a foundation could hold to 25% of the shares 
issued by the company.201  This limit affected Regenstrief’s ability to move his personal 
assets into the Foundation either during his lifetime or through his estate. Regenstrief had 
hoped to move ownership of D&M, or 100% of D&M’s corporate stock, to the 
foundation.  According to this plan, the foundation board could then have operated the 
company as a going concern after Regenstrief’s death.  The new rule foreclosed this 
option.202  The original plan was no longer viable, so the lawyer searched for an 
alternative.  
Betley concluded that slipping through a door used by Howard Hughes could 
solve Regenstrief’s problem.  Hughes had built the largest private medical research 
institute in the country, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute.  In 1969, Hughes 
persuaded Congress to include within the definition of a public charity any “organizations 
engaged in the active conduct of medical research in conjunction with hospitals,” which 
                                                 
200 Led by Congressman Wright Patman (D-Texas), Congress created limits on private 
foundations in response to what he and others described as abuses of the foundation form 
including self-dealing and private inurement.  Patman and others argued that private 
foundations had become vehicles to consolidate economic power in the hands of the 
wealthy and allowed them to avoid taxation.  For more, see Hammack and Anheier, A 
Versatile Institution, 82-83. 
201 Bremner, American Philanthropy, 182-183; Hammack and Anheier, A Versatile 
Institution, 83-84. 
202 Hammack and Anheier, A Versatile Institution, 182; Frumkin, Strategic Giving, 101-
105. 
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protected his institute.203  By reclassifying the Regenstrief Foundation as a “medical 
research organization,” rather than a private foundation, Sam Regenstrief could move all 
of his assets including the controlling share of the company directly into the Foundation.  
The Foundation could then operate D&M as a going business concern while also acting 
as a foundation/vary wording.  
To accomplish this transition, the Foundation needed to convince the IRS that it 
was not simply making charitable grants to others who then acted with discretion over 
how the money was used.  Instead, the Foundation would need to be "engaged in the 
active conduct of medical research."204  This meant moving away from the hands-off 
approach that the Foundation had taken up to this point.  The Foundation would need to 
run the Institute, not just fund it.  In practice, this meant that the Regenstrief Institute 
would no longer receive the Foundation’s financial support, but instead be an operating 
department of the Foundation.  The Regenstrief Foundation Board of Directors would 
take on all the financial and administrative obligations associated with operating a 
research institute at the same time that it fought to ensure D&M’s survival in an 
increasingly competitive marketplace.  
In June 1976, Betley submitted paperwork asking the IRS to change the 
Foundation's legal status from a private foundation to a public charity operating as a 
medical research organization.  The IRS said no.  The agency did not consider the 
Institute's research agenda, with its focus on improving the efficiency and efficacy of the 
health care system, to be medical research.  The Foundation appealed.  Betley and Walter 
                                                 
203 IRC 170(b)(1)(A)(iii)(1999) and 26 Code of Federal Register §1.170A-9 and IRC 
509(a)(1)(1999). 
204 Ibid. 
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Daly, the dean of the medical school, traveled to Washington, D.C., to convince IRS 
administrators that projects like the computerization of hospital records would both 
improve health outcomes and provide valuable information for other researchers.  
Because the computerized records were searchable, researchers could mine data to inform 
and validate their work in more traditional medical science inquiries, such as evaluating 
the efficacy of certain treatments.  The Foundation's case was helped by the fact that 
Clem McDonald's record computerization project had recently received grants from the 
National Institutes of Health.205 
On January 1, 1977, after Betley and Daly's personal intervention, the IRS 
relented and designated the foundation a public charity on a probationary basis.  The 
importance of this decision cannot be overstated.  Without this recognition, the 
Foundation Board might well have followed a different course given that Regenstrief’s 
business objectives first motivated his decision to create a foundation. In the face of a 
rejection by the IRS, Regenstrief could have abandoned his plans to place his assets, 
particularly his ownership interests, in the Foundation thereby leaving in question the 
long-term sustainability of the Regenstrief Institute and its work.  Wedging into the 
Medical Research Organization classification created a new layer of administrative and 
organizational complication for both the donor and its recipients that shaped and 
restrained their relationship over subsequent decades.  Navigating these complications 
proved trying for everyone. 
The first significant consequence of this change meant many who worked for and 
through the institute needed to have an employment or contract agreement with the 
                                                 
205 Ford, Regenstrief, 147. 
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Regenstrief Institute rather than with the Marion County Health and Hospital 
Corporation, the corporate entity that ran Wishard Hospital.  In early 1976, nearly 30 
employees of the Health and Hospital Corporation became employees of the Institute, 
including systems engineers, analysts, programmers, and support staff.  Similarly, 
medical scientists, including physicians, entered into contracts or subcontracts with the 
Institute. Walter Daly, a medical school faculty member and chair of Wishard’s 
Department of Medicine, the hospital’s largest department, was named director of the 
Regenstrief Institute, a position he held from 1976 until 1983.   
Daly, who had professional obligations to three different institutions, was 
responsible for the smart management of the Institute, including supervising the 
employees, associates, interns, appointees, joint-appointees, and students who filled the 
Institute offices, which were located adjacent to Wishard Hospital on Indiana 
University’s medical campus.  Daly managed internal funds from the Regenstrief 
Foundation and, eventually, external grants which came to the Institute directly or 
through grants made to individual researchers.  Individually funded researchers were 
associated with the school of medicine, Wishard Hospital, or both. Daly’s role was 
fraught with potential conflict.   
To maintain its new status, the Foundation was compelled to change how it 
operated, including diversifying the type of work it supported and adjusting its approach 
to grantmaking.  The Regenstrief Foundation’s early grants were block grants, or lump 
sums, paid directly to Indiana University, which had handled the employment and 
management of researchers working in the Institute.  The Foundation made little effort to 
limit or influence the projects that Institute researchers took on.  Under the new regime, 
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the Foundation Board needed to find a way to exercise control, but it sought to do this in 
a way that would not distract from the attention the company needed.   
Regenstrief first chose an option that medical research funders used before him, 
the creation of an advisory board that would investigate and evaluate the promise and 
performance of projects and make recommendations about which work was most 
promising.  The Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) was created in 1978 to advise the 
board on the "medical and scientific merit" of potential projects and to recommend "new 
directions for both the Institute and the Foundation."206   
External advisors can provide an unbiased view of current and prospective 
projects.  Regenstrief named three members to the SAC.  While each member was deeply 
knowledgeable in the field of medical research, none were external or disinterested.  
Harvey Feigenbaum, Sam Regenstrief’s nephew, a member of the IU faculty and 
successful medical researcher in his own right, was named chair.  Feigenbaum, a 
cardiologist, had begun his career with the Krannert Institute.  Steven Beering, Dean of 
the medical school, and Walter Daly, a medical faculty member who chaired the 
Department of Medicine at Wishard, were the other two SAC members.  Daly, who also 
directed the Institute, was responsible for both identifying and submitting funding 
requests to the Foundation and then for the administering the funds once they were 
distributed to the Institute.  Most of Regenstrief’s researchers worked in Daly’s 
department.  
It is tempting to criticize the SAC arrangement given that each member of the 
committee served multiple masters including the School of Medicine and Wishard 
                                                 
206 Regenstrief Foundation Board Minutes, September 5, 1975 (RF). 
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Hospital.  What would prevent the SAC from making a decision that furthered the 
interests of the medical school or the hospital?  Similarly, might a member seek to favor 
projects or researchers that also, or only, served the individual’s own professional 
interests?  These were legitimate possibilities, but they did not appear to have concerned 
the Regenstrief board.   
Sam Regenstrief, an experienced businessman, was comfortable with the fact that 
advisors often have multiple agendas.  Regenstrief’s own corporate board included senior 
managers from D&M’s largest materials supplier, its largest customer, and its primary 
investment bank.  Each of these board members brought the needs of another institution 
to the table, yet Regenstrief trusted that their longer-term interest in maintaining D&M as 
a healthy corporation would negate the risk of efforts to gain short-term advantages that 
did not also benefit the corporation in some manner.  Additionally, the SAC took steps to 
render its decision making more transparent to Sam Regenstrief and the board, and to 
assure that funding would satisfy the Foundation’s goals and the Institute’s purpose even 
if a decision also created a benefit to the other institutions. 207   
The SAC articulated two funding criteria to be used when determining what 
projects the Institute would support.  First, funded projects needed to "in some manner 
improve the health delivery system."  Second, Foundation contributions should serve as 
"seed money," to fund early stage work with the promise to attract external funding to 
supplement and then replace the Foundation's contribution. 208  The funding criteria that 
                                                 
207 Whether the grantmaking process is transparent to researchers hoping for support from 
the fund is a different question.  The issue of pressure from researchers themselves 
regarding how grant funds are distributed will be discussed in sections devoted to the 
Showalter Foundation.  
208 Regenstrief Foundation Board Minutes, June 14, 1978 (RF). 
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the SAC published in its minutes is the first written mention of the use of Foundation 
money as start-up funding, and there is no other documentation that reveals the rationale 
for this limitation.  It is reasonable to assume that Dean Steve Beering, then Dean of the 
School of Medicine, at least approved the idea if he was not the source.  The more 
external funders willing to provide support for early-stage work, the less pressure on a 
dean or director to identify internal funds to support faculty researchers.  Another 
explanation stems from the fact that this limitation provided some cover for SAC 
members when they failed to fund a project.  
The criteria provided a basis for discontinuing projects that failed to progress 
toward independence and presumably would give Regenstrief the assurance that funded 
projects could quickly attract other funding.  The SAC reviewed funding proposals for all 
new and renewable projects before each board meeting and then issued detailed written 
funding recommendations to the board.  The review committee did not hesitate to use its 
recommendations as both a carrot and a stick.  Underperforming projects risked 
decreased allocations while promising ideas or prolific researchers could see an 
increase.209 Committee members were quick to change course when their predictions did 
not bear out.  In 1979, the SAC's recommendation letter contained high praise for a new 
project and its driving researcher who had become "an extremely important member of 
the Institute."210  The Committee recommended a substantial increase from the prior year.  
                                                 
209 See, for example, Regenstrief Foundation, Scientific Advisory Committee, Letter to 
the Regenstrief Foundation Board, June 6, 1980 (RF). 
210 Regenstrief Foundation, Scientific Advisory Committee, Letter to the Regenstrief 
Foundation Board, May 31, 1979 (RF). 
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Only a year later, the same group urged a significant reduction to the same project.211  By 
1981, there is no mention of this research in the recommendation letter.  
Although created ostensibly to advise the board on funding, the SAC acted as the 
de facto manager of the Institute, both selecting the projects to fund and then managing 
and evaluating funded projects.  In this way, nothing had changed following the 
Foundation’s change in legal form.  The SAC was empowered to approve changes to the 
Foundation's project budget for any grant, a fact that afforded the SAC discretion to 
redirect funds without consulting the Foundation Board.  The minutes of board meetings 
include only occasional conversations and questions about the SAC’s funding 
recommendations, and there is no record of either Sam or others on the Board 
challenging, much less rejecting, any SAC recommendations.  The Regenstrief 
Foundation Board, for its part, paid only scant attention to its grantmaking work; it 
focused, instead, on the management of D&M.212  
Sam Regenstrief suffered two heart attacks and a stroke in late 1978.  He turned to 
his board to manage the company and named Betley CEO of D&M and then the 
President of the board that ran both D&M and the Regenstrief Institute.  Betley, who 
maintained a busy law practice, would soon also play a critical role in the development of 
two other Indianapolis charitable foundations, the Fairbanks Foundation and the Walther 
Cancer Foundation.   
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212 During this period, the Foundation directors include Sam and Myrtie Regenstrief, Dr. 
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Sam Regenstrief's business continued to decline alongside his health. Competition 
in the home appliance industry increased, and D&M lost ground to competitors.  The 
D&M board chose to sell the company after concluding that a sale was the best way to 
protect Sam’s workers while preserving, perhaps even increasing, the amount that could 
be transferred to the Foundation.  On December 5, 1987, the sale of D&M closed.  Sam 
Regenstrief died on January 17, 1988, only 45 days after the sale.  Eighty percent of the 
Regenstriefs’ estate, or just over $20 million, transferred to the Foundation.213  
As the business wound down, the Institute grew and several of its projects, 
particularly Clem McDonald's electronic medical records system, attracted national 
attention.  McDonald had successfully computerized all of the pharmacy records at 
Wishard Hospital.  He installed computer terminals in central locations throughout the 
hospital and in the Regenstrief outpatient clinic.  Clinicians could access patient records 
without the difficult and sometimes dangerous delay associated with tracking down paper 
charts that were often found incomplete and disorganized, when they were found at all.  
As a result of McDonald’s efforts, Wishard Hospital, a public hospital for the 
community’s poor, became the first fully computerized hospital in the world.214   
McDonald aspired to do more than create an electronic storage system.  He 
believed that computerized systems could improve patient outcomes by improving 
physician decision making.  The computer, he believed, could remind and check a busy 
physician and could even recommend actions that the provider should take, like 
                                                 
213 Ford, Regenstrief, 194; Regenstrief Foundation Board Minutes, January 30, 1991, p. 2. 
(RF). 
214 J. Marc Overhage, Presentation of the Morris F. Collen Award to Clement J. 
McDonald, MD, Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, Volume 12, 
no. 2 (March 2005): 241–244, https://doi.org/10.1197/jamia.M1709. 
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prescribing a test or medication.  One of McDonald’s early efforts involved the 
construction of a clinical reminder system in the Wishard diabetes clinic.  Physicians and 
nurses were prompted by a series of preventative care reminder rules that appeared on the 
patient’s chart and were immediately visible when practitioners logged on to the system.   
A randomized trial evaluating the efficacy of the system appeared as an invited 
paper in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1976.215  McDonald next led the 
development of a system that connected patient care across the hospital and its outpatient 
clinics.  Although computerized medical records seem routine now, it was remarkable at 
the time.  Controlled trials demonstrated using the computer programs improved care and 
reduced cost.  McDonald’s original New England Journal of Medicine article has been 
cited thousands of times in subsequent peer-reviewed journals, and McDonald himself 
went on to author over 275 peer-reviewed articles.  
McDonald’s early funding came entirely from Regenstrief.  Although some 
federal money was available for computer projects in the early 1970s, by the time 
McDonald developed his project to the point that it could be competitive for grants, 
federal funds had been diverted to other priorities.  McDonald has said that the 
Regenstrief Medical Record System (RMRS), “could not have been developed without 
Institute support.”216  The ability to attract financial support for new or innovative lines of 
research is a significant hurdle for scientists.  The more innovative the project, the more 
difficult the search for resources can be.  Medical scientists have long appreciated the 
                                                 
215 Clement J. McDonald, M.D., “Protocol-Based Computer Reminders, the Quality of 
Care and the Imperfectability of Man.” New England Journal of Medicine 295 (1976): 
1351-1355. 
216 Ford, Regenstrief, 156. 
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potential for philanthropy to fill the need to provide seed funding for new work.  
Regenstrief’s willingness to take on this role served as a model that other Indiana 
foundations would follow.  
Regenstrief’s bet on McDonald paid off.  Though McDonald could not secure 
funding during the early years of his work, both McDonald and members of his team 
ultimately secured millions of dollars in extramural support, including a $1.6 million 
grant from the National Center for Health Research and Health Care Technology 
Assessment to conduct controlled trials of the effectiveness of the physician order system 
and a $5 million grant from the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research along with 
the designation as a Patient Outcome Research Team site in 1990.  The Institute earned 
another $2.4 million grant four years later when it was designated a high performing 
medical informatics research center by the National Coordinating Office for High 
Performing Computing and Communication.217  
Importantly, the connected record system also did what Betley assured the IRS it 
would do.  Data collected and maintained in the system constitutes one of the largest 
longitudinal repositories of actual-time patient data in the world. In 2015, the system 
contained over 500 million individual laboratory and clinical measurements and nearly 
50 million clinical images that could be used to generate and test new medical 
hypothesis.  The trove of health data was mined by scientists working on health systems 
improvement and on finding cures to a wide variety of medical issues.  Because the data 
in the system includes patient outcome information, medical educators use the system for 
simulation training.  Work that could connect medical research projects using RMRS data 
                                                 
217 Ford, Regenstrief, 156-157. 
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with earned funding and subsequent discovery could quantify the value of Regenstrief’s 
early and sustained financial support of McDonald’s work. 
Work at the Institute was not limited to informatics.  In 1988, the Institute had 
three different research departments:  Management Science Research, Computer Science 
Applications, and a Department of Medicine.  Research sections in pediatric 
epidemiologic research, a vascular laboratory, and diagnostic radiology were added as 
well.  Key staff and researchers often split time between organizations working on 
projects for the Institute while also conducting research or performing clinical duties for 
the medical school and one or more of the system hospitals. The Institute also ran a 
fellowship program to entice physicians to participate in research projects while staffing 
the county hospital.  The Institute was busy. 
Minutes reveal how the pull of competing, but disconnected projects generated 
concern.  The Foundation Board repeatedly asked about the focus and direction of the 
Institute, particularly whether the Institute should pursue many questions simultaneously 
or cone down to a narrower focus.  Even the basic purpose of the organization remained 
open to reconsideration when members discussed whether the Institute "should be a 
research facility or a 'change agent' for medical care delivery."218  Questions about 
direction and scope surfaced repeatedly over the next few years, though no concrete 
action was taken to address the situation. 
Board membership remained stable in the initial years.  There was no organized 
exodus even after the sale of the company and Sam Regenstrief’s death. Nonetheless, 
                                                 
218  Regenstrief Foundation, Regenstrief Institute Board minutes, July 6, 1988, p.1-2 
(RF). 
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Board membership gradually transitioned as original members retired from participation.  
Only twenty-four people served as board members between 1968 and 1998.  The board 
roster typically consisted of 12 members.  Trustees originally invited to serve because 
they represented the manufacturing company’s suppliers or bankers continued to sit on 
the philanthropic board for years after the company’s sale.  Local lawyers, accountants, 
and current and former academic administrators associated with the medical school and 
Indiana and Purdue universities replaced corporate representatives.  Despite changes in 
composition, operational norms and attitudes persisted.  
By the early 1990s, both Foundation and Institute leadership expressed concerns 
that medical school administrators regarded the Institute as a certain and malleable source 
of funding available for projects that deans or program directors wanted to advance 
without regard to the Institute’s mission.219  Put differently, Foundation board members 
worried that the Medical School’s growing financial demands might lead school 
leadership to overlook Sam Regenstrief’s preferences in favor of satisfying their own 
short-term strategic goals.  Concern over the nature of this relationship was not one-
sided.  The dean of the Medical School worried that the Foundation would choose to 
move its funding entirely from the medical school.  As the Foundation’s assets grew, so 
did the risk.   
The inability to come to an agreeable resolution to these tensions became pressing 
as the decade wore on.  Regenstrief’s board members were aware that if the relationships 
between the Foundation and the medical school soured, it had no other dance partner.  A 
                                                 
219 Regenstrief Foundation, Minutes of the Regenstrief Foundation Board, January 30, 
1993 (RF). 
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small group of foundation board members, including Betley and Feigenbaum, considered 
several options to ensure a sustainable and productive future for the Institute, one that 
continued to reflect and advance a mission that honored Sam and Myrtie Regenstrief’s 
wishes.  The group ultimately recommended that the Institute should stand on its own as 
an independent legal organization and not as a part of the Foundation.  This meant that 
the Regenstrief Foundation would give up responsibility for running a medical research 
organization and again become a grantmaking foundation, a transition that required a 
change of status filing with the IRS. 
The Foundation memorialized this new direction on August 10, 2001, in a 
document that outlined its work as a grantmaker.  The Foundation established a funding 
strategy focused on “sustained, long-term funding of a small number of programs, with 
an emphasis on informatics, epidemiology, economics, and innovations in health care 
delivery.”220  The principal performance indicator for any funded work would be its 
"impact on healthcare."221  The Foundation’s earlier preference for start-up funding was 
dropped, perhaps in recognition of the value of long-term engagement with work like 
McDonald’s medical record system.  Recognizing that impact can often be measured 
only by available proxies, the statement spelled out preferred indicators of success for its 
own efforts, including the quality of institutional partnerships, the number and quality of 
academic publications resulting from foundation-supported research, the amount of extra-
mural funding earned by supported researchers, and the Institute’s general reputation.  A 
                                                 
220 Regenstrief Foundation, The Regenstrief Foundation Strategic Direction, Adopted 
August 10, 2001 p.1, (RF). 
221 The Regenstrief Foundation, Strategic Direction Statement, p.2. (RF). 
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casual reader might have overlooked a significant aspect of this statement.  The Research 
Institute that it created would no longer be the Regenstrief Foundation's only partner.  
The choice to look for new opportunities did not mark the end of the Foundation’s 
support for the Institute.  Indeed, the two remain closely connected.  The Regenstrief 
Institute continues to receive annual block grants from the Foundation.  In 2010, for 
example, the Institute received approximately $4.7 million for ongoing support.  In 2014, 
that amount was $5.7 million.  These grants comprised the majority of foundation 
expenditures any given year.  The Foundation also considered supplemental funding for 
special projects, particularly in years when required payouts that exceed the planned 
block grants.   
Another noteworthy aspect of the relationship between the Foundation and the 
Institute that survived was the intermingling of leadership.  Members of the Foundation 
board were named members of the newly independent Institute’s governing board.  
Leonard Betley, Harvey Feigenbaum, and Jack Shaw, for example, each served on both 
the Foundation’s and the Institute’s governing bodies simultaneously and each 
maintained those seats for many years.  Representatives from the medical school, 
including the dean, sat as members of the Foundation’s board of directors.  This type of 
organizational boundary spanning between the Regenstrief Institute and the Regenstrief 
Foundation remained a standard practice.  Shared staff and common and connected 
leadership spilled over to include other foundations funding medical research.  Betley, for 
example, both chaired the board and served as executive director of the Walther Cancer 
Foundation; he directed the Fairbanks Foundation.  This practice and its consequences 
are explored more fully in the next chapter.   
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In 2001, Jack Shaw, the newly-appointed chief financial officer of the 
Foundation, began hunting for new research partner.  Shaw was charged with identifying 
an organization that would align with Sam Regenstrief’s desire to make a "recognizable" 
difference in the health care system.222  Flexibility and the willingness to collaborate with 
the Institute to leverage the talents of both organizations and extend the scope and scale 
of each organization’s work was a primary criterion.   
Shaw met with Martin Jischke, the President of Purdue University, in 2002.223  
Jischke saw the potential that a partnership with Regenstrief provided to align Purdue’s 
existing expertise in the rapidly expanding healthcare sector.  In 2005, the Regenstrief 
Board voted to support Purdue in the creation of the Regenstrief Center for Healthcare 
Engineering on Purdue’s West Lafayette, Indiana, campus. 224  By the tenth year of the 
Purdue Center’s operation, the Regenstrief Board began expressing concerns that the 
Center’s research agenda was disjointed and unfocused.  Nearly 50 years after its first 
meeting, the Regenstrief Foundation Board found itself in a familiar conversation.  The 
Purdue relationships continues, but under close watch.  
Concluding paragraph for Showalter sums up resources, donations, and priorities.  
Seems useful to do here—as well to remind us whether the amounts make RF small or 
midsized. 
                                                 
222 Regenstrief Foundation, Minutes, Regenstrief Foundation Board of Directors, 
December 9, 2002 (RF). 
223 Ibid. 
224 Regenstrief Foundation, Minutes, Regenstrief Board, June 8. 2004, p. 4 (RF) 
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2.  Showalter Trust:  Finding a purpose, 1985 to 2005. 
After Grace Showalter’s death, her Trust’s Selection Committee quickly 
developed a simple and straightforward work pattern.225  The group met annually and 
allocated grants to all four named beneficiaries, the Indiana University School of 
Medicine, Purdue University, Methodist Health Foundation, and the Indianapolis Center 
for Advanced Research (ICFAR). 
The number of grants increased steadily as the value of the Trust corpus 
increased.  In 1973, the Committee awarded one grant to each designated school, Purdue 
and Indiana University.  By 1983, each school received five grants.  Many years, the 
number of grants awarded to the schools differed, but the total amount awarded to each 
school was held nearly equal.226  Over this same period, the money allocated to each 
school increased dramatically as the fund’s value increased.  In 1973, for example, the 
School of Medicine received grants totaling $34,000.  By 1983, the total amount was 
$350,000.   
The Selection Committee’s minutes reveal a gradual evolution during the 1980s 
from an almost entirely deferential posture to a more assertive role in proposal 
development and review.  In 1978, for example, it became clear that the funds available 
for allocation were not sufficient to fund all the projects proposed by the School of 
Medicine.  The Selection Committee turned to the school’s dean to ask him to choose 
between the potential projects.   
                                                 
225 Information about the Showalter Trust is largely drawn from Schneider and Lupton, 
“To Benefit Mankind and Encourage Medical and Scientific Research.” 
226 In 1980, IU chose to devote a portion of its allotted funds to create an endowed chair 
in pharmacology.  The Selection Committee supported this request, and the School of 
Medicine has maintained two endowed chairs since. 
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As the amount available for distribution grew, the Selection Committee chose to 
make larger awards, rather than increase the number of grants.  In 1984, Purdue 
submitted seventeen funding proposals, including one that sought only $5,500.  
Meanwhile, the Indiana University School of Medicine submitted only four proposals, 
but each request asked for more than $30,000.  Although the Committee granted each of 
Purdue's requests, it cautioned beneficiaries that it preferred fewer requests for greater 
support.  Put differently, it wanted more substantial initiatives.227  This represents one of 
the few occasions that the Selection Committee provided any feedback regarding its 
preferences or predispositions to the schools.  More typically, the Committee simply 
ratified the schools’ selections as presented and offered few, if any, comments in the 
recorded minutes. 
Over time, loose funding guidelines and submission preferences were developed.  
The Selection Committee, for example, wanted the schools to limit jargon, provide more 
detailed budgets, and submit fewer requests for larger grants.  Most notably, by the mid-
1980s, the minutes contain the first mention of what Regenstrief had briefly attempted 
before and has now become the main funding mission for the Showalter—support for 
promising researchers at the earliest stage of their work that might be unable to qualify 
for other grants.  Unlike Regenstrief, the Showalter Trust has remained committed to this 
mission.   
Young researchers who have not established a funded research agenda or 
scientists seeking to advance a novel line of work face a “chicken and egg” problem.  
                                                 
227 Showalter Trust, Minutes Showalter Trust Selection Committee Annual Meeting, 
1978 & 1984 (ST). 
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Cutting-edge research is expensive.  Scientists working at colleges and universities are 
typically given a relatively small amount of support to set up their laboratories and begin 
work.  The burden then falls to the individual to secure external support from public or 
private sources, typically private venture funders and philanthropy.228 
Government funders, accountable to the taxpayers, have skewed funding criteria 
to favor low risk investments in proven scientists or projects.  Research institutions often 
turn to philanthropists to assume the risk of seed funding for novel work and young 
researchers.  Philanthropists eager to demonstrate their own ability to make shrewd 
investments that return results are reluctant to fund speculative work.  Those willing to 
underwrite research look for common indicators that a faculty researcher has proven 
successful, markers like publication in peer-reviewed journals or prior success obtaining 
extramural funding.  At a minimum, an investigator must produce preliminary data to 
validate her thesis.  Even generating this proof-of-concept data, however, requires 
funding. 
In the 1980s, the Showalter trustees decided to dedicate the fund’s proceeds to 
addressing this gap.  This focus evolved gradually and with little fanfare.  There was no 
debate over the idea, nor was there a clearly definable moment of selection that appears 
anywhere in the organization’s documents.  The Selection Committee members came to 
enthusiastically embrace the work of providing seed or start-up funding, going so far as 
to suggest in the minutes that this had been Showalter’s intended focus all along.229  
                                                 
228 Many sources describe the challenges that young researchers face in the race for 
funds.  Moses, “The Anatomy of Medical Research,” 181.  
229 The Foundation did not abandon funding established research chairs.  Rather, it 
funded new work with the remaining proceeds.  
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Settling on start-up funds defined a specific role for Showalter as a research 
funder.  A second question remained open, that of determining what criteria the 
committee would use to choose projects to fund. The Selection Committee was unable to 
turn to Grace Showalter’s wishes as a guide.  She specified very little and delegated much 
of the work of narrowing the pool of possible recipients to the schools themselves.   
One of the few things that Showalter gave some guidance over was her desire to 
endow chairs at each school.  Again, however, she did leave significant discretion to the 
recipient schools.  She did not identify which positions to endow or set the total amount 
dedicated toward each position. This arrangement left the schools to determine how much 
of its annual allocation would go toward supporting the endowed chairs during a given 
year.  The schools were then able to identify projects that could use the remainder of the 
school’s available share.  Proposals for the use of the remainder of the annual allocation 
were put forward as grant proposals.  In effect, however, any real decision regarding what 
projects would receive funding had been made before the request went to the Committee.   
On a few notable occasions, the schools brought forward funding requests that 
helped build new departments, rather than individual careers.  Purdue, for example, used 
Showalter money to develop a new academic department of biomedical engineering.  
Showalter funds supplemented the recruiting package for new faculty and staff for the 
department.  Typically, however, the Showalter money was not used by deans or 
directors directly, but was instead made available to the larger academic community 
through an open contest.   
The Office of the Vice President for Research at Purdue adopted an egalitarian 
approach and invited deans and department heads from fields aligned with Showalter’s 
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stated interests to submit proposals from their faculty.  School administrators considered 
the grants a good opportunity for early-stage faculty and clinical researchers and 
encouraged their applications.  Because of the dearth of funding opportunities, young 
faculty eagerly complied.  Deans forwarded applicants to an internal university selection 
committee that selected a number of finalists to forward to the Showalter Selection 
Committee, typically a few more than the year’s income allocation could support.  The 
Purdue selection committee then ranked grant proposals according to their assessment of 
scientific promise.  This approach benefitted young scholars, who had the opportunity to 
compete for rare funds and for deans who had an avenue to support young faculty 
without having to reach into their own budgets.  The Selection Committee, for its part, 
did not need to do the work of sorting between disparate and complex proposals. 
Like Purdue, the School of Medicine initially used Showalter as a tool for the 
targeted development of selected medical departments, specifically biochemistry, 
pharmacology, and rheumatology.  Showalter funds created endowed chairs in two of the 
new departments and supported projects in all three.  In 1986, a new Associate Dean of 
Research, Dr. Ting-Kai Li, urged the creation of an open competition similar to Purdue’s.  
Li saw that Purdue was successfully using the smaller Showalter grants to attract larger 
funders.  An award from Showalter served as a testament to the potential of a project, and 
endorsements often propelled projects ahead in other funding competitions, particularly 
for government grants.  Li’s familiarity with Purdue’s approach likely resulted from 
conversations with the medical school’s dean, who also was a member of the Selection 
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Committee.230  The School of Medicine adopted Purdue’s open competition and ranking 
approach in 1986.  That year, over forty medical researchers applied for grants.   
The first mention in meeting minutes of the Selection Committee’s growing 
interest in the needs of "young scientist[s]" also appears in 1986.  The following year, the 
minutes contain a more specific description.  “The principal purpose of the Trust” is to 
fund “projects on the frontier of research for which the University could not get support 
from its regular sources.”  Then in 1989, the minutes show that the Committee selected 
an award because it would go to “young researchers . . . not well-funded, and that this 
[fits] with the purposes served by the Showalter Foundation.”231  The Foundation has 
remained committed to this focus since. 
In addition to the IU School of Medicine and Purdue, Showalter made provisions 
for two other institutions:  Methodist Hospital and ICFAR. The Selection Committee’s 
relationship with these entities differed from the relationship with the two universities, 
differences rooted in the nature of these beneficiaries. 
Grace Showalter created the Methodist Cardiac Treatment Fund in 1981, a legally 
distinct $2 million fund administered by the Selection Committee, to support "medical 
care and research" at Methodist Hospital.  Showalter specified that initial distributions 
from the fund go toward the "establishment and maintenance of a Cardiac Treatment 
                                                 
230 The members of the Showalter Trust Selection Committee have remained relatively 
consistent since inception, and always include deans and other senior members of the 
school of medicine and Purdue faculties, as well as representatives from the bank 
managing the trust accounts.  Showalter’s lawyer, Robert Claycombe also sat on the 
committee until his passing in 2012. 
231 Showalter Trust, Minutes of the Showalter Trust Selection Committee (1989) 3 (ST).   
 135 
Center."232  The majority of Methodist’s grants during the early years of the fund 
supported the purchase of diagnostic and therapeutic equipment such as an ambulatory 
arrhythmia monitor, an accelerated rhythm scanner, and Doppler flowmeters.   
Before 1998, the hospital requested funding for equipment or to cover exceptional 
patient care, such as heart transplant surgeries.  Research projects were not priorities.  
One important exception was a 1987 request for $96,000 that the hospital wanted to 
devote to a joint research project with Purdue titled "The Use of Autogenous Small 
Intestine as a Vascular Graft."  This request was noteworthy because Purdue's Showalter 
Professor of Bioengineering, Les Geddes, led the project.  The funded project led to 
important innovations in the development of surgical mesh.  The Showalter grants to 
Methodist became dedicated to research in 1998, after the hospital created the Methodist 
Research Institute to support research by its scientists.  The Showalter Committee 
successfully petitioned the probate court to amend the terms of the will to allow income 
from the Cardiac Trust to be directed to the Methodist Research Institute, which then 
distributed the funds.  Methodist received approximately $250,000 per year to support an 
average of six research projects per year.   
Showalter’s support for ICFAR proved more problematic.  ICFAR was a 
partnership between Indiana University, Purdue University, and the Indianapolis 
Chamber of Commerce designed to incubate translational projects that bridged medicine 
and technology.  Despite its link to two research universities, ICFAR struggled to 
develop a respected research program.  It may indeed have been ahead of its time. 
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Showalter included a provision in her will that allowed the Selection Committee 
to give up to one-third of the income generated from the Trust to ICFAR, including 
covering the salary of its director.  The Selection Committee expressed reservations about 
the Center as early as 1975, just a year after its first grant, and concerns surfaced 
regularly over the next 25 years.  In particular, the Selection Committee doubted the 
medical and scientific value of the projects undertaken there.  Though ICFAR identified 
some promising projects to fund, the entire effort failed to gain needed traction. 
Showalter stopped funding the program in 1999, shortly before the ICFAR ceased 
operations entirely. 
This episode marks an important development in the maturation of the Selection 
Committee.  Showalter, in one of her few concrete directives, specified allocations to 
ICFAR.  After extensive and careful review, the Committee chose a course that directly 
contradicted Grace Showalter’s direction out of an effort to preserve and more effectively 
use the proceeds of her trust.  When making this choice, Committee members turned to 
Robert Claycombe, who had been Showalter’s personal attorney and was one of the only 
members to have worked directly with her.  He assured them Showalter would have made 
the same choice given the change in conditions. 
The Showalter Trust was valued at approximately $15 million in 1973.  In 2014, it 
managed almost $40 million in assets.  The amount distributed has grown as well, from 
$369,102 awarded to four recipients in 1974 to nearly $1.8 million awarded to over 
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twenty-two recipients in 2010.  Grants have supported research in fields ranging from 
pediatrics to climate science, and from molecular pharmacology to gene modeling.233   
3. Walther Cancer Foundation:  Defining direction, 1986 to 2010. 
The legal challenges against the sale of Winona Memorial Hospital finally 
resolved in Joe Walther’s favor in May of 1985.  On June 30, the Walther Medical 
Research Institute (WRI or the Institute) was legally formed.  When the sale of Winona 
Hospital closed, just under $40 million was transferred into the Walther Institute.  Joe 
Walther wanted the WRI to be only one part of a multi-faceted effort aimed at 
“eradicating cancer,” so he asked Leonard Betley, the same lawyer who worked with the 
Regenstrief and Fairbanks foundations, to create several distinct, but related 
organizations. WRI would serve a “holding company” for Walther’s planned subsidiary 
organizations that would each focus on different aspects of the war on cancer.  His 
ambition resulted in an administrative tangle of overlapping organizations.  
The first entity, the Walther Cancer Foundation (or the Foundation), would 
generate public support and raise money for the Walther Cancer Institute initiatives, but 
the WCF’s efforts to fundraise accomplished little beyond hiring consultants and 
producing promotional materials.  The second entity, the Mary Margaret Walther Hospice 
Research Center (HRC) would provide support, education, and care to patients and 
families while conducting research on best practices in these areas.  Despite early 
innovations in patient care and scholarship, the HRC eventually withered and the 
research it supported was absorbed into the Indiana University School of Nursing.  This 
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Research.”  
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project focused on palliative care will be discussed more fully below.  The final entity, 
the Walther Oncology Center (WOC) was formed to conduct “basic and clinical 
research.”  This description suggests that the WOC was intended to look and work 
something like the Krannert and Regenstrief research institutes, with which Walther and 
Betley were both familiar.  From the WOC’s design, however, it was clear that the WOC 
was not, in fact, meant to engage in research directly.  
Walther had little appetite for employing researchers or for the challenges of 
defining and supervising a research agenda.  Instead, he hoped to create an “oncology 
center” that “would be neither a strictly free-standing center nor a granting agency, but 
would serve as a coordinating body” to develop “an overall [research] program plan and 
provide a funding source.”234 Despite his stated goal, however, the WOC was never 
centralized or coordinated and it did not develop a research plan.  Rather, it acted as a 
funding organization that supported the work of researchers employed by the Indiana 
University School of Medicine and other universities. 
Walther did follow Regenstrief’s model in one respect.  Walther looked for stable, 
long-term partnerships with individual scientists.  One of Walther’s first research partners 
was the Hoosier Oncology Group, a professional association of oncologists led by Dr. 
Larry Einhorn, an internationally recognized specialist and a faculty member at the 
School of Medicine.  Hoosier Oncology Group members formed a network of physician-
researchers who collaborated on research, ran clinical trials, and shared cutting-edge 
knowledge.  The group, now called the Hoosier Cancer Research Network, has conducted 
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13, 1984, p. 2 (WF). 
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over 200 clinical trials through a network of academic and community practitioners 
across the country.235  The relationship with Walther provided critical initial funding and 
then provided a source of steady funding, with the group receiving just over $18 million 
in total support between 1986 and 2009.236  Einhorn was at the center of this relationship 
and he was a primary beneficiary of Walther’s assistance.  It does not appear that Walther 
had any significant or ongoing role in the selection of work funded with his money.  
Rather, Einhorn and his colleagues determined what Walther’s money would support. 
The relationship with the Hoosier Oncology Group also highlights a central fact 
about the power and importance of philanthropic funders like Walther.  By 1985, Dr. 
Einhorn had earned an international reputation as the result of work he had done since the 
1970s that increased the survivability of testicular cancer from 15 to 95 percent.237  In 
1985, Dr. John Durant, who was consulting with Walther on the development of the 
Institute and its various entities, met with Einhorn to discuss a possible role leading the 
Institute or the Walther Oncology Center.  Durant reported to the Institute’s executive 
committee that Einhorn was “very interested in molecular genetics and would like to 
have a secure funding base to pursue his research efforts.”  Even a doctor who had 
already “cured cancer” found the promise of steady funding sufficiently appealing to 
consider taking on an additional role.238 
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Walther’s first and primary research partner, however, was IUSM more generally.  
Walther and his committee of close advisors, the Oncology Development Committee, 
looked to the Regenstrief Institute, “as a good model for the Walther Oncology 
Center.”239  Walter Daly, Dean of the Medical School, initially proposed a partnership 
structure that would give Walther the sense of flexibility he desired while securing an 
unencumbered stream of revenue for the school.  What Daly proposed and Walther 
agreed to eventually had little in common with the structure of the Regenstrief Institute, 
which consisted of a physical location and dedicated researchers and staff. 
The Walther Institute would not have a physical presence on campus, but it would 
be led by a professor able to “connect and engage with all of the cancer research projects 
underway on the campus.”240  This professor would act as the Center’s director, but 
would remain an employee of the School of Medicine, rather than the WOC.  Walther 
agreed to an arrangement that looked less like a research institute and more like a 
sponsored program.  
This structure must have pleased Daly.  The individual that Walther proposed 
putting at the head of the WOC would act as a coordinator and a conduit of information, 
but not a director with autonomy to set a research agenda and engage talent to pursue that 
work.  The school employed the director and therefore retained the option to exercise 
significant control over the direction of the work Walther would fund.  
                                                 
239 Walther Foundation, Walther Oncology Development Committee, September 10, 
1985, p. 2, (WF). 
240 Walther Foundation, Walther Oncology Development Committee, March 21, 1986, 
p.2, (WF). 
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A second aspect of the WOC’s operations revealed contradictions between 
Walther’s stated funding preferences and his actual decisions.  Walther and his advisors 
proposed a grant strategy that involved providing "seed funding" to encourage new 
initiatives.  In this aspect, Walther followed Showalter’s lead.  The funding would be 
restricted to a limited period, 3 to 5 years, a time sufficient to allow worthy projects to 
advance far enough to prove the initial concept and thereby attract other extramural 
support.  Walther was satisfied that this approach allowed him to retain entrepreneurial 
flexibility while still providing on-going funding to a single institution because the 
project would not fund a single researcher or project indefinitely.241  Daly agreed to this 
arrangement.  
Despite Walther’s stated reluctance to act as a sustaining patron, he and the 
Institute often did just that.  For a number of researchers, Walther became a source of 
steady and long-term support.  In 1985, for example, the Institute gave one of its first 
research support grants to Dr. Hal Broxmeyer, a microbiologist and immunologist 
researching the use of stem cells to treat cancer.  Broxmeyer proved a sure bet for the 
Walther Institute.  Although he had been with IU for only 2 years, local grantmakers, 
including Showalter and Regenstrief, already considered him a hot commodity.  In fact, 
Broxmeyer was recruited to Indiana with a hiring package that was funded, in part, 
through a special $29,000 grant from the Regenstrief Foundation.242  Broxmeyer, who 
pioneered the practice of infant cord blood banking for research and later disease 
                                                 
241 Ibid. 
242 Walther Foudation, Scientific Advisory Committee Report of the Regenstrief Institute, 
May 26, 1983 P. 3 (WF). 
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treatment, had received continuous funding from the NIH since 1978, and his laboratory 
often maintains multiple NIH grants at one time.243   
The 1985 grant was the first payment in a long series of grants to support his 
work.  By 2007, Broxmeyer was still funded generously by Walther.  For example, 
Walther made five grants to Broxmeyer to be used for faculty recruitment, program 
development, pilot projects, recruitment, and development, and basic research support.  
These totaled $2,889,000, approximately 25 percent of the $11.5 million in awards the 
foundation made in 2007.244  These grants helped Broxmeyer advance his work, though 
as noted above, Broxmeyer had an established record of high productivity and resulting 
grant performance.  Walther’s support was hardly seed money and, in the context of 
Broxmeyer’s balance sheet, was likely valued but not needed.  Walther proved a loyal 
patron to several other prominent researchers and initiatives.  While this loyalty ran 
contrary to his proclaimed preference for short-term funding, it did demonstrate 
Walther’s willingness to stand by successful efforts.  Indeed, Walther’s practice may 
have more closely mirrored the Rockefeller Foundation’s approach of “making the peaks 
higher.” 245 
The final organization created when the proceeds of the hospital sale were 
distributed in 1986 was the Mary Margaret Walther Hospice Research Center.  This effort 
grew most directly out of Walther’s personal experience.  Like his other ventures, 
                                                 
243 Hall E. Broxmeyer, https://medicine.iu.edu/faculty/1911/broxmeyer-hal/ 
244 Walther Foundation, Walther Cancer Foundation, Authorized Grants, July 1, 2007 
through June 30, 2008 (WF). 
245 “Making the peaks higher” is a phrase often used to encapsulate the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s strategy of “funding people and programs that were already strong.”  
Schneider, “The Difficult Art of Giving,” 311–312. 
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Walther envisioned an organization that would do all things.  He explained that the 
Hospice Research Center would provide direct patient care; institutional and at-home 
hospice services; transportation services; palliative care research; post-recovery 
psychological services; and public education.   
Walther also wanted the Center to partner with hospitals around the state to 
replicate the design of a patient care room he designed at Winona for his wife’s care.  He 
believed that the patient and family experiences were improved when patients were 
treated in a suite that included an attached room where family members could stay for the 
duration of treatment.  Again, Walther’s ambition and desire for direct engagement 
expanded beyond studying the efficacy of such spaces and advocating for their use.  
Instead, he wanted to enter into partnerships with hospitals around the state.  Hospitals 
would build the spaces and the Mary Margaret Walther Hospice Research Center would 
manage them.  In board meetings, he advocated for a "consortium approach" that would 
shift the HRCs work "from a single campus . . . to ongoing multiple programs 
concurrently."246  Walther retained an expansive view, one that quickly proved to exceed 
his reach.  
Dorothy Weber, a doctor of nursing, was placed at the helm of the HRC.  She 
developed a portfolio of research on palliative care issues, including pain management 
and holistic family care during and after illness.  Weber realized that the patient care 
spaces that Walther wanted to see in hospitals around the state could be used as nodes for 
gathering data useful for her research efforts.  Weber’s work coincided with a growing 
                                                 
246 Walther Foundation, Walther Medical Research Institute Oncology Development 
Committee, February 5, 1986, p. 1, (WF). 
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demand for improved palliative and hospice care options in both provider and lay 
communities.247  
The first patient care suite was completed at St. Elizabeth Medical Center in 
Lafayette in 1987.  After this successful launch, Dorothy Weber's appointment book 
filled with requests from hospitals in other cities interested in building similar units. 
Expanding the project proved difficult for several reasons.  Developing partnerships and 
overseeing work in distant facilities was time consuming and distracted Weber from her 
ability to conduct research.  Additionally, the IRS did not consider work on end-of-life 
care issues to constitute medical research as contemplated under regulations.  Finally, the 
cost of constructing and supporting family care suites made the facilities unattractive to 
providers interested in higher financial returns associated with more invasive 
interventions.  The effort to build and operate care suites ceased and the Mary Margaret 
Walther Hospice Research Center dissolved in June 1990.  Researchers in the IU School 
of Nursing picked up much of Weber’s research portfolio, and Walther continued to fund 
many of these projects. 
Since the creation of the Walther Cancer Institute, Joe Walther had been 
personally involved in the day-to-day administration of the organizations and their work.  
In 1986, the Walther Foundation hired James Ruckle to assist Walther.  Ruckle moved 
from California where he had worked with large academic medical centers and managed 
nonprofit organizations.  Much of his initial work at Walther involved efforts to bring 
                                                 
247 The American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine was chartered in 1988.  
For a brief history of the growth of palliative care in the United States, see David Clark, 
To Comfort Always:  A History of Palliative Medicine since the Nineteenth Century (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016).   
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discipline to a sprawling and seemingly unfocused organization by both simplify a 
complicated structure and to establish a process for selecting and evaluating funded work.   
When Ruckle arrived, the organization consisted of four independent units, the 
Walther Cancer Institute, the Walther Cancer Foundation, and the Mary Margaret 
Walther Hospice Research Center, as well as Walther Cancer Education, a short-lived 
unit created in 1988 and dissolved in 1990.248  Each unit had its own board, with a 
combined total membership of thirty-five people, each with its own working committees.  
Members’ voting rights were unclear and members often served on multiple, overlapping 
committees.  Failure to meet quorum requirements was common and members 
complained openly that meetings were little more than reporting events with information 
repeated at multiple places.249  At the urging of advisors, particularly Ruckle, Walther 
agreed to streamline the organization.  Amended bylaws reduced the number of members 
on each board.  Walther almost immediately undercut the benefits of this reduction by 
creating an entirely new board, The President’s Forum, which he filled with community 
leaders and members removed from other boards as a result of the bylaw amendments.250   
The bylaw changes did little to foster strong board governance of the 
organization. That was not a concern to Walther, who openly acknowledged his belief 
that organizations should be managed from “the top down and not the bottom up.”251  
                                                 
248 Walther Foundation, Motion to Dissolve and Transfer Assets, Walther Cancer 
Education, Inc., Board of Directors, June 18, 1990 (WF).  
249 Walther Foundation, Minutes of the Joint Board Meeting, August 10, 1988, (WF). 
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Yet, he clearly desired lengthy membership rolls, and rebuffed multiple attempts to 
reduce membership.  He also relied on a close circle of advisors for most decisions, 
including funding.  The Oncology Advisory Committee, the effective executive 
committee of the Walther Institute, approved all research funding decisions, rather than 
the full board of either of the two research entities, the Oncology or the Mary Margaret 
Walther Hospice research centers.  Minutes from meetings, however, included little 
discussion of either funding requests or project status updates.252  As a result, it is not 
possible to determine the actual depth or vigor of the committee’s consideration of any 
funding proposal.   
When Ruckle arrived, several funded and ongoing projects were ripe for review.  
He began constructing a formal peer review process to evaluate funding proposals and 
existing projects.  Ruckle proposed a creation of a Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) 
comprised of external, disinterested research scientists who would meet at least twice a 
year to evaluate funded projects and then report to the Executive Committee. This board 
would also examine proposals and make recommendations regarding the potential of 
each project.  
 Ruckle promoted his proposal by arguing that an external advisory board staffed 
with respected scientists would "communicate a seriousness from a scientific standpoint" 
that the existing structure lacked.253  Ruckle understood the importance of external peer 
review as the gold standard in research funding.  Walther and the Board approved this 
                                                 
252 Walther Foundation, Executive Committee Minutes, April 20, 1987 (WF).  At this 
time, the executive committee included eleven members.  Four members were medical 
doctors and one was an R.N., Ph.D.  
253 Walther Foundation, Minutes of the Walther Cancer Foundation Board of Trustees, 
December 12, 1989, p. 2 (WF) 
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idea in December 1989, and Ruckle secured the participation of the director of a 
prominent cancer center as the Advisory Board’s chair.  
 Again, Walther almost immediately muddied the water when he announced that 
his existing Scientific Advisory Committee, which included himself and several long-
term insiders, would conduct a parallel review of funded research and new proposals.  
Walther essentially duplicated the role of Ruckle’s newly created Scientific Advisory 
Board.254  Ruckle did not disband his external board and the group met and provided 
input as intended.  There is no record of any evaluations completed by Walther’s 
Scientific Advisory Committee.  Indeed, it may not have met at all. 
Ruckle also sought to create a sense of partnership between donor and recipient.  
He added regular scientific presentations at board meetings to educate board members 
about cancer and the work the fund supported.  Ruckle also asked program directors to 
submit regular written reports on the progress of experiments, projects, and findings.  
These reports were shared with board members.  Ruckle’s request for written reports was 
the first time that grantees had been asked to report on their progress or even on how they 
used the funds they received.  This education and reporting efforts did more than 
establish functional accountability requirements for the recipients.  Regular 
communication between funder and recipient personalized and, thereby, tightened the 
knit between institutions.  Within a year, however, reporting requirements were reduced 
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after Walther announced that written reports would be accepted, but were “optional” 
because the scientists were "extremely busy."255   
Ruckle’s SAB conducted its first review in 1990 and evaluated six individual 
researchers.  The reviewers recommended continued support for all of the funded projects 
save one, a researcher sufficiently advanced that his work was ready to transition to other 
extramural support.256  A second important development occurred that same year.  
Walther added a second university research partner.  Eager to expand beyond the medical 
school, Walther finalized an agreement with Indiana’s other major research institution, 
Purdue University.  Jack Dixon, a distinguished professor of biochemistry, managed 
Walther’s sponsored work there.  When Dixon left Purdue to join the faculty at the 
University of Michigan several years later, Walther Institute support followed him.  
Walther entered a collaborative research agreement with University of Michigan.  This 
was the first of several attempts to extend Walther’s reach to other cancer research 
programs.   
The Foundation next agreed to support two postdoctoral researchers at Notre 
Dame in 1995, a commitment that laid the groundwork for a $1.2 million grant to fund 
the creation of the Walther Cancer Institute Center of Excellence in Cancer Research at 
Notre Dame in 1996.257  An agreement followed with Michigan State University, focused 
on work to improve family interventions, was conducted through the Mary Margaret 
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Walther Hospice Research Center.  By 2010, Walther was funding research at Michigan 
State, Ohio State, University of California, San Diego, University of Michigan, and the 
University of Notre Dame.  Managing work at multiple and distant institutions proved 
difficult and Walther began pulling back to focus primarily on partnerships with three 
Indiana research institutions—the Indiana University School of Medicine, Purdue 
University, and Notre Dame. 258 
Joe Walther died in 2005.  Even before his death, the organization had moved into 
a period of significant transition.  Ruckle left in 2003 to pursue another opportunity, and 
many of Walther’s long-time associates had rotated off the board.  New trustees, 
including several with prior experience managing medical research and nonprofit 
foundations, replaced Walther’s long-time advisors, particularly Leonard Betley who 
joined the board in 2003.  As Walther’s health began to decline in 2004, he appointed 
Betley as board chair.  The Walther Foundation moved out of its offices near the former 
Winona Hospital to a building owned by Richard Fairbanks.259  The new address was 
also home to the Regenstrief and Fairbanks foundations.  Under Betley’s leadership, the 
three foundations maintained separate offices, but began to share some administrative 
staff and board members. 
The Walther Cancer Institute, like Regenstrief before it, also changed legal forms.  
In May 2004, a subcommittee of the board chose to change the organization’s legal status 
                                                 
258 Walther Foundation, Walther Foundation Funding Guidelines, Revised, October 2010. 
Walther Cancer Foundation Files (WF).  
259 When the Foundation moved offices, many of the records, including board minutes 
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from a medical research organization to a private grantmaking foundation.  On July 1, 
2007, the Walther Cancer Institute was absorbed into the Walther Cancer Foundation, 
and this single entity became a private foundation.  In many ways, the transition was little 
noticed as the Institute and the Foundation had operated as a single organization since the 
early 1990s and looked very much like a grantmaking organization. 
James Ruckle returned to the organization in 2006.  One of his first major 
undertakings involved leading the trustees through a review and revision of the 
Foundation’s grant criteria as a means of focusing and affirming the group’s mission.  In 
2008, an ad hoc committee of the board recommended, “emphasizing investment in 
people and organizational infrastructure as distinguished from projects” and focusing on 
“translational and applied research.”260  These guidelines were further modified in 2010 
to prioritize opportunities for the Foundation to serve as a “catalyst for collaboration 
between or among institutions” and to “stress interdisciplinary work.”  The organization 
also identified a willingness to “consider initiatives that traditional funders viewed as 
high risk or unconventional.”261 
 While maintaining a distinct relationship with each major research institution in 
the state, the Foundation focused on projects that would foster cross-institutional 
collaboration and develop a regional cancer research infrastructure. For example, Walther 
provided early funding to the Center for Cancer Engineering (CCE), a collaboration 
between Purdue, the Indiana University Simon Cancer Center, and the Regenstrief 
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Institute.  The CCE brought together clinical, scientific, and engineering specialists to 
develop new treatment and prevention strategies. 
The Foundation also remained committed to funding work in a field that emerged 
from Joe Walther’s desire to improve the experience for patients and families dealing 
with cancer.  Walther provided assistance to research on projects in palliative care, 
behavioral health, and nursing care.  When the Foundation chose to identify its own 
exemplary projects for its website, it selected four initiatives, two that dealt with 
behavioral care:  the Behavior Cooperative Oncology Group, a collaboration of 
universities in Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio, and a $1.4 million grant to Notre Dame to 
build a psychosocial care center for cancer patients.262  Since 1985, the Foundation has 
distributed over $118 million to support cancer research projects at research institutions 
across the Midwest with the bulk of those funds dedicated to Hoosier research 
institutions. 
4. Conclusion.   
By many metrics commonly applied to foundations, Regenstrief, Showalter, and 
Walther are dissimilar.  Regenstrief held assets of approximately $170 million in 2014, 
an amount four times the total assets held by Showalter.  Showalter is a small foundation 
by asset and staff size, while Regenstrief and Walther are midsized foundations given 
their assets (more than $150 million) and the fact that they do not rely on volunteers. Two 
of the funds maintain a full-time staff, while Showalter depends entirely on volunteers.  
Regenstrief is nearly 50 years old while Walther is half as old.  Despite these differences, 
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the three organizations’ paths toward maturation shared a number of important 
similarities.   
Most significantly, each organization adapted both grant focus and legal and 
organizational form.  Each worked—and continues to work—to identify a funding role 
that allows the organization to contribute in a defined way, one that is consistent with its 
donors’ intentions.  Outsiders, including advisors, grant recipients, and other funders, 
significantly influenced the growth and transition of each organization.  These 
connections to the funders proved essential for each organization as it created funding 
processes and defined purpose.  The recipients’ role in this work was consistent, engaged, 
and sometimes extensive.  Indeed, recipients placed such a heavy thumb on the scale that 
they exercised great influence—if not control—over funders’ choices and agenda.  
Showalter, in particular, made no pretense about turning authority over to the 
recipients, and she directed the leadership of the two schools to preselect projects.  With 
only a little information about the amount the Showalter board was likely to contribute, 
the schools could effectively allocate anticipated grant funds among their own internal 
priorities.  Walther and Regenstrief also developed close working relationships with 
funded organizations, including seating senior representatives from recipient 
organizations on the foundations’ governing boards and meeting regularly with them to 
discuss priorities. 
As the foundations gained experience and knowledge, relationships with 
recipients did often move toward more balance as the foundations engaged in co-creation 
of funding options as well as larger multi-institution initiatives.  Indeed, funders were 
aware that they were a valued resource and began to use that power more assertively.  Put 
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differently, the foundations transitioned from patrons to partners, though the extent and 
nature of these partnerships differed over time and by the organizations.  The foundations 
also developed and revised grantmaking processes, funding guidelines, and policies, and 
even amended their legal forms to meet their objectives.   
Understanding the choices that these foundations made about both relationships 
and funding decisions provides an opportunity to consider more fully the roles that these 
foundations play in both the narrow world of medical research funding and the broader 
universes of institution building and economic development.  The conclusion to this work 
provides a more detailed discussion of these relationships and choices in order to better 
understand how foundations like these matter the research effort.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusions and Proposals for Future Studies 
How can smaller foundations make a meaningful contribution to modern medical 
research given the scale, complexity, and cost of the work as well as the dominance of the 
federal government?  Would it be better if foundations looked to other opportunities to 
create a social benefit through their grantmaking?  This project examined the history and 
effort of small and midsized foundations working in a single, American city in order to 
address these questions.  Smaller foundations can, in fact, play a valuable role as strategic 
partners in the work of advancing medical research.  Understanding how small 
foundations can maximize the benefit they bring to the research endeavor requires a 
nuanced understanding of the impact that smaller funders can have in a large and 
complicated system. 
Medical research foundations typically frame the philanthropic motivation for 
their gifts in terms of curing or preventing a disease or physical ill.  On balance, and with 
few exceptions, there is little to suggest that the three foundations at the heart of this 
study made critical contributions directly linked to a particular discovery.  Although their 
support was undoubtedly appreciated and helpful, the foundations’ support typically 
represented only a small and often early part of a much larger funding portfolio.  Medical 
discovery, after all, is expensive, and foundation contributions happened in the earliest 
stages of work.   
There are examples of how these foundations did play a critical role in advancing 
work, including Regenstrief’s early, sustained, and vital support for Clem McDonald’s 
work on electronic medical records (discussed in Chapter Four).  Additionally, the 
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foundations in this study identified and supported scientists doing important, even 
groundbreaking work, including Les Geddes, Larry Einhorn, and Hal Broxmeyer.  In 
these cases, however, the foundations were not the primary or the first sources of funds to 
support the scientists’ work. The foundations’ contributions were valued, certainly, but it 
is wise to maintain a measured view of their importance as one small part of a long and 
expensive effort. 
Nonetheless, the foundations, both individually and collectively, contributed to 
the advancement of medical research in an important and distinctive way.  These 
foundations served as important allies and partners to Indiana’s medical and scientific 
research institutions as these institutions developed and pursued strategic initiatives.  
Indeed, the principle contribution of these foundations was not their support for research 
per se, but their flexible and sustained contributions to the local research infrastructure.   
The three foundations made philanthropic investments that were individually 
productive in that the funds helped launch research projects and careers of individual 
scientists.  Similarly, they funded projects that might have otherwise struggled to find 
other support.  Foundations provided capital for needed physical space and supported 
recruiting efforts for highly productive faculty members.  Finally, and most importantly, 
the foundations served as useful and flexible partners to the institutions of medical 
research in Indiana, a contribution that ultimately resulted in economic benefit to the 
general community.   
Foundation grants contributed to the construction and expansion of research 
facilities and to successful efforts to recruit and retain highly skilled medical faculty and 
research scientists.  Building and equipping physical spaces and bringing highly 
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compensated workers into a community both generated social and economic benefits. 
Additionally, these activities enhanced the reputation of the institutions themselves, 
which further increased the institutions’ ability to attract personnel and grant funding.  
The three foundations in this study made these strategic, institution-building 
contributions not in spite of, but perhaps because of, their size and local focus. 
This chapter summarizes the findings and conclusions from the study and is 
organized to correspond to the questions posed at the beginning of the dissertation.  After 
identifying common traits and characteristics that the three foundations share with one 
another and with others who supported research in the same community, the question of 
motivation is considered, followed by a discussion of how the subject foundations 
operated, and, ultimately, whether and how these organizations matter. The work ends 
with a review of conclusions related to issues that confront contemporary medical 
research funders as well as offer suggestions for future studies.  
1.  Characteristics of foundations in this study. 
Not surprisingly, the three foundations at the core of this study share some 
characteristics.  These entities were created in or near Indianapolis within a 20-year 
period of one another. Identifying common traits and practices among organizations is a 
fundamental first step to a richer and broader understanding of these organizations.  
Placing organizations in historical context, which this study did, provides an opportunity 
to understand how they these organizations compare to their predecessors and whether 
they either continued or rejected practices and traditions common in their community or 
field of work. 
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This study included a range of philanthropists who lived and made their fortunes 
in Central Indiana.  Among the funders individually named in Chapters Three and Four, 
several are known only for large, one-time capital gifts that supported the construction of 
buildings, including Long, Coleman, and Reid hospitals.  The other named donors—Ball, 
Krannert, Fairbanks, Regenstrief, Showalter, and Walther—all created philanthropic 
foundations.  Members of this latter group either created companies that generated their 
wealth in Indiana (Ball, Krannert, Regenstrief, and Walther) or acquired their fortunes 
through the management and growth of an Indiana company (Showalter).  All but the 
Ball Brothers made most of their fortunes in the decades during and immediately 
following the Second World War.  Krannert, Regenstrief, and Showalter had no children 
or other immediate heirs.  Walther and Fairbanks did have children, but nonetheless 
elected to devote a large portion of their fortune to their charitable intentions.  The Ball 
Brothers chose a family foundation to manage joint assets, and each brother decided how 
much to contribute toward their collective charitable effort. 
Each of the foundation funders prioritized work done in states where they lived or 
made their fortunes.  Krannert supported causes in Indiana and Illinois, where he had 
gone to college, while Fairbanks made grants in Indiana and Florida where he lived in 
retirement.  Both men used their foundations to assist a wide variety of causes in health 
and medicine as well as arts, education, and community development.  Their largest gifts 
were for construction of buildings or venues like public parks, museums, and concert 
halls.  These foundations supported the construction of physical spaces that could be seen 
and used by the community. 
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The Ball Brothers Foundation operated similarly to Krannert and Fairbanks in that 
its support stayed primarily in their home community.  Collectively and individually, the 
brothers supported the construction of a hospital and a housing residence, but they also 
supported a variety of other projects in higher education, community beautification, and 
the arts.  Although Krannert, Fairbanks, and the Ball Brothers contributed toward 
institutions that participated in research, their support for this work was not exclusive.  
They gave to other causes and, therefore, it can be assumed were motivated to support 
medicine and research for reasons other than a commitment to advancing a particular 
cause. 
Regenstrief, Showalter, and Walther, however, were dedicated to research 
exclusively and had been since their creation.  They confined their support to Indiana, 
with a few rare exceptions. The three foundations also provided funds for capital projects, 
but these allocations were out of the ordinary practice.  Most grants went to support 
researchers and research projects. 
This fact raises the most interesting question about the three dedicated foundation 
funders: Why they would eschew other options in favor of maintaining a devotion to 
working in medical research given its inherent challenges?  Only one of the donors, Joe 
Walther, had a medical background.  Though he was fluent in the language of medicine, 
he was a long-time practitioner and hospital administrator distant from the laboratory and 
cutting-edge basic research.  The next section explores the intriguing question of 
motivation. 
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2. Why create a foundation that supports medical research? 
The factors that motivate making large donations, whether to a particular 
organization or the creation of an irrevocable charitable trust, range from the genuinely 
altruistic to the self-serving and all matter of combinations in between.  Joel Fleishman 
groups motivations for starting a nonprofit foundation into two general categories.263  The 
first group includes donors motivated by practical concerns such as tax or business 
considerations, and the second group is made up of those who desire to create a social 
good or change. In the case of medical research support, an overlay should be added to 
Fleishman’s social-good category. The grateful patient/grieved love-one theory suggests 
that individuals who encounter significant health challenges personally or through a 
loved one can be motivated to engage in medical research philanthropy as a response to 
their own experience. 
Among the three donors highlighted in this study, only Walther seems to have 
been motivated by a personal health issue, his wife’s death from cancer.  Neither 
Regenstrief nor Showalter appear to have a health-related motivation.264  They do, 
instead, fit into Fleishman’s first group of donors who were motivated by more practical 
concerns. 
Regenstrief wanted to keep his corporation operating after his death and he took 
advantage of a provision in the tax code that allowed him to accomplish this goal by 
creating a private foundation.  Regenstrief’s choice of medical research as the focus of 
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his foundation can reasonably be attributed to the influence of his nephew, a rising star on 
the medical school faculty.  The Krannert Institute for Cardiology, where Feigenbaum 
worked, served as a model for the research institute that was created by the Regenstrief 
Foundation.  Regenstrief’s own professional interest in rationalizing and improving 
operational systems may also have made the improvement of health care systems an 
appealing option.  Although Regenstrief often demonstrated curiosity about the work 
taking place at the institute that bore his name, his committed focus and energy remained 
squarely with his company.  Regenstrief was motivated by practical concerns and seemed 
only generally interested in the particular cause. 
Grace Showalter’s motivations are the least clear of the three dedicated founders.  
Showalter did not seem to have a personal interest or engagement in science or medicine 
until shortly before her death and sometime after she made her intentions for the creation 
and use of her foundation clear.  Instead, she had contributed most frequently to the 
visual and performing arts.  She was the first woman to serve on the Indiana University 
Foundation Board, a fact that evidenced her financial and personal dedication to the 
university.  There, too, her interest was primarily in the arts, not science.  Showalter’s 
husband had made his fortune as a senior executive at Eli Lilly and Company.  It is 
unsurprising that Showalter choose to direct one half of the proceeds of her foundation 
annually go to Purdue University, her husband’s alma mater.  What is more interesting, 
however, is her decision to dedicate the other half to the IU School of Medicine and not 
to IU’s main campus. 
Showalter left no records explaining her choice, though her personal attorney, 
Robert Claycombe, believed that she originally turned away from the university based on 
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its response to student protests on campus during the Vietnam War, and that while she 
softened over the years, she was unwilling to relent entirely.  She selected the medical 
school as a compromise.  Part of her estate benefitted Indiana University, but the money 
went to the portion of the university located in Indianapolis, rather than the main campus.  
It is possible, even tempting to consider, that Showalter came to support medical research 
at least partly out of spite. 
The Fairbanks Foundation, though not a dedicated research funder, provides an 
example of a motivation noteworthy in the context of the other funders in this study.  
During his lifetime and through his foundation after his death, Fairbanks made several 
large and important gifts to support medical institutions in Indianapolis, including a $20 
million commitment to create a school of public health on the Indianapolis campus near 
the medical school.  This new school provided a benefit to research beyond training 
students in the disciplines of public health.  The presence of a school of public health 
increased opportunities for the School of Medicine to obtain funding through some grant 
funders, including the National Cancer Institute. 
Fairbanks personally expressed no particular interest in healthcare or medical 
research.  His career was spent building a media empire, and he supported education 
programs in that field.  He gave to a variety of other causes, including large capital grants 
and small gifts to causes his family had traditionally supported or that his wife preferred.  
He appeared to have no particular charitable interests of his own beyond a stated desire 
that his philanthropy be used to honor his family and benefit Indianapolis.  While 
Fairbanks was the only donor to express this intention directly, all of the foundation 
funders, even those dedicated to medical research, sought to benefit the well-being and 
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vitality of their communities given their commitment of funds within the community, 
despite opportunities to contribute to causes outside the state. 
The role of external advisors should not be overlooked in a discussion of factors 
influencing these donors.  Just as advisors had played important roles in the creation and 
direction of Carnegie’s and Rockefeller’s foundations, personal advisors were important 
to the foundation donors in this study.  Showalter relied on her attorney to act as her 
emissary with the organizations she wished to fund and with the individuals who would 
serve on her selection committee.  Regenstrief followed the advice of his attorney, 
Leonard Betley, and his nephew, Harvey Feigenbaum.  Betley recommended and set up 
the foundation and Feigenbaum supported and encouraged the choice of a medical focus.  
Walther did not need a nudge from an outsider toward medical research as a topic, but he 
did depend on an attorney—again Betley—to structure the organization initially and then 
to help simplify the organization’s complicated structure several years later. 
Betley proved a key figure not only to each of the three central foundations in this 
study, but also to the broader medical research community in Indiana.  He worked with 
Walther, Regenstrief, and Fairbanks, at first as outside counsel and then as an internal 
decision maker and leader within the foundations. Betley served as chief executive of 
both the Fairbanks and Regenstrief foundations, and he served at one time on the boards 
of directors of all three organizations.  He often held these roles simultaneously.  The 
impact of his engagement is more fully discussed below.   
Does a donor’s motivation to create foundation or dedicate its proceeds in whole 
or in part to support medical research matter in their work or the way we understand 
them?  Certainly, the question is one of human interest.  The answer can add charm and 
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heart to the creation story of a nonprofit organization.  More importantly, these 
motivations may portend some aspect of how the organization is run and how it uses its 
resources.  Although the donors in this study present a variety of different motivations for 
starting a foundation and dedicating its work to medical research, the funders here share 
one common link:  each foundation expressed a desire to support and build their local 
community, including its medical institutions. 
3.  How these foundations operated? 
Medical research occurs in a highly technical, complex, and interconnected 
environment.  The work is expensive and the federal government dominates funding.  
One of the questions that animated this study asked how smaller foundations could 
operate in such an environment.  How could smaller foundations make a contribution that 
was unique and necessary rather than simply providing a contribution to a need filled by 
others?  The funders in this study provide insight into the approaches and tools that 
smaller foundations can adopt.  
Each of the dedicated foundations in this study found a niche for its work.  They 
sought to create operating structures and processes meant to balance the donor’s intent 
and the recipients’ needs. For Walther and Regenstrief, the process took longer and 
involved more dramatic organizational and procedural changes over time.  For Showalter, 
the smallest organization according to managed assets, this came more quickly, but even 
that organization developed and changed its operating norms over time. 
As discussed earlier in this work, Grace Showalter directed her advisors to 
annually divide most of the proceeds of her trust equally and give one half to Purdue and 
the other half to the IU School of Medicine. Showalter never participated in a grant 
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allocation; the first one occurred after her death.  At the first meeting, her Selection 
Committee promptly ignored her direction and began discussing how to determine which 
grants to fund. They did not split the proceeds evenly, as she had directed, though the 
committee has always honored the spirit of her direction by reaching a general 
approximation.  Because of the initial decision to do something more than simply 
dividing each year’s amount in half, the Selection Committee needed to develop a 
process to evaluate the merits of the proposals submitted by the designated recipient 
institutions.  
The immediate dilemma that Showalter’s committee faced stemmed from their 
lack of scientific and medical expertise. The Selection Committee was composed of 
Showalter’s bankers, her attorney, a personal friend who was a practicing physician, and 
the president of Purdue University, Fred Hovde.  The technical and specialized nature of 
the grant proposals, which represented disciplines and topics ranging from basic biology 
and chemistry to biomedical engineering and environmental science, were outside the 
professional knowledge of any of the committee’s members, including Hovde. The 
members were unable to evaluate the quality of individual projects or compare the 
relative merits of one against the other.  To cope with this challenge, the committee 
quickly turned to the recipients and asked them to screen and rank proposals before 
submitting them for consideration. 
Engaging the schools in the decision-making process transmitted power to the 
deans and program chairs at each school who could determine which faculty proposals 
would be carried forward to the Selection Committee.  Further, given the assumption that 
each school would receive approximately one half of the allocation, and they could learn 
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what that amount would be prior to the selection meeting, the schools could game their 
list to take advantage of every dollar.  The two funded institutions developed a practice of 
preselecting and ranking individual project proposals. The Selection Committee chose to 
leave themselves little room to direct the agenda and instead deferred to the strategic 
decisions made by deans and department chairs at the school.   
One favorable example of how this approach worked can be seen through 
Showalter’s support of Purdue’s decision to create a new department of biomedical 
engineering. Purdue requested, and Showalter approved, the use of much of the school’s 
annual allocation one year toward the creation of a start-up package to hire Les Geddes, 
one of the first faculty members in biomedical engineering, a then-emerging field.  
Grants in subsequent years helped build a stable of work in Geddes’ department.  The 
department grew and attracted substantial extramural funding that generated important 
innovations as discussed more completely in Chapters Three and Four. Eventually, some 
committee members complained that the schools were gaming the system in a manner 
that prevented them from having any meaningful say in what was brought forward for 
consideration.  Yet, the process continued generally unchanged and apparently to the 
satisfaction of the grantor and grantees. 
For Walther and Regenstrief, the work of settling on a structure and working 
processes took longer and involved more significant transition and conflict.  This was 
true despite the fact that both foundations were created with a developed general focus 
for their work—improving health care delivery (Regenstrief) and eradicating cancer 
(Walther).  Despite a stated purpose and the fact that both foundations immediately began 
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and sustained funding in furtherance of these goals, settling on a structure and 
grantmaking process took time.  
Notably, both foundations made two significant changes in their legal status, 
moving from being private foundations to become medical research organizations and 
then returning again to foundation status.  These changes had critical implications for 
both the organizations’ internal operations and their relationships with the institutions 
they funded.  When the foundations were grantmaking foundations, they could make 
decisions at arm’s length and then make funding available to the schools.  Grantmakers 
can exercise some control over the amount of contact from potential and actual recipients 
and the type of information that comes into the grantmaking process.  Managing their 
relationships with the institutions and individuals that they were funding grew more 
difficult when the organizations were medical research organizations and needed to 
secure the professional services of faculty at the medical schools.  Regenstrief provides 
the most dramatic example of the challenges associated with the transitions in 
organizational form. 
A grantmaking foundation was a means to an end for Regenstrief.  The tax laws 
permitted him to use the legal form to meet his goal.  During the Foundation’s early 
years, distributions took the form of annual block grants. Funding became more 
complicated when changes in the tax law required Regenstrief’s foundation to become a 
medical research organization.  In this new model, Regenstrief needed to employ or 
contract directly with researchers, a requirement he fulfilled by assuming responsibility 
for the operation and support of the Regenstrief Institute.  This greater engagement in 
research distracted Regenstrief from his ability to focus on his business.  To reduce that 
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risk, Regenstrief brought representatives from the school and hospital onto the Institute’s 
board.  The Regenstrief Foundation funded the Institute and the Institute leadership spent 
the funds.  Under this arrangement, Regenstrief increased his dependence on the 
institutions that benefitted from his largess.  Over time, the members of the Regenstrief 
Foundation board occasionally chafed at the sense that the medical school seemed to see 
Regenstrief’s support as a dependable resource that could be molded to the school dean’s 
strategic preferences. Ultimately, this concern led to the legal separation of the 
Foundation and the Institute into independent nonprofit organizations.  It also motivated 
the decision to pursue a relationship with Purdue University. 
The most significant challenges in Walther’s organization stemmed from the 
complexity of the far-reaching set of organizations designed to tackle cancer on several 
fronts at one time.  The size of the organization, the number of partners involved in this 
effort, and Walther’s penchant for top-down, highly engaged management challenged 
many inside the organization.  The internal organizational challenge distracted from the 
fact that Walther provided consistent funding to a number of very talented, productive 
researchers.   
Walther selected most of his recipients; although it is not clear what criteria he 
used to select them.  Hal Broxmeyer, for example, received consistent support.  As 
discussed in Chapter Four, Broxmeyer was a safe bet, however.  He also had NIH 
funding from the time he arrived at IU.  Many of Walther’s other grantees also had strong 
extramural support.  There is a reasonable question about whether, in cases like 
Broxmeyer’s, Walther did more than top an already full glass.  After Walther’s death, the 
Foundation developed grantmaking procedures that were less bound by Walther’s 
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personal preferences and loyalties. They turned to the term-limited grant, the very type 
developed by the Rockefeller Foundation 100 years earlier. 
4. Challenges faced by small and locally focused private foundations funding 
medical research and lesson from this study. 
 
All three of the dedicated foundations in this study provide lessons about the 
push-pull relationships between medical research funders, the physicians and scientists 
who complete the work, and the institutions that employ them.  Each party to the 
transaction has different needs.  The researcher’s interests are the most straightforward.  
They need as much funding as possible for as long as possible.  The institute that 
employs the funded scientist or physician also wants their researchers to be funded 
because this allows the institution to shift its internal resources to other purposes that 
align with its need and strategic goals.  For the foundation funder, the goal is to advance 
the founding donor’s intent and fund projects that are not otherwise supported or that 
cannot advance without the foundation’s contributions.   
 In some ways, the foundation’s task is most challenging, particularly if the funder 
is a small organization without access to information necessary to evaluate potential 
projects and assess the progress of funded ones.  Typically, and as shown by the 
dedicated foundations examined in this dissertation, the foundations seek to overcome the 
knowledge deficit by turning to outside experts.  But even this move can be challenging 
in specialized fields where there are few experts and these individuals are, in fact, 
typically potential competitors for available funds.  Local experts are most often also 
grantees.  The organization must build a productive partnership with experts who can 
provide honest and useful assessment of prospective recipients and their work.  Without 
access to information like this as well as the institutional ability and disposition to seek 
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and use this information, foundations supporting research may fall short in their effort to 
use their funds in the most effective way. 
This study demonstrates one approach to confronting that challenge.  The three 
foundations maintained a local focus and contributed consistently and, with the exception 
of the Walther Cancer Foundation, exclusively to support only the School of Medicine 
and the two other research universities in Indiana, Purdue and Notre Dame.  Additionally, 
the foundations met regularly with members of the leadership teams from these 
organizations and, in all three cases, involved representatives from the grantee 
institutions in some consistent and meaningful way in the grantmaking process in a 
manner appropriate to the foundation’s own personality and preferences.  To use an 
analogy, the foundations invited the diners into the kitchen and asked them to help plan 
the menu and prepare the meal.   
This approach resulted in the development of close and long-term relationships 
between grantor and recipient organizations as well as the individuals who participated in 
the work. These relationships oriented both parties away from short-term thinking and 
toward a generally cooperative, longer-term orientation. Certainly, this did not eliminate 
all strife, but both donor and recipient were incentivized to see beyond immediate 
discussion to a longer line of future grant funding.  This structure created an ongoing 
negotiation between the grantor and grantee that was similar to the type of relationships 
that developed between the Rockefeller Foundation’s long-serving program officers and 
the schools those officers routinely funded.  The Indianapolis foundations watched the 
development of strategic initiatives and could monitor work at the funded institutions 
both directly, through formal reports, as well as informally through regular and less 
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formal communication that occurs among friends and acquaintances that exist and work 
in the same community.  Recipients and their work across the institution was more visible 
to donors.  
In the case of Indianapolis, this arrangement began to emerge by chance when one 
man, Leonard Betley, was separately engaged to do legal work for all three foundations.  
Betley continued his work with the organizations, eventually moving from outside 
counsel to joining each organization and leading its board or internal staff.  Betley, who 
spent several decades with these organizations, created a network of funders and 
recipients that engaged in loose collaborations and worked to develop and implement 
strategies that benefitted the foundations, the funded institutions, and the broader 
community.   
Betley acted as a conduit carrying information between the foundations and their 
recipients as well as laterally across the foundations.  Shared knowledge facilitated 
opportunities for increasing the foundations’ impact through loose coordination of grants.  
For example, Walther funded cancer research at the School of Medicine and thus was 
aware that oncological departments at the school were limited in their funding success by 
the fact that the campus did not have a school of public health at a time when more 
federal and large foundation funders were interested in integration of public health efforts 
into cancer prevention and treatment efforts.  The Fairbanks Foundation, the largest 
foundation in this study by total assets, made a large gift to create a public health school.  
While this example does not suggest that Betley single-handedly engineered the 
contribution for this purpose, his direct and long-term engagement with these foundations 
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facilitated the type of partnerships that increased the impact of the foundations’ work to 
the benefit of the grantors, grantees, and the community.   
Developing lasting collaborative relationships provides advantages to the parties 
included in or preferred by the decision makers inside the network.  Parties to these 
relationships share information in a context of heightened trust that results from the 
existence and promise of ongoing engagement.  This type of relationship is not without 
risks, however.  The type of foundation-recipient partnership that developed between 
each of the three foundations and their grant recipients can give the research institution 
the power to effectively act as a gatekeeper dictating who is eligible to pursue funding 
with certain organizations.  Purdue originally used this approach internally when deciding 
which proposed projects would be submitted for funding.  For those outside these 
networks, closed associations can be problematic as the existing relationship can form a 
high or complete barrier to anyone not already on the inside. To overcome this risk, either 
the institution must implement, or the foundation must create or insist upon, a process 
that keeps the opportunity to seek funding open and flexible.  
Relationships of the type that developed between the three dedicated funders and 
the School of Medicine, in particular, highlight a second challenge.  Recipients that grow 
used to receiving funding from a single source over a long period can begin to treat the 
funds as dependable income that can be funneled toward projects that do not honor the 
donor’s intentions or that simply supplement other funds.  For foundations, this risk can 
be reduced if the foundation is willing and able to find another recipient as the 
Regenstrief Foundation did when it started funding work at Purdue in addition to grants 
to the medical school.  The willingness to find new collaborative relationships or types of 
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work ensures that foundations can continue to find opportunities to use their funds in 
ways that are most valuable.  
Each of the dedicated foundations in this study invested a substantial portion of its 
annual expenditure in efforts that the recipient institutions were challenged to fund in 
other ways.  For example, the Walther Cancer Foundation the youngest foundation in this 
study, held assets of just over $139 million in 2016.  Since its founding in 1985, the fund 
has made over $150 million in research grants to cancer research.  While Walther 
supports basic and applied projects related to drug discovery, the most common 
expression of cancer research, the foundation also continues to honor one of Joe 
Walther’s most innovative contributions, his focus on palliative and behavioral oncology.  
In fact, the Foundation’s commitment to this work has increased over time.  In 2017, 
Walther made a $14 million grant to create the Walther Supportive Oncology Program at 
the School of Medicine.  Walther is an example of two domains where even small 
funders are able to contribute in a meaningful way:  Walther supports an area that 
remains underfunded and it concentrates its grants locally and thereby benefits the entire 
community. 
The most frequently mentioned reason that the research community values 
nonprofit and philanthropic funders is because of their willingness to take risks by 
funding a novel concept or a researcher presenting a slim vita because of youth or 
inexperience in a field. 265  New projects often lack clear indicators that the work is likely 
to succeed and will have value and, as a result, the quest for funding is far more 
                                                 
265Moses, Biomedical Research and Health Advances, New England Journal of Medicine, 
567-571.   
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difficult.266  Philanthropic funders provide critical start up or proof-of-concept funds in 
these cases.  Nonprofit grants can also act as an external endorsement that can be 
leveraged by scientists seeking other extramural funding.  Foundation grants can also 
cover gaps in funding that occur when a project’s funding is nearing exhaustion and 
additional extramural support has not been obtained.  Assuring a continued stream of 
funds prevents the threat caused by interruption.267 They can also accelerate work by 
providing an infusion of needed dollars at a critical juncture, particularly given their 
presumed flexibility regarding funding schedules. 
Foundations are also able to assist researchers working on orphan or neglected 
diseases as well as on health issues that plague the vulnerable and underserved.  These 
groups are typically unable to produce the political power or economic incentive needed 
to place their issue at the top of the public funding agenda, and they do not promise the 
type of financial return to attract commercial researchers.  Put differently, philanthropic 
funders are asked to fulfill their expected roles of aiding the vulnerable and the 
underserved. 
The medical research philanthropist does not work free of criticism.  Funders who 
contribute to research, particularly the individuals and organizations able to make large 
gifts and grants, are exerting influence over the research agenda.  Setting or shaping an 
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biomedical workforce,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, January 5, 
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agenda is a form of policy making, particularly given the immediate connection between 
research and the promise of public wellbeing.  Those who question the role of 
philanthropy in research are concerned by the absence of the type of transparent, multi-
phase review process undertaken by the NIH when evaluating the scientific value of the 
research it funds.268  Critics also worry that funders are governed by personal interest or 
parochial loyalties, such as affection for an alma mater, and will direct money to serve 
those interests and loyalties over the broader public interest.  Finally, critics note 
potential inequalities as some scientists, including those who have found either scientific 
or popular recognition, receive the lion’s share of funds as others are left to do without.  
Complaints about uneven distribution of assets and the benefits they bring become a less 
powerful critique of philanthropy as the competition for NIH funding more frequently 
favors proven researchers, a fact that produces the same result.  In addition to learning 
more about how local foundations engage in medical research, this examination of one 
group of foundation funders in one mid-sized American city provides an opportunity to 
examine on a micro-level whether and how the promise or perils of philanthropic funding 
play out. 
5. Summary and recommendations for continued study of smaller and local 
foundations. 
 
Research foundations rarely make financial contributions that take a project over 
the line from initial concept to practical application. The timeline is too long and the 
work, on the whole, too expensive for any single foundation.  Instead, foundations play a 
                                                 
268 There is, of course, critique of this process, including challenges that it is neither 
transparent to fair.  See Kathy L. Hudson, PhD, et.al, “Toward a New Era of Trust and 
Transparency in Clinical Trials,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 316(13) 
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role in ensuring that some research questions get into the pipeline in the first place.  This 
work shows that foundations can and do take risks on new and unproven work at a time 
when other funding is not readily available to the scientist.  In this way, the foundation 
donor serves as a bridge that can allow a researcher to qualify for the type of corporate or 
government funding that will carry work forward. 
Foundation contributions have a second impact.  They support the construction of 
a research infrastructure in a community.  Foundations, including the funds profiled in 
this study, sometimes provided key funding for both literal and figurative institution 
building.  They supported the construction of physical spaces such as classrooms, 
hospitals where research and teaching occur, and laboratory space. They funded faculty 
chairs and other hires, and either created or assisted in creating new medical departments 
and specialized and focused research institutes that concentrated on advancing knowledge 
in defined areas such as cancer, aging, palliative and behavioral care, and electronic 
medical information technology. 
Each of these contributions resulted in tangible benefits to the research institution 
itself.  Importantly, those institutional benefits often generated further gain for the local 
community in terms of economic benefits and institutional prestige. Consider, for 
example, the impact of creating a medical research institute like the Regenstrief Institute 
or the bioengineering department (now a school) at Purdue.  Regenstrief and Showalter, 
respectively, provided all or a key part of the funding for those initiatives.  Both of the 
new entities were productive in terms of scholarship and innovation as discussed in 
Chapters Three and Four of this work.  Both earned prestige for their associated schools, 
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which, in turn, created an ability to attract talented researchers and students to the 
community and to the school.   
Medical research institutions provide jobs and produce significant economic value 
in their surrounding communities.  A 2010 study by the consulting firm Tripp Umbach 
found that Indiana University’s research programs produced $844 million in local impact 
and supported 6,500 jobs, many of these high-paying professional roles.269  Others have 
found same thing.270  Individuals working in the life sciences in 2016 earned an average 
of $98,934 in wages compared to the private sector average of $44,121.271 It is not 
difficult to see why so many states have concentrated efforts on attracting life science 
jobs like those found in the institutions that form the backbone of the medical research 
enterprise in Indiana.  Foundation contributions to bolstering the work of medical 
research organizations contributed more broadly to the general economy.   
This project demonstrates the value of careful consideration of foundations 
typically underrepresented in scholarly literature.  The findings of this study challenge 
conventional ideas about medical research philanthropy and about small foundations and 
the nature and value of their contribution.  For example, my work demonstrates that the 
primary value of the foundations in this study was not their support for research per se, 
but their flexible and sustained contributions to the local research infrastructure, 
including philanthropic investments that helped launch research projects and the careers 
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of individual scientists, provided capital for needed physical space, and supported 
recruiting efforts to bring innovative and productive faculty members to staff new 
research and patient care departments.  The foundations served as partners to the 
institutions of medical research in Indiana, and that contribution ultimately benefitted the 
entire community.  
These findings raise potential questions for future researchers.  Some questions 
grow out of the local focus in this matter.  Are the Indianapolis organizations unusual or 
typical of other smaller and locally focused foundations around the country?  Do other 
such funds work in the same way?  Is it common to for smaller foundations to confine 
their support locally?  Are the Indiana foundations models for a type of strategic 
networking that is similar to or different from networks found in other areas or other 
fields?  Are there, for example, networks of smaller funders in the arts or devoted to food 
justice?  If so, can they learn from one another? 
Importantly and finally, this study encourages donors and foundation 
professionals to take a wider and deeper view of their role in advancing the work of 
medical research and to change the yardstick by which they typically measure success.  
This study demonstrates that the Indianapolis philanthropists made a significant and 
important impact on the advancement of medical research through their support of 
institutions where the work of discovery and care goes on in small increments every day.   
Although not always thought of as research support per se, funding for building 
spaces, supporting the hiring of faculty, and providing opportunities for young 
researchers to get a start in the profession are all needed to sustain the broad process of 
discovery.  Each of these activities should be valued as a meaningful outcome.  
 178 
Additionally, the organizations in this study developed strong partnerships that served as 
a source of ongoing support and strategic input to the institutions.  The knowledge that 
medical schools and research institutions had a dependable financial partner able to 
provide a fairly predictable amount of funding facilitated and, in some ways, shaped the 
institutions’ own strategic advancement.  This type of reliable engagement, too, is a 
meaningful contribution to the research endeavor.   
This work opened by noting the challenge issued by Hammack and Anheier to 
further study the purpose, practice, and procedures developed by foundations of all sizes 
in order to foster a more meaningful appreciation of the potential and actual impact of 
these institutions.  Such research requires going beyond the few funds that crowd the top 
of the largest and wealthiest lists.  It means going into communities and studying the 
work of local organizations.  Given the potential and increasingly important role that 
these foundations can play in both medical research and local community growth, work is 
needed to understand, appreciate, and effectively harness the power of smaller 
foundations in medical research and beyond.   
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NOTE ON SOURCES 
 
 
Research for this dissertation involved review of the corporate records of several 
foundations, including Fairbanks and Krannert and the three organizations at the heart of 
this study—Regenstrief, Walther and Showalter.  The three core foundations each gave 
me generous and open access to their files, records, and archives.  The foundations’ 
willingness to permit such an extensive review significantly enriched this study.  The 
documents maintained by each organization were relatively complete and organized in 
each case.  They are treated as working documents and are stored on site and in the 
foundations’ corporate offices.  The documents were not maintained a fashion common 
to those searching professionally maintained archives.  In addition, and with the two 
exceptions noted below, the documents are not publicly available.   
Each collection of documents includes documents and material related to the 
creation and operation of the foundations.  There are some materials associated with 
awards or recognitions to the founders, as well as copies of obituaries and other tributes.  
I found no personal papers in any of the document collections.  
Unless noted below, each foundation collection included most types of documents 
and records common in any business and organization,  including: 1) legal records related 
to the formation, operation, and status of the organization; 2) governance documents, 
including board minutes and board committee minutes; 3) annual reports; 4) grantmaking 
records, including grant applications, requests for proposals, grant committee notes, 
related records and correspondence, grant reports, summaries and lists; and 5) 
grantmaking policies, priority statements, and strategic plans. I also reviewed 
organizational staff lists, board lists and staffing tables, where these were available.  Each 
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foundation maintained different types of documents in their collection.  I note below a 
few organization-specific limitations and collection omissions.   
The Regenstrief and Fairbanks foundations maintained the most complete body of 
documents.  Historic as well as current working documents were available in hard copy 
in the foundations’ offices.  These two foundations share some professional staff and are 
housed in offices within a single, multi-story building in Indianapolis, Indiana.  Their 
record collections contained similar but not identical types of documents.  Both 
foundations had copies of transcripts from interviews and oral histories conducted with 
trustees and administrators made in conjunction with organizational anniversary 
celebrations.  
The Showalter Foundation records were also generally complete.  These records 
had been in the hands of Showalter’s personal attorney and Trust board member, Robert 
Claycombe until his retirement from the board at which time he gave the documents to 
Robert Holden, then chair of the Trust.  Subsequent to the completion of this research 
project, the Showalter documents were placed in the Philanthropy Archives of the Ruth 
Lilly Special Collections Archive at the Indiana University Purdue University Library in 
Indianapolis.  At the time of this publication, the documents were being processed into 
the collection and should eventually be accessible to other researchers.  
 Two foundations had records that were less complete, including Walther and 
Krannert.  The Walther Cancer Foundation moved from its offices near the former 
Winona hospital in Indianapolis, to the office building where the Regenstrief and 
Fairbanks foundations are also located.  During or prior to that move, some of the 
organization’s records were lost or destroyed.  Many records that would have been 
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produced during the early to mid-1990s could not be located, including meeting minutes 
and records of grants made. These gaps hampered the ability to draw comparisons 
between the three organizations in some respects as well as to fully explore the reasons 
for and nature of some organizational changes.  It was not certain, for example, how 
many grants the organization funded in certain years.  
Similarly, few documents associated with the Krannert Foundation could be 
located.  The Foundation and Trust were both terminated in 1987, and the associated 
documents were most were likely destroyed when the Inland Corporation moved its 
headquarters out of the city.  The few documents that remain are maintained in the Ruth 
Lilly Special Collections and Archives, Foundation Center Historical Information Files, 
Krannert Charitable trust – Indiana Folder.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 182 
REFERENCES 
Primary Sources:  Manuscript Collections 
Coleman Hall Clipping File, Ruth Lilly Special Collections and Archives, Indiana 
University, Purdue University/Indianapolis. 
 
KF Herman Charles and Ellnora Decker Krannert Foundation, Foundation Center 
Historical Foundation Collection, Ruth Lilly Special Collections and Archives, 
Indiana University, Purdue University/Indianapolis: Box 44. 
 
FFOF Fairbanks Foundation Office Files, Richard M. Fairbanks Foundation, 
Indianapolis Indiana. 
 
KT Krannert Charitable Trust, Foundation Center Historical Foundation Collection, 
Ruth Lilly Special Collections and Archives, Indiana University, Purdue 
University/Indianapolis: Boxes 44 & 112. 
 
RFOF Regenstrief Foundation Office Files, Regenstrief Foundation Indianapolis, 
Indiana. 
 
ST Ralph W. and Grace M. Showalter Trust Collection, Ruth Lilly Special 
Collections and Archives, Indiana University, Purdue University/Indianapolis  
 
WFOF Walther Cancer Foundation Office Files, Walther Cancer Foundation, 
Indianapolis. Indiana.  
 
 
Primary Sources:  Newspapers and Periodicals 
Indiana Daily Student 
Indianapolis News 
Indianapolis Star 
New York Times 
 
Primary Sources:  Published Sources  
 
Ball Memorial Hospital: A Legacy of Caring, 1929-1989. Muncie, IN: Ball Memorial 
Hospital, 1989. 
 
Bush, Vannevar. Science, The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President on a Program 
for Postwar Scientific Research (reprinted). Washington DC: National Science 
Foundation, 1960.  
 
 183 
——— “As We May Think,” The Atlantic 176 no. 1 (July, 1945): 101-108. 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1945/07/as-we-may-think/303881. 
 
Carnegie, Andrew. “Wealth,” North American Review, 148 no. 391 (Sept. 1981): 653-64. 
 
Flexner, Abraham. The American College: A Criticism. New York: Century Company, 
1908. 
 
Ford, Wendy. Regenstrief: Legacy of the Dishwasher King. Indianapolis: Regenstrief 
Foundation, 1999. 
 
———. Richard M. Fairbanks, A Life in Broadcasting. Indianapolis: Richard M. 
Fairbanks Foundation, 2008. 
 
Hale, Katherine, Ronda Britt, and Michael Gibbons “Higher Education R&D Spending: 
Spending and Funding Sources Differ by State.” National Science Foundation 
InfoBriefs, NSF 19-303, March 7, 2019. 
 
“Kiwanis and Riley Hospital for Children: A History of Service.” Kiwanis Magazine 100 
no. 4 (June/July 2015): 19. 
 
Lynd, Robert and Helen. Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American Culture. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1929. 
 
McDonald, M.D., Clement J. “Protocol-Based Computer Reminders, the Quality of Care 
and the Imperfectability of Man.” New England Journal of Medicine, 295 
(1976):1351-1355. 
 
Plosila, Walter, “Indiana Life Sciences Industry 2002-2010: Tracking Progress and 
Charting a Course for Continued Success. Indianapolis: BioCrossroads, 2010;” 
accessed May 18, 2019; https://www.ibrc.indiana.edu/studies/Indiana-Life-
Sciences-Industry-Report-2002-2010.pdf. 
 
Rockefeller, John D. Random Reminiscences of Men and Events. New York: Doubleday, 
Page & Company, 1913. 
 
U.S. National Institutes of Health, “Peer Review Process” at 
https://www.nichd.nih.gov/grants-funding/grants-
process/processoverview/peerreviewprocess/Pages/default.aspx last accessed July 
3. 
 
Van Allen, Elizabeth J., et al., Keeping the Dream, 1921-1996: Commemorating 75 Years 
of Caring for Indiana’s Children. Indianapolis: James Whitcomb Riley Memorial 
Association, 1996. 
 
 184 
Walther, Joseph E. A Life Like None Other. Indianapolis: Walther Cancer Foundation 
2003. 
 
Primary Sources:  Oral History and Interview Transcripts 
Leonard Betley, interview 1; January 23, 2010. Regenstrief Oral Histories Project. 
 
Harvey Feigenbaum, M.D., interview 1, January 28, 2010, Regenstrief Oral History 
Project.  
 
Joanne Fox, interview 1, July 12, 2010, Regenstrief Oral History Project.  
  
Primary Sources:  Public Laws and Regulations 
Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. Public Law 96-517 (1980). 
 
Hospital Survey and Construction Act (1946). 
  
Internal Revenue Code Section 509(a)(1)(1999). 
 
Primary Sources:  Websites 
 
“A Short History of the NIH: WWII Research and the Grants Program,” accessed July 1, 
2016, https://history.nih.gov/exhibits/history/docs/page_06.html. 
 
American Philosophical Society “About,” accessed August 1, 2016, 
https://www.amphilsoc.org/about/. 
 
Ball Corporation. “History and Timeline,” accessed January 15, 2019, 
https://www.ball.com/na/about-ball/overview/history-timeline#the-ball-family 
 
Ball Foundation. “Ball Foundation Milestones” accessed January 12, 2019, 
https://www.ballfdn.org/about-bbf/bbf-milestones. 
 
 “Bill and Melinda Gates Make $25 Million Grant to International AIDS Vaccine 
Initiative.” last modified May, 1999, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-
Center/Press-Releases/1999/05/International-AIDS-Vaccine-Initiative (1999).   
 
“Historic Evansville: Welborn Clinic” accessed May 13, 2018, 
http://historicevansville.com/site.php?id=welborn. 
 
“Lilly Endowment Grant Attracts Leading Scientists,” accessed March 1, 2019, 
http://medicine.iu.edu/news/2017/07/25-million-lilly-endowment-grant-attract-
leading-scientits-iu-school-medicine. 
 185 
 “Richard A. Rodebush Medical Center,” accessed February 10, 2019, 
https://www.va.gov/directory/guide/facility.asp?id=62. 
 
“Trends in Federal R&D, FY 1976-2018,” accessed April 30, 2019, 
https://www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/historical-trends-federal-rd.  
 
“What We Do: HIV Strategy Overview. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,” 
accessed May 30, 2016, www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global- 
HIV#bodyregion_0_interiorarticle_0_strategysections_2_strategysubsections003d
5bb5b7d94917b0e1f. 
 
Secondary Sources:  Books, Dissertations, and Theses 
 
American Cancer Society, Burroughs Wellcome Fund and Howard Hughes Medical 
Institute. “The Role of the Private Sector in Training the Next Generation of 
Biomedical Scientists.” Atlanta, GA: American Cancer Society, 2000. 
 
Anheier, Helmut and David Hammack. American Foundations: Roles and Contributions. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010. 
 
Apple, Rima. Women, Health, and Medicine in America:  A Historical Handbook. New 
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990. 
 
Arnove, Robert E., Philanthropic and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home 
and Abroad. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980. 
 
Badertscher, Kathi. “A New Wishard is on the Way” Indiana Magazine of History, 108 
no. 4 (December, 2012): 345-382. 
 
Bennett, James. Health Research Charities II: The Politics of Fear. Washington, DC: 
Capital Research Center, 1991. 
 
———. Health Research Charities: Image and Reality. Washington, DC: Capital 
Research Center, 1990. 
 
Berliner, Howard S.  A System of Scientific Medicine:  Philanthropic Foundations in the 
Flexner Era. (New York:  Routledge, Kagen and Paul, 1985).   
 
Bernholz, Lucy. “Private Philanthropy and Public Schools: San Francisco in the 1960s 
and 1970s.” PhD diss., Stanford University, 1995. 
 
———. “The Future of Foundation History: Suggestions for Research and Practice.” In 
Philanthropic Foundations: New Scholarships, New Possibilities, edited by Ellen 
Condliffe Lagemann. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 
 
 186 
Bliss, Michael. The Discovery of Insulin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
 
Blomquist, William. “Unigov, Creation of (1967-1971),” The Encyclopedia of 
Indianapolis, edited by David J. Bodenhamer and Robert G. Barrows, 1350. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. 
 
Bloomfield, William. “Grantmaking foundations in America: Analyzing the Process and 
Practice of Philanthropic Decision-Making.” Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 
2002. 
 
Blumenthal, Andrea K. “Leadership in a Medical Philanthropy: Simon Flexner and the 
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research.” Ph.D. diss., Drew University, 1991. 
 
Bodenhamer, David J. and Robert G. Barrows, The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. 
 
Boris, Elizabeth. “Creation and Growth: A Survey of Private Foundations,” in America’s 
Wealthy and the Future of Foundations, edited by Teresa Odendahl, 69. 
Washington DC: The Foundation Center, 1987. 
 
Boyer, John. “The University of Chicago’s 125-year History,” accessed February 27, 
2019, 
https://www.uchicago.edu/features/historian_illuminates_uchicagos_125_years. 
 
Brant, Allan M. and Martha Gardner, “The Golden Age of Medicine?” in Medicine in the 
Twentieth Century, Roger Cooter and John Pickstone (eds).  Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands: Harwood Academic Publishing, 2000, 221-250. 
 
Bremner, Robert Hamlett. American Philanthropy, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988. 
 
———. Giving: Charity and Philanthropy in History. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1994. 
 
Brown, E. Richard. Rockefeller Medicine Men. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1979. 
 
Burlingame, Dwight. The Responsibilities of Wealth. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1992. 
 
Cassedy, James H. Medicine in America: A Short History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991. 
 
Castle, Alfred L., A Century of Philanthropy: A History of the Samuel N. and Mary 
Castle Foundation. Honolulu: Hawaiian Historical Society, 1992. 
 
 187 
Clark, David. To Comfort Always: A History of Palliative Medicine since the Nineteenth 
Century. London, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
 
Chernow, Ron. Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. New York: Random House, 
1998. 
 
Clark, Lawrence J., Marilyn J. Field, Theodore L. Koontz, and Virginia L. Koontz. “The 
Impact of Hill-Burton: An Analysis of Hospital Bed and Physician Distribution in 
the United States, 1950-1970,” Medical Care, 18, no. 5 (May, 1980), at 
https://journals.lww.com/lww-medicalcare/Abstract/1980/05000. 
 
Creager, Angela. “Mobilizing Biomedicine: Virus Research Between Lay Health 
Organizations and the U.S. Federal Government, 1935-1955.” In Biomedicine in 
the Twentieth Century: Practices, Policies, and Politics, edited by Caroline 
Hannaway, 171-203. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press, 2008. 
 
Cuninggim, Merrimon. Private Money and Public Service the Role of Foundations in 
American Society. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972. 
 
Curti, Merle. “The History of American Philanthropy as a Field of Research.” American 
Historical Review 62, no. 2 (January 1957): 352–63. 
  http://www.jstor.org.proxy.ulib.iupui.edu/stable/1845188. 
 
DeHoff, Beth. “Community Hospitals” in The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, edited by 
David J. Bodenhamer and Robert G. Barrows, 467. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994. 
 
Diamond, Arthur. “The Relative Success of Private Funders and Government Funders in 
Funding Important Science.” European Journal of Law and Economics 21, no. 2 
(April 1, 2006): 149–61. 
 
Diaz, William.  The Behavior of Foundations in an Organizational Frame:  A Case 
Study,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 25, no. 4 (December 1, 1996): 
453-469.  Doi.org/10/117/0899764096254004. 
  
———. “The ‘Black Box’ of Foundation Decision Making.” Foundation News & 
Commentary, August 1997. 
 
Dickson, D. “Science Research and Philanthropy. Charities Taking the Strain.” Nature 
364, no. 6439 (August 19, 1993): 742–44. 
 
Dooley, Betty, and Georgetown University. Health Giving of Private Foundations, 1975 
and 1980. Washington, DC: Center for Health Policy Studies Georgetown 
University, 1984. 
 
 188 
Dowie, Mark. American Foundations: An Investigative History. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2001. 
 
Erickson, Norma B. “The Lincoln Hospital of Indianapolis: An Effort to Remedy a 
‘Lamentable Condition,’ 1909-1915.” Traces of Indiana and Midwestern History. 
26 (Winter 2014): 26-25.  
 
Farley, John. To Cast out Disease. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
Field, Robert I., Barbara J. Plager, Rebecca A. Baranowski, Mary Anne Healy, and 
Margaret L. Longacre. “Toward A Policy Agenda on Medical Research Funding: 
Results of a Symposium.” Health Affairs 22, no. 3 (May 1, 2003): 224–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.22.3.224. 
 
Fishbein, M. “The Foundations and Private Philanthropy.” Postgraduate Medicine 47, 
no. 2 (February 1970): 220. 
 
Fitzpatrick, S. “Editorial - Science Funding and Private Philanthropy.” Science. 277, no. 
5326 (1997): 621. 
 
Fleishman, Joel L. The Foundation: A Great American Secret: How Private Wealth Is 
Changing the World. Washington, DC: PublicAffairs, 2007. 
 
Fosdick, Raymond. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a Portrait. New York: Harper, 1956. 
 
———. The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1989. 
 
Fox, D.M. “Foundations’ Impact on Health Policy.” Health Affairs (Project Hope) 25, no. 
6 (November 2006): 1724–29. 
 
———. “The Politics of the NIH Extramural Program, 1937-1950.” Journal of the 
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 42, no. 4 (1987): 447–66 
 
Friedman, Lawrence J., and Mark D. McGarvie, eds. Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility 
in American History. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Frumkin, Peter. On Being Nonprofit: A Conceptual and Policy Primer. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2002. 
 
———. Strategic Giving. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 
 
———. The Essence of Strategic Giving. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. 
 
 
 189 
Gascoine, Kelley. “Saving Children from the White Plague: The Marion County 
Tuberculosis Association’s Crusade Against Tuberculosis, 1911-1936.” M.A. 
Thesis, Indiana University, Indianapolis, 2010. 
http://scholarwordks.iupui.edu/handle/1805/2188 
 
Ginzberg, Eli and Anna B. Dutka. The Financing of Biomedical Research. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. 
 
Glaser, R.J. “The Impact of Philanthropy on Medicine and Health.” Perspectives in 
Biology and Medicine 36, no. 1 (1992): 46–56. 
 
Granshaw, Lindsay and Roy Porter, The Hospital in History.  New York: Routledge, 
1989. 
 
Greene, S. “Science Research and Philanthropy. Government Funding Dominant.” 
Nature 364, no. 6439 (August 19, 1993): 741–42. 
 
Gruman, J., and D. Prager. “Health Research Philanthropy in a Time of Plenty: A 
Strategic Agenda.” Health Affairs 21, no. 5 (2002): 265- 69. 
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.21.5.265.  
 
Gunn, Selskar, and National Health Council. Voluntary Health Agencies, an Interpretive 
Study. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1945. 
 
Hall, Peter Dobkin. “Abandoning the Rhetoric of Independence: Reflections on the 
Nonprofit Sector in the Post-Liberal Era.” In Shifting the Debate: Public/Private 
Sector Relations in the Modern Welfare State, edited by Susan Ostrander, Stuart 
Langdon, and John Van Til, 11–28. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1987. 
 
———. Inventing the Nonprofit Sector and Other Essays on Philanthropy, Voluntarism, 
and Nonprofit Organizations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. 
 
Hale, Katherine, Ronda Britt and Michael Gibbons, “Higher Education R&D Spending:  
Spending and Funding Sources Differ by State, NSF 19-202” accessed March 7, 
2019, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2019/nsf19303. 
 
Hammack, David. “Foundations in the American Polity.” In Philanthropic Foundations: 
New Scholarships, New Possibilities, edited by Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, 43-68. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 
 
Hammack, David C. and Helmut Anheier. A Versatile American Institution: The 
Changing Ideals and Realities of Philanthropic Foundations. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 2013. 
 
Hannaway, Caroline. Biomedicine in the Twentieth Century: Practices, Policies, and 
Politics. Amsterdam, The Netherlands; IOS Press, 2008. 
 190 
Harvey, A. McGehee. For the Welfare of Mankind: The Commonwealth Fund and 
American Medicine. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 
 
Hathaway, Esse Virginia. Partners in Progress. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 
1968. 
 
Henderson, Mark. “Problems with Peer Review.” British Medical Journal 340 (March 
15, 2010): 1409. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.c1409. 
 
Hudson, Kathy L., et.al, “Toward a New Era of Trust and Transparency in Clinical 
Trials,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 316, no. 13 (October 4, 
2016): 1335-1354 doi:10.1001/JA/.2016.14668 
 
Iglehart, John, and Project Hope. Private Foundations and Health Policy. Millwood, 
VA.: Project Hope, 1990. 
 
Isaacs, Stephen L., and James R. Knickman. “Field Building: Lessons from The Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation’s Anthology Series.” Health Affairs 24, no. 4 (July 1, 
2005): 1161–65. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.24.4.1161.  
 
Jones, Gerald. The Circuit Riders: Rockefeller Money and the Rise of Modern Science. 
New York: Norton, 1983. 
 
Karl, Barry. “Funding Science: An Adventure in Public History.” Reviews in American 
History 23, no. 3 (September 1, 1995): 496–501. 
 
Kevles, Daniel J. “Foundations, Universities, and Trends in Support for the Physical and 
Biological Sciences, 1900-1992.” Daedalus 121, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 195–235. 
http://vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com.proxy2.ulib.iupui.edu/hww/results/getResults.jht
ml?_DARGS=/hww/results/results_common.jhtml.38. 
 
Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Pearson 
Education, 1997. 
 
Kohler, Robert E. Partners in Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.  
 
———. “Philanthropy and Science.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. 
129, no. 1 (March 1, 1985): 9–13. http://www.jstor.org/stable/986975. 
 
Lagemann, Ellen Condliffe. ed. Philanthropic Foundations: New Scholarships, New 
Possibilities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 
 
———. Private Power for the Public Good: A History of the Carnegie Foundation for 
the Advancement of Teaching. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 
1983. 
 
 191 
Lee, Dwight. “Review of Health Research Charities: Image and Reality.” Southern 
Economic Journal 57, no. 4 (1991): 1201. 
 
Ludmerer, Kenneth M. Learning to Heal: The Development of American Medical 
Education. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 
 
Matherlee, K.R. “The Outlook for Clinical Research: Impacts of Federal Funding 
Restraint and Private Sector Reconfiguration.” Academic Medicine: Journal of the 
Association of American Medical Colleges 70, no. 12 (December 1995): 1065–72. 
 
McCarthy, Kathleen D. American Creed: Philanthropy and the Rise of Civil Society. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
 
McDonell, Katherine Mandusic. “Hospitals” in The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, edited 
by David J. Bodenhamer and Robert G. Barrows, 713.  Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008. 
 
McKersie, William. “Local Philanthropy Matters: Pressing Issues for Research and 
Practice.” in Philanthropic Foundations: New Scholarships, New Possibilities, 
edited by Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, 329-358. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1999. 
  
———.“Strategic Philanthropy and Local Public Policy: Lessons from Chicago School 
Reform, 1987-1993.” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1998. 
 
Moore, Sarah E. H. Ribbon Culture: Charity, Compassion, and Public Awareness 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
 
Moses III, Hamilton. “The Anatomy of Medical Research: US and International 
Comparisons,” Journal of the American Medical Association 313, no. 2 (2015): 
174-189. 
 
———.Moses, III, Hamilton and Joseph B. Martin, “Biomedical Research and Health 
Advances,” New England Journal of Medicine 2011; 364: 567-571 and Richard 
R. Nelson, Kristin Buterbaugh, Marcel Perl, Anatine Gelijns, “How medical 
know-how progresses.” Research Policy. 40 (2011): 1339-1344. 
National Academy of Sciences. “Who Will Keep the Public Healthy? Educating Public 
Health Professionals for the 21st Century.” Washington, D.C., National Academy 
of Sciences, 2003. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK221176/ 
 
Nielsen, Waldemar. The Golden Donors: A New Anatomy of the Great Foundations. New 
York: Truman Talley Books; E.P. Dutton, 1985.  
 
———. The Big Foundations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. 
 
 192 
Odendahl, Teresa. Charity Begins at Home: Generosity and Self-Interest among the 
Philanthropic Elite. New York: Basic Books, 1990. 
 
Oshinsky, David. Polio: An American Story. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Ostrander, Susan, and Paul A. Schervish. “Giving and Getting: Philanthropy as a Social 
Relation.” In Critical Issues in American Philanthropy, edited by John Van Til, 
67-98, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990.  
 
Park, Buhm Soon. “The Development of the Intramural Research Program at the National 
Institutes of Health after World War II.” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 
46, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 383-402 
 
Patton, Michael. Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, 2002. 
 
Phillips, K. A. “The Application of Business Models to Medical Research: Interviews 
with Two Founders of Directed-Philanthropy Foundations.” Health Affairs 26, no. 
4 (2007): 1181–85. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.26.4.1181. 
  
Plosila, Walter. “Indiana Life Sciences Industry 2002-2010: Tracking Progress and 
Charting a Course for Continued Success.” BioCrossroads, 2010. 
 
Porter, Roy. The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: Medical History of Humanity. New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1999. 
 
Prager, Denis, and Grantmakers in Health. “Raising the Value of Philanthropy: A 
Synthesis of Informal Interviews with Foundation Executives and Observers of 
Philanthropy.” Washington, DC: Grantmakers in Health, 1999. 
 
Prewitt, Kenneth. “Foundations.” in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, edited 
by Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg, 356–75. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2006. 
 
——— “American Foundations and the Funding of Science,” Essays on Philanthropy, 
No. 21, Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, (1996), 6. 
 
Rayner, Jeremy. “Understanding Policy Change as a Historical Problem.” Journal of 
Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 11, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 
83–96. 
 
Regenstrief, D. I., C. A. Langston, and C. H. Rieder. “Decades of Focus: Grant Making at 
the John A. Hartford Foundation.” Health Affairs 23, no. 2 (2004): 258–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.23.2.258. 
 
 193 
Rosenberg, Charles E. The Care of Strangers, The Rise of America’s Hospital System. 
New York: Basic Books, 1987. 
 
Russell, Mary Lou. For the Common Good: The Commonwealth Fund, 1918-1993. New 
York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1994. 
 
Salamon, Lester M., Alan J. Abramson and Nonprofit Sector Project, The Federal Budget 
and the Nonprofit Sector.  Washington D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1982.  
 
Schervish, Paul G. Charity and Strategy. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010. 
 
Schneider, William H. Rockefeller Philanthropy and Modern Biomedicine: International 
Initiatives from World War 1 to the Cold War. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2002. 
 
——— “The Difficult Art of Giving,” Nature, 497 no. 331 (May 2013): 311-312. 
 
 ——— “The Origin of the Medical Research Grant in the United States: The Rockefeller 
Foundation and the NIH Extramural Funding Program.” Journal of the History of 
Medicine and Allied Sciences, http://jhmas.orxfordjournals.org (2014): 297-311 
 
Schneider, William H. with Elizabeth van Allen, Angela Potter, and Kevin Grau. The 
Indiana University School of Medicine: A History. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, in press. 
 
Schneider, William H. and Suzann Weber Lupton, J.D., “To Benefit Mankind and 
Encourage Medical and Scientific Research.” The Ralph W. and Grace M. 
Showalter Research Trust, 1973-2007, July 2, 2009. 
 
Scott, W. Richard. Organizations and Organizing: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems. 
New York: Routledge, 2006. 
 
Shryock, Richard. National Tuberculosis Association, 1904-1954: A Study of the 
Voluntary Health Movement in the United States. New York: National 
Tuberculosis Association, 1957. 
 
Simon, Greg. “Entrepreneurial Philanthropy and Innovative Medical Research: The 
Arthur C. Frantzreb Lecture at Indiana University’s Center on Philanthropy 19th 
Annual Symposium: ‘Health and Philanthropy: Leveraging Change.’” Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 37, no. 1 suppl (March 1, 2008): 6S-16S. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764007310528. 
 
Smith, Robert. “Early History Space Astronomy: Issues of Patronage, Management and 
Control.” Experimental Astronomy, 26, No 1-3 (2009): 149-161. 
 
 194 
Spier, Ray. “The History of the Peer-Review Process.” Trends in Biotechnology. 20, no. 
8 (August 1, 2002): 357–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7799 (02)01985-6. 
 
Starr, Paul. The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York: Basic Books, 
1982. 
 
Stevens, Rosemary. In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth 
Century. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
Strickland, Stephen. The Story of the NIH Grants Programs. Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1989. 
 
Strobel, Gabrielle. Research Funding in Neuroscience: A Profile of the McKnight 
Endowment Fund. Boston: Elsevier Academic Press, 2007. 
 
Stewart, Rosalyn. “Success in Grateful Patient Philanthropy: Insights from Experienced 
Physicians.” The American Journal of Medicine, 124 no. 12 (2001): 1180-1185. 
 
Sung, Nancy S. “Central Challenges Facing National Clinical Research Enterprise,” 
Journal of the American Medical Association 289, no. 10 (March 12, 2003): 
1278-1287. doi:10.1001/jama.289.10.1278. 
 
Terrance, Keenan. “The Health Record of Private Foundations.” Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law 2, no. 1 (2004) 11-19 doi: 10.1215/036158782867869. 
 
Tilghman, Shirley, and National Research Council (U.S.). The Funding of Young 
Investigators in the Biological and Biomedical Sciences. Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press, 1994. 
 
Toon, Elizabeth. “Selling the Public on Public Health: The Commonwealth and Milbank 
Health Demonstrations and the Meaning of Community Health Education.” In 
Philanthropic Foundations: New Scholarships, New Possibilities, edited by Ellen 
Condliffe Lagemann, 119-130. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 
 
Travis, G. D. L., and H. M. Collins. “New Light on Old Boys: Cognitive and Institutional 
Particularism in the Peer Review System.” Science, Technology, & Human Values 
16, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 322–41. 
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.ulib.iupui.edu/stable/689918. 
 
U.S. Institute of Medicine Committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health, “A 
History of the Public Health System,” accessed January 13, 2019, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK218224/. 
 
U.S. National Institutes of Health. Windows into NIH History: A Centennial 
Retrospective. Bethesda. MD: National Institutes of Health, 1988. 
 
 195 
Van Til, Jon, ed. Critical Issues in American Philanthropy: Strengthening Theory and 
Practice. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990. 
 
Viegever, Roderick F. and Thom C.C. Hendriks. “The 10 Largest Public and 
Philanthropic Funders of Health Research in the World: What They Fund and 
how They Distribute Their Funds.” Health Research Policy and Systems 14, no. 
12 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1186/s12961-015-0074-z. 
 
Wailoo, K. “Sovereignty and Science: Revisiting the Role of Science in the Construction 
and Erosion of Medical Dominance.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 
29, no. 4–5 (2004): 643–60. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-29-4-5-643. 
 
Weaver, Warren. A Great Age for Science. New York: Sloan Foundation, 1960. 
 
Weaver, Warren, and George Wells Beadle. U.S. Philanthropic Foundations; Their 
History, Structure, Management, and Record. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. 
 
Weiner, Doris B. and Michael J. Sauterl “The City of Paris and the Rise of Clinical 
Medicine.” Osiris 18 (2003): 23-42. 
 
Wheatley, Steven C. The Politics of Philanthropy: Abraham Flexner and Medical 
Education. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. 
 
Wren, Daniel “American Business Philanthropy and Higher Education in the Nineteenth 
Century,” Business History Review 57 no.3 (1983): 321-46. 
 
Wright, Scott M., Leah Wolfe, Roslyn Stewart, et al. “Ethical Concerns Related to 
Grateful Patient Philanthropy,” Journal of General Internal Medicine. 28: no. 5 
(2013): 645 - 651. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11606-012-2246-7. 
 
Wynkoop. Mary Ann. Dissent in the Heartland: The Sixties and Indiana University. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. 
 
Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Los Angeles: Sage 
Publications, 2014. 
 
Zunz, Olivier. Philanthropy in America, A History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2012. 
 
 
 
  
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Suzann Weber Lupton 
Education 
Indiana University                          2019 
Lilly Family School of Philanthropy             
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis                              1991 
Juris Doctor 
 
DePauw University                        1988  
Bachelor of Arts 
 
Academic Appointments & Professional Experience 
 
Paul H. O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs,    2010 - 
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis     current                      
Clinical Assistant Professor, Law and Nonprofit Organizations            
     
Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, Indiana University                          2011- 
Associate Faculty         current 
     
 McKinney School of Law, Indiana University          2004-2006 
 Associate Faculty       
 
Professional Experience 
 
Baker & Daniels, Attorney at Law                       1997-2010 
    
Office of the Indiana Attorney General                      1992-1997 
 
Indiana Supreme Court, Judicial Clerk                                            1991-1992 
 
Publications 
 
“Nonprofits in Rule Based Agreements: Finding Meaning and Motivating Compliance.” 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, with Saba Saddiki, Ph.D.  (July 2016). 
 
Book Review: Almost Worthy: The Poor, Paupers, and the Science of Charity in 
America, 1887-1917, 110.  Magazine of Indiana History, 3, p. 281 (2014). 
 
Book Review: Understanding the Roots of Voluntary Action: Historical Prospective on  
Current Social Policy. 42 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 2, p. 411 (2013)  
